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Foreword 
The work described in this report is a “Review of environmental multi-hazards research and risk 
assessment approaches” for the Natural Environment Research Council (NERC) through a UKRI 
contract for services (CR18075) and was compiled and led by a BGS consortium, supported by 
Natural Hazard Partnership (NHP) partners (HSE, CEH, and Met Office). Multi-hazard research 
is in its infancy, despite the growing attention it has received in the last years. Climate change, 
natural and anthropogenic hazards result in multi-hazard environments characterized by complex, 
interacting processes that generate impacts on the built environment and people, which are 
different to those incurred from the individual hazards happening in isolation. The recently 
developed methodologies for multi-hazard risk assessment processes represent an advancement in 
our understanding of these complexities, but they also pose specific challenges to policy makers 
and practitioners due to the cross-disciplinary nature required to undertake these assessments. This 
review strives to present an impartial and well-evidenced report of current developments in 
research, policy and industry with respect to multi-hazard processes and risk assessments. The 
need for such studies is now more apparent than ever, given the expected effects of climate change 
on the frequency and magnitude of weather-related hazards. 
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Executive Summary 
This report is a scoping review of the existing environmental multi-hazard approaches, projects 
and associated literature that has been undertaken across academia and industry (policy and 
practice) mainly within the UK, but also highlighting where appropriate international practice. 
This report is aimed to identify what existing or new knowledge is required to advance our 
understanding of multi-hazard events, their impact, as well as the methods and approaches 
available to assess multi-hazard risks in policy/practice. The report was compiled and led by a 
British Geological Survey (BGS) consortium, supported by Natural Hazard Partnership (NHP) 
partners (HSE, CEH and Met Office) and was undertaken for the Natural Environment Research 
Council (NERC) through a UKRI contract for services (CR18075).  
Definition of multi-hazards 
A plethora of different definitions of multi-hazard events exist, however throughout this report, 
the definition of multi-hazard is assumed as meaning (1) the selection of multiple major hazards 
that a country faces, and (2) the specific context where hazardous events may occur 
simultaneously, cascadingly or cumulatively over time, and taking into account the potential 
interrelated effects (UNISDR, 2017). There are different types of ‘interrelated effects’ described 
by UNISDR (2017). For this report, these are summarized as: triggering relationships, 
amplification relationships and compound hazards. Multi-hazard assessment approaches are often 
more qualitative than quantitative and do not incorporate temporal changes in the vulnerability of 
assets over time, such as during successive hazards.  
Multi-hazard approaches in academia and practice 
From the academic review that was undertaken there were a limited number of papers identified 
that described approaches that fully understood multi-hazard interactions. The best examples were 
highlighted from the civil and structural engineering communities, and were applied to bridges 
and other critical infrastructure for the assessment of earthquake, wind and erosion hazards. Many 
of these examples were applied to simulated environments, rather than to actual geographical 
extents; potentially due to access challenges around the data needed for these multi-hazard 
assessments. There are a limited number of examples found in the review, which used real multi-
hazard situations, which often involve multiple natural hazard types, anthropogenic processes, and 
a range of interaction types. 
From the practice review there was again a very limited amount of literature with cases studies 
from industry and policy. The national and international policy literature strongly emphasize the 
need for development of multi-hazard approaches and risk assessment tools. Quantitative methods 
applied in industry were as complex and diverse as those described in the academic literature. The 
energy sector (e.g. nuclear, electricity, gas), in particular, demonstrated good examples of 
developing and applying a wide range of qualitative, semi-quantitative and quantitative multi-
hazard characterisation and risk assessment approaches. There were well-established practices 
identified that could be adopted in other business sectors. From the review it was highlighted that 
the UK government is making efforts to move from recognising to assessing interdependencies 
and interactions between hazards, which fits well with their holistic UK perspective on assessing 
hazards. 
What is needed to improve multi-hazard risk assessment in practice? 
As part of the review of practice, data-rich interviews were carried out on a number of key 
stakeholders (33 stakeholders, representing 25 stakeholder organisations). From these interviews 
it was concluded that stakeholders perceived the science of multi-hazard assessment as immature 
and poorly understood. They acknowledged that process understanding was the primary 
knowledge gap in implementing multi-hazards risk assessments in practice. Private-public 
partnerships were suggested as a good ground for transferring knowledge on multi-hazard models 
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and methods used across sectors. Stakeholders highlighted a reasonably good understanding of the 
range of scenarios that may be possible in their own sector, but the application of multi-hazard 
methodologies in real case study examples was limited. The stakeholders identified largely 
triggering multi-hazard relationships (47%), followed by amplification effects (36%) and 
compound types (17%) as the types of interrelated effects of multi-hazards. The weight of interest 
across sectors lies with four multi-hazard scenarios: storm surges and flooding (identified by 
21.2% of respondents), extreme rainfall triggering landslides (15.2%), river and coastal flooding 
(15.2%), and strong winds, snow, ice and extreme cold (12.1%). Stakeholders representing the 
transport, energy and geotechnical engineering services find most relevant combinations of 
geological (e.g., landslides, sinkholes, rockfalls), atmospheric (e.g., storms, rainfall) or/and 
hydrological hazards (e.g., river and groundwater flooding), while the policy sector is focused on 
a wider range of possible multi-hazards, both natural and anthropogenic. The existing knowledge 
about methodologies and approaches used to quantify economic costs of multi-hazards was 
highlighted as being very scarce. Systematic data collection about exposure, vulnerability, impact 
and dynamic modelling was highlighted by a number of stakeholders as a key barrier for advancing 
the state-of-the-art of multi-hazard approaches in both applied research and practice within 
industry. A lack of practical guidance on how/when to use existing methods for those without a 
technical background was indicated by stakeholders as a major knowledge gap. 
Evidence for socio-economic impacts of multi-hazards 
From the analysis of societal and economic consequences case studies, there was a lack of impacts 
identified, which enabled a fully considered and assessed cost model. Under-estimation of total 
economic costs was seen in all the case studies analysed due to a lack of data, an accumulation of 
damage in the case studies and single-hazard analysis methods used for multi-hazard events. 
Gaps & opportunities 
From the review of the existing environmental multi-hazard approaches, projects and associated 
literature, taken from across academia and practice (policy and industry), a number of potential 
gaps and opportunities have been concluded: 
• Gap: Understanding of multi-hazard processes. 
Opportunity: Research to understand physical processes behind multi-hazards. 
• Gap: Testing of multi-hazard assessment methodologies. 
Opportunity: Trial existing assessment methodologies to more complicated or alternative 
multi-hazard scenarios. 
• Gap: Understanding of multi-hazard concepts. 
Opportunity: Sharing of best practice for joined-up approaches. 
• Gap: Limited understanding of UK multi-hazards. 
Opportunity: Development and dissemination of guidance on UK multi-hazards. 
• Gap: Accounting for differences between single and multi-hazards. 
• Gap: Assessing creeping changes in vulnerability associated with multi-hazards. 
• Gap: Lack of data for understanding costs. 
• Gap: Lack of in-depth case studies. 
Opportunity: Develop more case studies accounting for interdependencies. 
• Gap: Assessment of cost differences. 
Opportunity: Simulations should be used to prove a way to look at multi-hazards as if they 
occurred independently of one another and compare the impacts and the associated full economic 
costs with a multi-hazards scenario. 
• Gap: Better links between science and industry/policy. 
Opportunity: Facilitate further collaboration between academia and industry/policy. 
• Gap: Baseline knowledge of multi-hazards. 
• Gap: Knowledge transfer and communication. 
• Gap: Lack of regulatory or legislative framework.
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1. Introduction 
Multi-hazard approaches to assessing hazard potential and risk are increasingly advocated as part 
of disaster risk reduction policies and practice (e.g. Government Office for Science, 2012; 
UNISDR, 2015) but have only recently been defined within the disaster risk community 
(UNISDR, 2016). The UNISDR definition of multi-hazard, which we adopt in this report, says:  
“Multi-hazard means (1) the selection of multiple major hazards that the country faces, and (2) 
the specific contexts where hazardous events may occur simultaneously, cascadingly or 
cumulatively over time, and taking into account the potential interrelated effects.” (UNISDR, 
2017) 
We discuss the definition of ‘multi-hazards’ in the published literature in Appendix 2, highlighting 
possible alternatives and the common characteristics within these definitions. We explicitly reject 
definitions of multi-hazard that treat hazards as being discrete or independent and do not consider 
or incorporate the potential impact of hazard relationships. In Appendix 2 we also summarise the 
different types of ‘interrelated effects’ described by UNISDR (2017). We summarise these below, 
and provide examples of these relationships.  
i. Triggering Relationships. One hazard triggering other hazards, or a series of triggering 
relationships forming a cascade or domino event. For example, a storm triggering 
landslides and floods.  
ii. Amplification Relationships. One hazard changing the landscape and thereby increasing 
the probability of other hazards occurring. For example, sustained heavy rain increasing 
the likelihood of flooding (by saturating the ground).  
iii. Compound Hazards. Hazards may coincide in space and/or time with impacts greater than 
the sum of the two. This could be due to a primary hazard triggering multiple secondary 
hazards within a given timeframe, or the coincidence of two independent hazards. For 
example, extreme temperatures and drought may both occur and result in greater strain on 
water resources. The latter includes situations where hazards occur consecutively, with one 
hazard changing the vulnerability so as to make exposed assets more susceptible to the 
impacts of a following hazard. For example, strong wind loading may weaken pylons and 
thereby increase the risk of subsequent hazards having a negative effect on exposed assets. 
National commitments to the UNISDR Sendai Framework for Disaster Risk Reduction (SFDRR - 
UNISDR, 2015), which advocates multi-hazard approaches, will likely result in a demand for new 
assessment frameworks and methodologies building on those developed by the academic 
community (e.g. Gill and Malamud (2014, 2016 and 2017); Liu et al., 2015; Liu et al., 2017; 
Pescaroli and Alexander, 2018). Often these assessments are more qualitative than quantitative 
and do not incorporate changes in the vulnerability of assets over time, such as during successive 
hazards. For example, an initial hazard (storm) may weaken an infrastructure, and make it more 
vulnerable to a subsequent storm or erosion. There are large knowledge gaps, including 
understanding the natural physical processes and their interaction with infrastructure, and little 
good practice documented in the UK and internationally. Research is generally fragmented, but 
there are some examples of good practice in industry within the UK (e.g. HSE ALARP, nuclear, 
electric and gas energy). 
Significant social and economic impacts following events like the 2007, 2013 – 2014 flood and 
storm events in the UK highlight the importance of a holistic approach on building resilience to 
disasters through integrated risk assessments. To this end, infrastructure experts from the NERC 
Environmental Risk to Infrastructure Programme (ERIIP) stakeholder panel have highlighted the 
need for an up-to-date mapping of current knowledge, capabilities and tools existing and available 
for use in practice for multi-hazard impact and risk assessment. The work described in this report 
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is a “Review of environmental multi-hazards research and risk assessment approaches” for the 
Natural Environment Research Council (NERC) through a UKRI contract for services (CR18075) 
and was compiled and led by a BGS consortium, supported by Natural Hazard Partnership (NHP) 
partners (HSE, CEH, PHE and Met Office).  
The scope of this work is to conduct a review of existing environmental multi-hazard literature, 
approaches and projects across academia and industry in the UK and internationally. In addition 
to these sectors, key risk assessment policy-makers in the UK are taken into account. The focus of 
the study is on combinations of natural hazards (e.g. floods, strong winds, extreme temperatures); 
however the concerns of the industry and policy-makers with respect to combination of natural 
with-/ or anthropogenic hazards are also partially considered. 
1.1 AIMS, OBJECTIVES AND METHODOLOGICAL APPROACH 
The study aimed to exploit the existing knowledge of a range of stakeholders in academia and 
practice (industry and policy) with respect to multi-hazard impacts and risk assessment in areas 
such as, but not exclusive to: scientific research results and literature; operational processes and 
methods; and policy guidelines and procedures. The objectives of the study are to: 
• Map the research activity and capability in the academic community (mainly focused on 
the UK, but using international examples where relevant) and practice (industry and policy) 
to understand the processes underlying multi-hazard events, their social-economic impacts 
and associated risks; 
• Understand how industry and policy-makers currently consider and approach multi-
hazard risk assessment; 
• Gather evidence and examples, from existing publications, of the key societal/economic 
consequences of multi-hazard events; 
• Identify what existing or new knowledge is required to advance our understanding of 
multi-hazard events, their impact, as well as the methods and approaches available to assess 
multi-hazard risks in policy/practice; 
• Consider the barriers and possible solutions to progress multi-hazard research in the UK 
and its use in risk assessments. 
To ensure efficient and complete delivery of these objectives, the project was managed through 
four related work packages (onwards called WP). Figure 1.1 illustrates the methodological 
workflow, work packages and the associated deliverable outputs undertaken as part of this project.  
1.2 WORK PACKAGE MANAGEMENT AND OUTPUTS 
A Technical Steering Panel acted as the internal technical project advisor, contributing to, and 
reviewing all output project materials, in order to ensure that a complete and effective evidence 
review and short analysis of the multi-hazard research, policy and practice was undertaken. This 
approach has enabled a multi-disciplinary project team and a flexible group of technical experts in 
the Steering Panel who have provided additional specialist support (Figure 1.2). 
The Project Manager successfully kept the project on program, coordinated the Technical Steering 
Panel, mapped and liaised with stakeholders, as well as maintained and communicated with the 
UKRI/NERC Innovation Manager (Ruth Hughes). A description of the research undertaken in the 
following sections of this study is given below and the associated WP outputs are listed in 
Appendix 1. 
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Figure 1-1 Project methodological workflow 
 
 
Figure 1-2 Project Organigram (Technical Working Team, in blue. Technical Steering 
Committee, in yellow) 
Following the Introduction, Section 2, associated with WP2, reviews and maps 
past/current/planned research in the academia and practice (industry and policy). The lack of a 
clear definition of ‘multi-hazards’, until recently, means that this term has been used in different 
ways in the published literature. Not everything that is labelled ‘multi-hazard’ fell within the scope 
of this review, and not everything within the scope of this review was labelled ‘multi-hazard’. 
Considering the complexity of the term multi-hazard and its several interpretations, we have 
reviewed and defined the common characteristics of the phenomena, using NERC’s definition as 
the starting point. The review of the terminology has ensured that the boundaries of the project are 
comprehensive, consistent, feasible and repeatable. This review has helped to define the 
appropriate keywords to be used in the preceding literature reviews.  
In the context of this review and WP2 (see Figure 1.1), and considering the experience and 
knowledge that the team and the Technical Steering Panel has from previous work/projects, we 
have examined literature that: 
1. Synthesises interaction and case study-specific publications. In recent work developed by 
Dr Gill , 200+ references were reviewed, to develop a comprehensive, systematic and 
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evidenced matrix of possible interactions between 21 diverse natural hazards [Gill and 
Malamud, 2014]. 
2. Synthesises existing research approaches to identify and characterise relevant multi-
hazard interactions, or present new approaches. 
3. Synthesises existing approaches used for operationalising multi-hazard research and 
incorporating it into a risk assessments, or presents a new approach. 
Where appropriate, we complemented peer-review literature with other forms of evidence, to 
enrich our understanding of current applications of multi-hazard approaches. The team, with 
multiple networks through the NHP, engaged with partners from industry, policy makers and 
professional organisations/NGOs. A summary of how the activities in WP2 (Section 2) have been 
carried out is presented below. 
For Academia, we have used knowledge, experience and literature reviews from the project team, 
in particular Dr Gill, to deliver a methodology that identifies, reviews, maps and summarises past 
& current academic research and innovation projects in multi-hazard processes, impacts and the 
assessment of risk. We have adapted and built on a review methodology used to characterise the 
potential interactions of natural hazards (Gill and Malamud, 2014), using a set of review criteria 
(Boaz et al., 2002) to assess the types of literature in a systematic manner for the project. The 
literature that has been reviewed includes peer-review journal articles and edited volumes, 
technical reports, workshop reports and Masters and PhD theses (i.e., both peer review and grey 
literature). Where appropriate we have also referred to textbooks, technical reports, databases, and 
NGO disaster situation reports. This approach to this review has enabled us to build on the work 
and literature that Dr Gill has collected in previous studies, such as Gill (2016, 2017), Gill and 
Malamud (2014, 2016 and 2017). This has ensured an effective use of time and resources. It has 
also ensured a thorough review has been undertaken using similar criteria so the work is 
comparable. 
For Practice (Industry & Policy), we have built on the stakeholder landscape mapping undertaken 
in WP1. We used the knowledge/experience and networks of the project team and Technical 
Steering Panel to conduct literature reviews and undertake discussions with key practicing 
stakeholders in industry (particularly in infrastructure, construction, agriculture, environmental 
management, and H&S). Policy strategists (particularly in central and devolved government in the 
UK) have also been contacted to help collate the information and knowledge that identifies, 
reviews, and maps past & current practices of research and innovation projects in multi-hazard 
process, impact and the risk assessment. 
To complement the information collected from the literature reviews, 3 case studies have been 
identified. The case studies have provided information detailing the societal and economic impacts 
of multi-hazard events, using existing evidence from the literature. The research has drawn on the 
knowledge and experience of economists at HSE’s Economic and Social Analysis Team, to 
identify, review and apply economic models for impact assessment. The outcomes of WP2 are 
listed in Appendix 1. 
 
Section 3, associated with WP 3, investigates the industry and policy practitioner’s view on multi-
hazards. This research builts on the stakeholder landscape mapping undertaken in WP1. The 
project team selected participants based on their experience and relevance to our questions 
(purposeful sampling), which has ensured data-rich interviews (MacDougall and Fudge, 2001; 
Longhurst, 2003; Suri, 2011; Palinkas et al., 2015). The questions were structured and formulated 
in consultation with the Technical Steering Panel and the NERC Project Manager, around the core 
areas of: 
• Knowledge of multi-hazard processes and risk assessment methodologies used in 
research and practice (both in industry and policy); 
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• The advantages and pitfalls of current methodologies and approaches used in practice to 
undertake multi-hazard risk assessments, including multi-hazard spatial representation; 
• Their concerns and experience in undertaking multi-hazard risk assessment; 
• The current gaps in knowledge/skills for undertaking multi-hazard risk assessments. 
Due to the time constrains of this this research, a standardized questionnaire (Appendix 8) and/or 
a ~ 40-45 minute open-ended telephone interview were carried out. This methodology enabled us 
to cover the factual episodes, using the elements of a semi-structure interview for all the 
interviewees. The open-ended questions ensured that greater knowledge of the interviewees 
understanding of multi-hazard processes and risk assessment methodologies is obtained. All 
interviewees were given an explanation of the project, and their consent obtained to use 
information from these interviews. Participants have been able to choose how they are identified: 
by name and organisation, by organisation only, or by a code that cannot be traced to an individual 
or organisation. An Ethics Policy has been developed for the project (Appendix 7). The interviews 
provided a means to ground-truth the uptake of current research on multi-hazards and evaluate the 
feasibility of methodologies and approaches in practice. The outcomes of WP3 are listed in 
Appendix 1. 
 
Section 4, associated with WP4, synthesized and analysed the knowledge gained in Section 2 
(WP2) and Section 3 (WP3) to identify gaps (in knowledge and skills) and potential future 
opportunities to progress multi-hazard events and risk assessment research. To help structure the 
synthesis, we have used the stakeholder mapping outputs to identify areas of common challenges 
that are shared by academia, industry and policy. In Appendix 9, we propose a number of 
disciplines that could inform multi-hazard research and risk assessment and in Appendix 10, 
relevant initiatives, forums and conferences. This work has drawn from the findings of a workshop 
undertaken in 2018 internally at BGS (Gill, 2018) as part of an assessment on “Multi-Hazard 
Interactions: Research & Innovation Opportunities”. The outcomes of WP4 are listed in Appendix 
1. 
 
As part of this review there are some limitations that have arisen due to the short timeframe of the 
study. This has caused some challenges around the consultation and capture of all the potential 
industry and policy representatives that work and practice within the environmental multi-hazard 
risk assessment area. For example, in the stakeholder survey, there are no representatives from the 
local government emergency resilience communities, emergency response, insurance and financial 
sectors. To minimize the impact of this limitation, the literature reviews have identified studies 
that use and/or discuss data/methods/tools from the insurance industry and from different levels of 
the UK government (national – regional – local). The results of this review are only designed as a 
quick overview of the historical and current multi-hazard research landscape in how policy-makers 
and industry consider and approach multi-hazard assessments; the scale of the problem caused by 
multi-hazard events and the barriers, research gaps and potential opportunities in multi-hazard 
research and practice. This study should therefore, be used only as a high-level overview document 
and not as a complete and comprehensive study of all known activity that has taken place in 
environmental multi-hazard risk assessment research.  
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2. State-of-the-art multi-hazard review and mapping of the 
past/current/planned research (Academia, Industry & 
Policy) 
2.1 SUMMARY OF PAST AND CURRENT PROJECTS, RESEARCH AND 
APPROACHES IN MULTI-HAZARD PROCESSES, IMPACT AND RISK 
ASSESSMENT 
Almost 50 years ago, Hewitt and Burton (1971) noted that most research on natural hazards takes 
a single hazard approach, but that a greater emphasis on systematic cross-hazard approaches is 
required. Single hazard approaches treat natural hazards as independent phenomena, not 
recognising a range of potential relationships between hazards (Kappes et al., 2012). This approach 
can lead to a distortion of management priorities, an increased vulnerability to other spatially 
relevant hazards, or an underestimation of risk (Tobin and Montz, 1997; ARMONIA, 2007; 
Kappes et al., 2010; Gill and Malamud, 2014; Duncan et al., 2016).  
While some progress towards systematic cross (or multi-) hazard approaches has been made, there 
is a continued focus by the natural hazard and disaster risk communities on single hazard 
approaches to assess hazard potential. Nevertheless, academic and practitioners (industry and 
policy) have developed some approaches to consider multi-hazard scenarios. The outcome of a 
short review on academic and practitioner methods are outlined below. 
2.1.1 Academia 
Here we focus on general multi-hazard tools and techniques described in the academic literature 
that are applicable to multiple hazards and interaction types. As outlined in Appendix 2, the term 
‘multi-hazard’ is widely used, but rarely defined. This means that not all of the academic literature 
labelled as ‘multi-hazard’ is relevant to the scope of this review, and some review boundaries are 
needed, as set out in later sections. 
2.1.1.1 METHODOLOGY FOR IDENTIFYING ACADEMIC LITERATURE ON MULTI-HAZARD 
APPROACHES 
Search Procedure 
Our review process was based on Collins et al. (2015), and used to determine current academic 
approaches to understanding multi-hazards, as presented in both peer-review and grey published 
literature. We selected Google Scholar as our primary database, ensuring both relevant peer-review 
and grey literature (e.g. masters and PhD theses) was returned. In order to complete a Boolean 
search using this database, we first selected keyword phrases relating to multi-hazard. These 
included both multi-hazard (Anglicised spelling) and multihazard (Americanised spelling), and 
multi-risk. We paired each of these terms with a set of descriptors that would likely identify 
approaches used to characterise multi-hazards. These keywords were methodology, approach, tool, 
method, review, assess, assessment, analysis, modelling, modeling, and model. 
We searched for these keyword pairs in article titles to ensure that the most relevant results, likely 
to support the review, were returned. Results were then input into an excel spreadsheet, and the 
abstracts reviewed to ensure only relevant and complete results (i.e., not conference abstracts) 
were included in the analysis. Where we could determine relevance solely on the abstract, we 
subsequently reviewed the full paper. 
In addition to the results of this search procedure, we also incorporate perspectives from some 
other general multi-hazard review papers that integrate many references and characterise multiple 
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approaches. As the focus of these papers was not describing a single tool or methodology, these 
were not likely to be returned in the search procedure.  
Search Results and Processing 
Table 2.1 characterises nine searches completed on 14 August 2018, and the number of returned 
results for each search. The searches returned a total of 476 results. After the removal of duplicate 
results, incomplete results and irrelevant results, 84 unique articles were available for further 
analysis. Incomplete results included conference abstracts where a full paper was not available, 
and inaccessible results (e.g. due to language, paywall, or embargo restrictions). Irrelevant (and 
therefore excluded) results could generally be grouped into four categories:  
i. Limited in Scope. Focusing on tools that are specific to one hazard pairing, rather than 
looking at the range of relevant hazards and their interactions.  
ii. Multi-Layer Single Hazard. Completed an independent assessment of multiple single 
hazards, without considering the impact of hazards occurring simultaneously or successively 
on assets. 
iii. Other Domains. Explored multi-hazards, but not in the context of natural hazards (e.g. 
finance). 
iv. Case Study Descriptions. Described a specific multi-hazard event, without presenting an 
approach or method to understand or manage multi-hazards.  
The database of results used in the analysis, with web links and abstracts, is given in Appendix 3. 
Table 2-1 Search terms used to identify academic literature that presents methods relating 
to multi-hazards. Search excludes patents and citations, with results in English only. 
Search Term Returned Results 
Search Engine/ 
Database Search Date 
allintitle: methodology (multi-hazard OR multihazard OR 
multi-risk) 
13 Google Scholar 14 August 2018 
allintitle: approach (multi-hazard OR multihazard OR multi-
risk) 
52 Google Scholar 14 August 2018 
allintitle: tool (multi-hazard OR multihazard OR multi-risk) 17 Google Scholar 14 August 2018 
allintitle: method (multi-hazard OR multihazard OR multi-
risk) 
10 Google Scholar 14 August 2018 
allintitle: review (multi-hazard OR multihazard OR multi-
risk) 
9 Google Scholar 14 August 2018 
allintitle: assess (multi-hazard OR multihazard OR multi-
risk) 
4 Google Scholar 14 August 2018 
allintitle: assessment (multi-hazard OR multihazard OR 
multi-risk) 
203 Google Scholar 14 August 2018 
allintitle: analysis (multi-hazard OR multihazard OR multi-
risk) 
94 Google Scholar 14 August 2018 
allintitle: (modelling OR modeling OR model) (multi-hazard 
OR multihazard OR multi-risk) 
74 Google Scholar 14 August 2018 
Total Results 476   
Total Unique Results 380   
Total Unique Results After Removal of Conference 
Abstracts and Irrelevant Results 
84   
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2.1.1.2 CONCLUSIONS FROM THE CLASSIFICATION AND CHARACTERISATIONS OF ACADEMIC 
APPROACHES ON MULTI-HAZARD APPROACHES 
The academic literature on multi-hazards presents a range of approaches to either understand a 
hazard landscape (i.e., assessing hazard or components of hazard) or potential damage to assets 
(i.e., assessing risk). Both sets of literature include qualitative and quantitative approaches. Some 
approaches may focus on a particular factor that is required to support a full multi-hazard approach, 
while others collate multiple tools to present a more complete multi-hazard approach. In this 
section, we summarise the main techniques profiled in the academic literature, with relevant 
examples from the review results. Methodology types range from those that are fully qualitative 
to those that are fully quantitative, shaped by a range of factors (e.g. purpose of the study, intended 
audience, data availability).  
(a) Narrative Descriptions (Qualitative) 
Individual case studies (i.e., an event report) characterise actual or potential multi-hazards in a 
given region. For example, Collins and Jibson (2015) is an event report of the 2015 Nepal 
earthquake, characterising the earthquake, landslides, and associated flooding. These examples are 
prominent in the literature, and provide a valuable source of evidence regarding what has 
previously occurred, informing scenario planning. Some narrative descriptions extend towards this 
forward-looking approach, with qualitative discussion of what could occur given a particular 
natural hazard occurrence. For example, Han et al. (2007) discussed examples of hazard chains in 
China, and used this to develop a taxonomy of potential types of hazard chain.  
(b) Hazard Wheels (Qualitative) 
Particularly used in the context of coastal hazard management, coastal hazard wheels are used to 
characterise coastlines, their hazard profile, and possible management options (Appelquist and 
Halsnæs, 2015). Coastal hazard wheels include a classification system that incorporates the 
primary static and dynamic parameters that determine the characteristics of a coastal environment. 
This include hazards such as ecosystem disruption, gradual inundation, salt-water intrusion, 
erosion and flooding. The coastal hazard wheel is designed to facilitate decision making at diverse 
scales (local, regional and national) in areas with limited access to geological data. For example, 
the tool can be used to facilitate hazard screening or the identification of hazard hotspots. This 
approach allows the identification of appropriate management options, and visualises whether 
these mitigate one or more hazard types that may occur simultaneously or successively.  
Such approaches are well suited to hazard management in the Global South if there are restrictions 
on data availability and institutional capacity. The methodology is flexible, with additional steps 
improving accuracy if systematic and detailed field assessments are possible. The approach has 
been developed for coastal management, and therefore could be used to assess hazard potential at 
existing and potential future sites for coastal infrastructure.  
(c) Hazard Matrices (Qualitative/Semi-Quantitative) 
Hazard matrices are a qualitative or semi-quantitative way to examine relationships between 
hazards. Spatially relevant hazards are first identified, before determining how each hazard relates 
to other hazards (Gill and Malamud, 2014). These have been produced for both natural hazards 
and triggering natural hazards (Gill and Malamud, 2014) and anthropogenic processes 
(e.g., groundwater abstraction) triggering natural hazards (Gill and Malamud, 2017). Matrices can 
use binary symbols (Tarvainen et al., 2006; Kappes et al., 2010) or descriptions (De Pippo et al., 
2008; Kappes et al., 2010) to outline the influence of one hazard on another. Gill (2016) used this 
approach to characterise potential hazard relationships at national and sub-national scales in 
Guatemala and Barrantes (2018) used a matrix to characterise potential hazard relationships at a 
sub-national scale in Costa Rica.  
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Figure 2-1 Coastal Hazard Wheel (from Appelquist and Balstrøm, 2014). The Coastal 
Hazard Wheel consisting of six geo-biophysical classification circles, five hazard circles and 
the coastal classification codes (CP stands for coastal plain, BA for barrier, DE for delta, 
SR for sloping soft rock, HR for sloping hard rock, CI for coral island and TSR for tidal 
inlet/sand spit/river mouth). 
 
Hazard matrices may form one component of a more comprehensive approach. For example, 
Gallina (2015) uses an influence matrix to inform her multi-risk methodology applied in Italy. 
This semi-quantitative approach characterises the extent to which hazards influence each other, 
with weightings derived from expert consultation. The quality of hazard matrices differs 
considerably, with varying evidence to support the inclusion/exclusion of particular hazards and 
hazard relationships (Gill, 2016). Hazard matrices are scalable, can be used with diverse amounts 
of information depending on the specific context, and can represent large amounts of 
multidisciplinary information extracted from multiple evidence sources. For this reason, they can 
be an effective tool for rapid identification of secondary hazards and a popular tool in many multi-
hazard approaches. 
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Figure 2-2 Global Hazard Interaction Framework (from Gill and Malamud, 2014). A 21 × 21 
matrix with primary hazards on the vertical axis and secondary hazards on the horizontal 
axis. 
 
(d) Network Diagrams (Qualitative/Semi-Quantitative) 
Another tool used to inform multi-hazard assessments are qualitative network diagrams, with 
nodes (e.g. hazards/processes) and connectors (e.g. triggering or catalysing relationships types) to 
generate a diagram of possible multi-hazard relationships.  
Van Westen et al. (2014) used this approach to visualise the hazards and hazard relationships in 
an alpine mountainous environment. Such approaches are visually appealing, and can help to 
document the potential relationships between hazards and therefore identify possible scenarios. 
This approach is also scalable, with potential to be used in local, regional or national scales. While 
generally qualitative, additional information could be added to characterise quantitatively each 
hazard, or the interaction between two hazards (see (i) probabilistic and statistical assessments, 
below). 
(e) Hazard Maps (Qualitative/Semi-Quantitative) 
Cartographic approaches are widely used to represent the spatial overlap of multiple hazard or risk 
maps (e.g. Bell and Glade, 2012; Eshrati et al., 2015; Johnson et al., 2016). Such approaches can 
be used to assess spatial regions susceptible to multiple independent or dependent hazards. If 
exposure and/or vulnerability maps are also included, the overlay of hazard maps can be used to 
inform management strategies. For example, Johnson et al. (2016) mapped multiple hazards in 
Hong Kong, and used this approach with vulnerability maps to visualise concentrations of risk. 
They note the potential of this approach to guide prioritisation of risk management and adaptation 
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actions for regions exposed to multiple hazards. This can ensure that actions are taken that do not 
increase vulnerability to other spatially relevant hazards. A key challenge with prioritisation 
decisions when overlaying hazard maps is ensuring comparability of hazards (Kappes et al., 2012). 
Potential losses may be greater in a region susceptible to one high impact or high frequency hazard, 
than a region with multiple low impact or low frequency hazards. One possible solution is to apply 
some form of weighting relating to the impact of different hazards (Mukhopadhyay et al., 2016). 
(f) Development of Hazard/Risk Indices (Semi-Quantitative) 
The calculation of hazard and risk indices can be used to characterise multi-hazard environments 
and inform decision-making. The simple aggregation of multiple single hazard indices, however, 
may not be sufficient to determine a multi-hazard index (Marzocchi et al., 2012). Araya-Muñoz et 
al. (2017) developed a semi-quantitative approach, based on fuzzy logic modelling, to identify 
hazard combinations that have the greatest influence on hazard impacts. Indicators relating to 
multiple weather-related hazards (coastal flooding, fluvial flooding, water scarcity, heat stress, and 
wildfire) were determined, standardised and aggregated into a multi-hazard impact index, with the 
ability to explore how interactions between indicators influences this index. 
(g) Systems Based or Physical Modelling (Quantitative) 
There is a growing ability to develop sophisticated process-based models that can be used to 
explore multiple hazards and relationships between these. For example, Chen et al. (2016) present 
a physically based model to look at interactions between rainfall, slope failures and debris flows, 
in a seismically active region. Machine learning, or artificial neural networks, are another 
modelling approach, used to understand complex connections between a range of meteorological 
factors (wind, pressure, storm surge, and precipitation resulting in inland flooding) generating 
damage during a tropical cyclone (Pilkington and Mahmoud, 2017a). These can help to predict the 
impacts of such multi-hazard events, where impacts vary significantly depending on landfall 
location, wind speed, storm surge, and inland flooding from precipitation (Pilkington and 
Mahmoud, 2017b). Developing new, location specific, multi-hazard models that incorporate the 
environmental heterogeneity of that location would require significant investment and research. 
There may be scope to combine existing models relating to single hazards to develop something 
that provides useful information that is more than the sum of its parts. 
(h) Probabilistic and Statistical Approaches (Quantitative) 
Another quantitative approach used to characterise multi-hazards is through probabilistic and 
statistical assessments. For example, Mignan et al., (2014) present a probabilistic framework using 
a Monte Carlo Method, a variant of a Markov chain, and time-variant vulnerability and exposure 
to generate multiple time-series of risk scenarios. Analysis of these time series helps to develop a 
probabilistic assessment of potential losses and identifies which risk paths (i.e., scenarios) are more 
likely to occur. This approach can be used with differing levels of information regarding 
interactions, as it becomes available. Probabilistic and statistical approaches include a range of 
possible techniques (e.g. fragility functions, scenario trees, expert elicitation, fault tree analysis, 
life cycle cost assessments, Bayesian networks, copula for joint probabilities) to better understand 
the likelihood of a particular hazard sequence. 
One method is to harmonise losses from different hazard types to understand the impact of 
different multi-hazard scenarios on infrastructure. For example, recognising that bridges are made 
of different components that respond in different ways to diverse hazard types, Gehl et al. (2016) 
derived hazard-specific component fragility curves (i.e., showing the probability of exceeding a 
stated level of damage or performance, as a function of an engineering demand) to quantify the 
occurrence of multiple failure modes for combinations of hazard and component. They proceeded 
to estimate functionality losses for each component failure mode as a metric to characterise the 
performance of infrastructure systems. Finally, system failure modes can be considered by 
combining component damage states, with the calculation of system fragility functions to 
characterise different multi-hazard configurations. This approach can be used on different types of 
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infrastructure, including bridges and road networks (Gehl and D’Ayala, 2015; Gehl et al., 2016; 
Gehl and D’Ayala, 2016, Gehl, 2017). 
Probability or scenario trees set out a range of potential scenarios, and associate numerical 
information (e.g. probability, frequencies, impacts) with each step of these scenarios. For example, 
Neri et al. (2013) used an interaction scenario tree for the Kanlaon volcano (Philippines), showing 
the types of hazardous events in this location and estimates of their frequencies. Neri et al. (2008) 
compiled a probability tree for possible future scenarios at the volcano Vesuvius. This probability 
tree included possible eruption styles and the secondary hazards associated with them. The authors 
used both quantitative processes and expert elicitation (a structured approach to gain scientific 
consensus) to calculate a range of conditional probabilities (the probability of an event, given that 
another event has already occurred). Marzocchi et al. (2009) also describe the identification of 
different scenarios and the quantification of these scenarios using probability trees, but did this for 
a simulated environment rather than a real case study.  
 
Figure 2-3 Type of hazardous events and their possible frequencies at Kanlaon volcano. 
(from Neri et al, 2013). In grey are rare events at Kanlaon, where reliable statistical 
calculations are not permitted. 
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A related approach is the use of fault tree analysis, aimed at analysing the effects of faults or 
weaknesses on a complex system. These approaches are a component of multi-hazard assessment 
done in the context of infrastructure engineering. For example, Unobe and Sorenson (2015) used 
a fault tree analysis to estimate numerically the possible effect of a seismic load (earthquake) on a 
wind turbine foundation that has undergone fatigue over time from constant exposure to wind 
forces. Another example is given in Gehl and D’Ayala (2015) in the context of analysing the 
multiple hazards that affect bridges. The use of a fault tree analysis is sometimes complemented 
with the use of a Bayesian network approach to represent causation or conditional relationships 
(e.g. Gehl and D’Ayala, 2015).  
Some studies integrate probabilistic assessments of multiple hazards affecting infrastructure either 
simultaneously or successively to calculate a Life Cycle Cost assessment, a method for evaluating 
all relevant costs over the lifespan of the infrastructure (e.g. bridge). For example, Fereshtehnejad 
and Shafieezadeh (2017) examine the likelihood of infrastructure being impacted by a hazard 
before it has recovered from another hazard. This is then used within a life cycle cost assessment 
framework to determine the potential cost of hazard induced consequences compared to retrofit 
options. 
2.1.1.3 SUMMARY OBSERVATIONS FROM REVIEW 
From the results of Section 2.1.1.2, we make a number of observations. 
• Limited papers. The literature describing approaches to understand multi-hazard interactions 
is limited, with clear scope for further research and innovation. We acknowledge that further 
papers may exist that were not returned in our search, but anticipate these including additional 
examples of the approaches described in Section 2.1.1.2.  
• Infrastructure (e.g. bridges). Some of the most developed methods can be found within the 
civil and structural engineering communities, applied to bridges and other critical infrastructure. 
These methods currently focus on earthquake, wind and erosion hazards. Greater dialogue between 
natural hazard scientists and civil/structural engineers could enable the translation of methods for 
point source infrastructure (e.g. bridges) to other assets of interest, as well as the inclusion of other 
hazards of interest.  
• Simulations vs. actual events. Many of the methods described are applied to simulated 
environments, rather than to actual geographical extents. This could be due to a lack of access to 
the data needed to test methods in a real world context. It is feasible that unpublished data, held 
by the private sector, exists that could help academia to develop more real-world (vs. simulated) 
applications of methods.  
• Multi-Method. A comprehensive understanding of multi-hazard risk involves many stages, 
and therefore is a multidisciplinary and multi-method activity. Many of the studies characterised 
in this review integrated multiple methods to build understanding of multi-hazard relationships 
(e.g. Thierry et al., 2008; Lari, 2009; Nadim et al., 2014; Ming et al., 2015; Chen et al., 2016). The 
approaches outlined in Section 2.1.1.2 can be used in combination or succession to understand 
multi-hazard risk. 
• Desired application guiding appropriate methods. Liu et al. (2015) present a three level 
framework to understand multi-hazards, noting that the most appropriate level of information to 
generate will depend both on data availability and the end purpose. While a quantitative assessment 
of risk may be preferable in some contexts, other groups will prefer the development of maps or 
scenarios. Organisational discussion around these can help to guide institutional understanding of 
multi-hazard relationships, and build capacity to respond appropriately.  
• Two hazards vs many hazards. Many of the quantitative methods articulated in Section 
2.1.1.2 are developed and applied to a specific combination of two natural hazards. Real multi-
hazard situations often involve multiple natural hazard types, anthropogenic processes, and a range 
of interaction types. More work is needed to test these methods with more complex multi-hazard 
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scenarios. Selva (2013) noted that extending methods to more than two hazards could lead to much 
more complicated analyses and many scenarios in long-term risk assessments. While these are 
valid comments, the development of multi-hazard approaches that can explore more than two 
hazards is clearly important in many contexts. 
2.1.2 Practice (Industry & Policy) 
The review of academic literature outlined in Section 2.1.1 identifies a range of current projects, 
methods and approaches for multi-hazard processes, impact and risk assessment potentially 
applicable into practice. Building on this review and additional grey literature, the current section 
focuses on the tools and techniques for multi-hazard risk assessment adapted or developed by the 
industry and policy sectors. The key questions that this section addresses are: 
• What frameworks/approaches are being used in industry & policy to understand multi-
hazards events, their impacts and risk assessment methodologies? 
• What similarities and differences exist between the methods and approaches available in 
academia and those used or recommended by the industry and policy? 
2.1.2.1 METHODOLOGY FOR IDENTIFYING INDUSTRY AND POLICY LITERATURE ON MULTI-HAZARD 
APPROACHES 
This review is based on the identification of relevant industry sectors and policy levels (Figure 
2.4) and the selection of primary and secondary search databases. Google Scholar and Web of 
Science were used as primary search databases. A separate search was performed on individual 
web-sites of relevant industry and policy stakeholders (e.g. Cabinet Office, https://www.gov.uk/).  
 
Figure 2-4 Identified policy levels and industry sectors 
 
In addition to the results of this procedure, other documents indicated by the project stakeholders 
were incorporated into the analysis. The keywords or phrases used to search were a combination 
of two or three terms denoting the term multi-hazard (e.g. “multihazard”, “multi-risk”, “multi-
hazard”), the industry/policy sector (“infrastructure”, “railways”) and/or a specific stakeholder 
(e.g. “Network Rail”, “Transport Scotland”). The literature search returned predominantly grey 
literature (reports, guidance notes, project deliverables, working papers, etc.), the majority of 
which were filtered in a subsequent phase of processing in accordance with their relevance. It 
should be noted that the selection is based on a non-exhaustive review limited by time and direct 
access to relevant documentation. 
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2.1.2.2  SEARCH RESULTS AND ANALYSIS OF FINDINGS 
Twenty-one documents were identified from UK and international policy and industry sources as 
being potentially relevant for the review analysis. These were assessed in terms of differences or 
similarities with the academic approaches classified in section 2.1.1.2 and are summarized in Table 
2.2. A detailed description of findings is provided in Appendix 3. 
 
Table 2-2 Summary of findings from the industry & policy literature 
Sector (no. of 
documents) 
Source Multi-hazard frameworks/approaches 
Policy UK (10) DfID, Cabinet Office, 
Committee on Climate 
Change, Environment Agency, 
HSE (2018) 
Narrative descriptions (a), scenario analysis (h), 
physical modelling (g)  
Industry UK (3) Office for Nuclear Regulation 
(ONR), Espinoza et al. (2016), 
ETI (2018) 
Fragility curves (h), tabulates (a) showing potential 
secondary/associated hazards with primary hazard; 
hazard curves (h); empirically-based, Markov 
chains, multi-variate Bayesian, joint tail models, 
kernel density, copulas (h) 
Policy International 
(1) 
European Commission (EC) No methods are actually presented (it rather suggest 
the need for multi-hazard approaches) 
Industry International 
(7) 
Swedish Nuclear Inspectorate 
(SKI), Derek et al. (2016), 
Cazzoli et al. (2016) 
Hazard matrices (c), probabilistic methods (c), 
event trees (h), expert judgement (h) 
 
Characterisation of multi-hazards frameworks and approaches in policy 
As demonstrated in a recent analysis (Chutmina et al., 2016), the UK policy framework focuses 
on a multiple hazard perspective, taking into account both natural as well as man-made threats (see 
The National Risk Assessment). National policies serve as a background and guidance for 
implementation at local level, while recognising the interdependencies between services/systems 
that may be disrupted on one hand and multiple, interacting threats on the other hand. It is apparent 
that government departments such as the Department for International Development (DfiD) and 
the Cabinet Office use both qualitative and quantitative methods. The Department for International 
Development (DfID, 2016) focused on narrative descriptions (type (a) in section 2.1.1.2) that bring 
together diverse sources of qualitative information to inform decision making in financing. The 
same department endorses the development of a risk matrix (similar to hazard matrix, type (c) in 
section 2.1.1.2) to compare different hazards in the Multi-Hazard Disaster Risk Assessment v2 
Guidance Note (DfID, 2012). No explicit methodology is presented or requested as a minimum 
standard before embedding disaster resilience in DfID country offices (DfID, 2013). 
Following the UK 2007 flooding events, the Cabinet Office produced a report on the lessons 
learned and future recommendations (Cabinet Office, 2008). Both physical modelling (type (g) in 
section 2.1.1.2) and scenario analysis (type (h) in section 2.1.1.2) are suggested in order to ensure 
that the possibility of multiple floods events occurring both simultaneously and within different 
overlapping time periods are taken into account. Nevertheless, no description of specific 
methodologies or tools are provided.  
Consideration of multi-hazards is a key component of HSE's approach to land use planning and 
risk assessment for sites with hazardous substance consent (HSE, 2018). Sites are considered 
individually, with the risk assessment incorporating a wide range of factors including (but not 
exclusively): substance type, storage methods, quantities, and storage locations on site (see Box 1, 
page 42). Multiple hazards are identified based on these factors and then the hazards, or risk 
presented by those hazards, are summed to provide the overall individual risk (i.e. the risk of harm 
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to an individual person at different locations around the site). The results are translated into zones 
used for land use planning purposes. HSE’s approach also considers consequential hazards (for 
example where a fire may lead to an explosion), and the domino effects of sites in close proximity 
(scenario analysis, type (h) in section 2.1.1.2). 
The NHP have developed a Hazard Impacts Framework (HIF; Gunawan et. al., 2017) that outlines 
concepts for hazard impact modelling, including consideration of multi-hazard assessment. They 
put an emphasis on using standards to ease the compatibility of modelling approaches (multi-
hazard or otherwise) including common inputs and outputs, shared terminology and standardised 
impact categories.   
At European level, the paper on Risk Assessment and Mapping Guidelines for Disaster 
Management (European Commission, 2010) does not present a standard way of developing multi-
hazard risk assessments, it rather advises that both multi-hazard and multi-vulnerability 
perspectives are needed. 
 
Characterisation of multi-hazards frameworks and approaches in industry 
The international literature on multi-hazard risk assessment approaches that are used in industry is 
represented by a limited number of sectors. Among them, nuclear safety is one of the most 
advanced. For example, Knochenhauer & Louko (2003) present a method for identifying 
combined hazards using matrices (type (c) in section 2.1.1.2), network diagrams (type (d) in 
section 2.1.1.2) and engineering judgment (or expert elicitation, type (h) in section 2.1.1.2). 
Cazzolli et al. (2016) discuss the development and quantification of events trees (type (h) in section 
2.1.1.2) in addition to fragility analyses (type (h) in section 2.1.1.2) to describe the interaction 
between internal and external events leading to failure in a nuclear plant. As part of the same 
international effort (Advanced Safety Methodologies: Extended PSA, FP7 Project), Decker & 
Brinkman (2016) present a 101 x 101 natural and external man-made hazard matrix (type (c) in 
section 2.1.1.2), with expert opinion identifying 579 event combinations and correlations. 
Correlations discriminate between: (1) causally connected hazards (cause-effect relation) where 
one hazard may cause another hazard, or where one hazard is a prerequisite for a correlated hazard, 
and (2) associated hazards which are probable to occur at the same time due to a common root 
cause.  
Several international guidance documents point towards the importance of combined hazard 
analysis but do not provide any explicit guidance on how it should be performed. The Electric 
Power Research Institute (EPRI, 2015) focuses on hazard matrices (type (c) in section 2.1.1.2), 
and the use of engineering judgement (type (h) in section 2.1.1.2), together with an overview of 
some probabilistic and statistical approaches to assess correlated, consequential, and coincidental 
hazards. The document makes reference to EDF's methodology, which determines the frequency 
of combined hazards (either dependent or independent), based on their seasonality. 
The UK Office for Nuclear Regulation (ONR) produces similar guidelines (ONR, 2018) . When 
considering external hazards, ONR focuses mainly on methods that evaluate single hazards. 
Nevertheless, to analyse the relationship between primary and potential secondary or associated 
hazards, narrative descriptions (type (a) in section 2.1.1.2) are used. Also, the ONR Annual Report 
illustrate the use of hazard curves for storms. 
The UK Energy Technologies Institute (ETI) recently finalized the Natural Hazards Project 
delivered by EDF Energy, Met Office and Mott Macdonald1. The aim of the project was to develop 
a consistent methodology for the characterisation of natural hazards, and to produce a high-quality 
peer-reviewed set of documents suitable for use across the energy industry to better understand the 
impacts of natural hazards on new and existing infrastructure (ETI, 2018). Technical Report 
Volume 12 (ETI, 2018) illustrates the use of copulas for calculating joint probabilities (type (h) in 
                                                 
1 http://www.imeche.org/policy-and-press/energy-theme/enabling-resilient-uk-energy-infrastructure 
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section 2.1.1.2) of meteorological hazards, in addition to other quantitative methods listed from 
the literature (empirical, Markov chains, multivariate Bayesian, joint tail models and kernel 
density, type (h) in section 2.1.1.2). 
2.1.2.3  SUMMARY OF OBSERVATIONS FROM REVIEW: 
The literature describing practical approaches to understanding multi-hazard interactions and 
associated risks in industry and policy is very limited. We acknowledge the existence of further 
relevant documents that were not returned by the search, but assume the overall result is still valid. 
From the results of Section 2.1.2.2, we make a number of observations. 
• Limited literature. Both national and international policy literature strongly emphasize the 
need for multi-hazard approaches and risk assessment tools. However, the number of cases 
where these are not only recommended but also developed and implemented in practice is 
limited. 
• The range of qualitative and semi-quantitative methods identified in the academic literature 
is greater than those identified in the industry literature. The energy sector favours the 
application of narrative descriptions, hazard matrices and network diagrams and does not 
consider hazard wheels, hazard maps and hazards/risk indices. This may be due to the scale 
of analysis, in that there is a need to identify and characterise all actual or potential multi-
hazards linked with a given point-receptor (e.g. nuclear plant). Visualisation tools, such as 
network diagrams, are used to better understand linkages and relationships between 
hazards rather than their spatial overlap over extended regions. Nuclear plants may be 
connected with other receptors within a spatially distributed electrical grid network (e.g. 
nuclear power reaches the distribution networks through AC/DC overhead lines and 
underground AC/DC cables and transformers). Thus, there is an opportunity to explore the 
application of cartographic approaches (hazards maps), when the risk to multi-hazards is 
assessed spatially for the entire electrical system structure. Likewise, the infrastructure 
sector could benefit from the transfer of both spatially and non-spatially explicit 
approaches for transport infrastructure networks. 
• Quantitative methods applied in industry are as complex and diverse as those described in 
academia. In the energy sector, probabilistic and statistical approaches (e.g., scenario 
analysis, fault trees, expert judgement, copulas, Markov chains, multi-variate Bayesian, 
kernel density, joint-tail models, etc.) have the widest use, while systems based or physical 
modelling approaches are not as common. Well-established practices in the energy sector 
can be adopted as new instruments for other business sectors, such as the utilities, 
telecommunications and agriculture, while the application of process-based models 
developed by the academia to case studies in the energy or infrastructure sectors could be 
explored in order to test their applicability. 
• Multiple-hazard vs multi-hazard policy focus. Whilst the UK government’s perspective on 
hazards is holistic, when scrutinised, in practice, it currently focuses on the assessment of 
multiple single hazards. However, efforts are being undertaken to move from recognising 
to assessing interdependencies and interactions between hazards. In this sense, the 
development of hazards and risk indicators can be used as a first step to characterise multi-
hazard environments and inform decision-making. In addition, hazard matrices and maps 
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can aid the identification of hazard relationships and guide prioritisation of risk 
management and adaptation strategies. 
Energy sector. The energy sector represents a good example of an industry developing and 
applying a wide range of qualitative, semi-quantitative and quantitative multi-hazard 
characterisation and risk assessment approaches. Existing guidance documents could 
potentially be used to support the transfer of methods from one industry to another. 
2.2 SUMMARY OF CASE STUDY EVIDENCE OF THE SOCIETAL AND ECONOMIC 
CONSEQUENCES OF MULTI-HAZARD EVENTS 
 
To identify relevant case studies, this analysis uses the two literature searches (academic and 
practice/grey literatures – section 2.1) undertaken as part of this report as they covered much of 
the multi-hazard literature and have also captured studies of the economic costs of these events.  
2.2.1 Methodology for identifying case studies which present the socio-economic impacts 
from multi-hazard events 
The abstracts from the academic literature search (several hundred papers and reports) were 
searched for relevant terms e.g. ‘economic’, ‘impact’, ‘loss’, ‘cost’, ‘£’, ‘€’, ‘million’, ‘billion’ 
and so on. The practice literature searches predominantly brought up grey literature, articles or 
unpublished papers without abstracts. Therefore, each paper was searched for the same relevant 
terms.  
Eight papers were identified from the academic search and ten from the grey search as being 
potentially relevant and were assessed for inclusion in this report against the following criteria:  
• Fitness: how well did the multi-hazard assessment methods in the paper fit the 
specification for the case studies from the NERC call? 
• Robustness: how robust were the methods and the data used? 
• Completeness: how many of the expected full range of costs did the paper attempt to 
estimate? 
• Clarity: how clear was the paper in its description of methods, data and results? 
Each paper was scored against each criterion as either 3 (very good fit/ no significant gaps); 2 
(partial fit/ some gaps); 1 (poor fit/ significant gaps); or 0 (no fit/ missing content).  
Overall, there was not a large number of relevant papers in the literature and none that fit all of the 
criteria perfectly – as such, this analysis has had to make practical compromises. Selection of the 
papers for inclusion in this study was agreed among the project’s Technical Steering Panel and 
decided additionally on the criterion of ‘variety’, to give a range of multi-hazard types, method of 
estimation and cost components estimated. These are: 
• Forzieri et al. (2018) Escalating impacts of climate extremes on critical infrastructures in 
Europe 
• Environment Agency (2018) Estimating the economic costs of the 2015-16 winter floods  
• Pielke et al. (2008) Normalized hurricane damage in United States: 1900-2005 
Each case study has limitations in terms of the economic costs and no study estimates the ‘full 
economic cost’ of a multi-hazard event. Therefore, we will first present the framework and 
elements of the ‘full cost’ we would attempt to use when estimating economic costs and critique 
each paper against this framework. This will be explained further in section 2.2.2 below. The three 
case studies selected are individually presented and discussed in detail in section 2.2.3. 
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2.2.2 Economic costs framework used for case studies which present the socio-economic 
impacts from multi-hazard events 
When a multi-hazard event happens there can be a large number of different impacts to society. 
This would be true of any major incident, whether natural or man-made, but multi-hazard events 
have the added complication that there is more than one hazard occurring and their impacts can 
interact in different ways. However, we can attempt to group impacts in to four broad sections as 
shown in Table 2.3 (more detail on the economic framework categories can be found in Appendix 
4). 
Table 2-3 Economic cost framework 
Population 
and work 
Fatalities & 
Casualties Lost Working Hours Social 
Assets Infrastructure Buildings Other losses 
Economic 
Activity 
Business Disruption 
(local) 
Business Disruption 
(national/international) Lost Tourism 
Enviro and 
Other 
Environmental 
Damage 
Environmental 
Decontamination 
Emergency 
Response & 
Evacuation 
 
Most of the impact categories will contain some components of financial cost as measured by 
prices or insurance valuations; and of intangible welfare costs, some of which can be monetised to 
some extent. The financial and the welfare costs together comprise the ‘full economic cost’.  
To value intangible welfare costs there are two broad methods used by the UK Government: stated-
preference methods and revealed-preference methods (see Fujiwara & Campbell, 2011 for a 
detailed discussion of valuation techniques). In summary, stated preference methods ask people to 
directly report their willingness-to-pay (WTP) or willingness-to-accept (WTA) to obtain/ give up 
a specified object or outcome. The main disadvantages of stated-preference methods are that they 
are based on hypothetical situations and their application can be complex and studies can be 
resource intensive. 
Revealed preference methods seek to determine preferences for the goods/service listed above, 
from actual, observed market-based information such as travel costs and market prices in other 
markets. People’s preferences for goods can be ‘revealed’ indirectly by their behaviour. However, 
their applicability is limited to a small number of goods and services and rely on perfectly 
functioning markets. 
Summing the ‘financial’ costs with the ‘intangible welfare’ costs will provide the ‘economic cost’ 
to society. However, this assumes that the financial costs comprise both the price paid in markets 
and the social welfare provided by these financial goods (known as consumer and producer 
surplus). This is the value over and above the market price that an individual is willing to pay for 
a good or service. For example, when a railway is damaged in a storm, the rail company may not 
just refund passengers tickets but pay them compensation over and above this cost for the distress 
it causes to their life. For non-market goods and services, we assume that this consumer/ producer 
surplus is implicit in their WTP or WTA.  
Economic costs should estimate costs at a national level vs an individual household, business or 
local area, they should also have been adjusted when using financial data so that they take into 
account: transfer costs (e.g. between government and employers), displacement of economic 
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activity from one part of country (e.g. tourism moving to other cities) and betterment (where 
something damaged will be replaced with an improved, more up-to-date version). As some impacts 
may cut across some of the categories above there is a risk of double-counting some costs. For 
example, the costs to infrastructure may be counted under both ‘Business Disruption’ and ‘Lost 
Working Hours’ and so these must be carefully estimated. 
In all cases, monetisation of cost components may not be possible. Cost-benefit analysis should 
seek to qualitatively describe all impacts; then to quantify those that can be quantified; and finally, 
to monetise those that can be monetised. It is vital for the presentation and interpretation of such 
analysis that one understands that just because an impact cannot be monetised does not mean it is 
not just as important as those that can be monetised. Each component in Table 2.3 is explained in 
detail in Appendix 4. 
Below each of the methods used in the three chosen papers to monetise economic impacts and the 
impacts they include are briefly described in Table 2.4. A more in depth analysis of each of the 
case studies is presented in Appendix 5. However, a common theme that occurred in the academic 
papers is that they did not present a detailed description of how the economic costs were estimated, 
which makes it more difficult to analyse and compare methods. This could be for several reasons:  
• Papers on multi-hazard events are generally not found in economic journals and therefore 
the economic analysis is not a focus of the paper 
• There is limited space in published academic papers which means the method can only be 
summarised 
• The costs tended to be focused around asset costs and so there was little economic valuation 
of non-market impacts 
 
Table 2-4 Summary of cost estimates from the three selected case studies 
Author and title of paper Context Economic cost 
Forzieri et al. (2018) Escalating 
impacts of climate extremes on 
critical infrastructures in Europe 
Estimated the cost of climate 
hazards over the next 80 years 
across Europe  
Annual cost of climate change 
across the EU 
Baseline - $3.4 billion 
2020’S – $9.3 billion 
2050’s - $19.6 billion 
2080’s - $37.0 billion 
Environment Agency (EA) 
(2018) Estimating the economic 
costs of the 2015-16 winter floods 
Estimated the cost of the winter 
floods in the UK in 2015/16. The 
EA have also estimated the cost 
of flooding in 2007 and 2013/14 
(also provided) 
2007 – £3.9 billion 
2013/14 – £1.3 billion  
2015/16 – £1.6 billion  
Pielke et al. (2008) Normalized 
hurricane damage in United 
States: 1900-2005 
 
Estimated the cost of 50 
hurricanes in the U.S. over the 
last 100 years. We have provided 
the cost for the 3 most damaging 
hurricanes 
Great Miami Hurricane (1926) – 
$157.0 billion 
Katrina (2005) - $81.0 billion 
Galveston (1) (1900) - $78.0 
billion 
The figures from the 3 studies analysed are highlighted above. All papers refer to very different contexts. 
Pielke (2008) and EA (2018) are costing events at a single point in time whereas Forzieri (2018) is costing 
multiple events over a long time period. They also differ in terms of the location (country) and impacts 
included in the analysis and methods for estimation. Therefore, they cannot be directly compared.  
 
Examples of less rigorous cost estimations for multi-hazards events are reported in the media. In 
2018, Storm Emma and “the beast from the East” probably caused the construction industry a loss 
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up to £2bn over the three worst days2, while the total cost of severe winter weather in 2015 was 
estimated at £13bn3. Similarly, in 2010, heavy snow and sub-zero temperatures costed the aviation 
and retail industries many millions of pounds, with a total for the economy of approximately 
£13bn4. Lastly, the damage caused by Storm Desmond in 2015 was estimated at £400m - £500m, 
with the insurance industry paying out between £250m and £325m5.  
2.2.3 Summary observations from review 
The review of the papers in this chapter reveals a number of themes which refer to some of the 
issues outlined in Section 1 of this report. 
One issue relates to compound hazards (defined in Section 1), including two or more independent 
hazards coinciding in space and/or time with impacts greater than the sum of the two. We would 
expect to see this, however none of the case studies prove that this is true because they are generally 
estimating total costs or cannot distinguish which impact caused the damage. This may be due to 
a lack of methods which model how different impacts interact but also a lack of data to estimate 
costs for different impacts. Simulations may prove a way to look at multi-hazards as if they 
occurred independently of one another and compare the impacts with a scenario where they 
occurred together, but case studies do not provide an opportunity to do this. 
Another issue is “one hazard changing vulnerability and thereby increasing the risk of subsequent 
hazards having a negative effect one exposed assets”. This may be a reason why the case studies 
in this chapter are unable to prove that the total impacts are greater than the sum of its parts. The 
case studies demonstrate that the accumulation of damage over time can push systems or 
infrastructures beyond operability thresholds. Often the effects of one hazard can hamper the 
mitigation of the effects of another hazard. Therefore, the costs from one event may be an 
accumulation of costs from smaller preceding events which have increased the vulnerability of 
infrastructures and negative effects from future events. In the selected case studies, costs are often 
estimated using repair costs and insurance costs which often reflect impacts from several years 
e.g. EA 2018. Therefore, it is difficult to elicit the actual impacts from an event or distinguish 
between hazard impacts in an event, as the methods to estimate costs do not reflect this.  
Another issue is “one hazard triggering other hazards, or a series of triggering relationships 
forming a cascade or domino event” which we would expect to result in a wide variety of impacts 
to society. Standard cost-benefit analysis techniques can be applied to multi-hazard events, even 
if the events are part of cascade or domino events – the domino effect presents more of a challenge 
to the risk assessment and modelling stages of the work than the economic assessment, which is 
based more on summing the instances of damage multiplied by a unit cost. The cases in this 
analysis demonstrate that – they do not use different costing techniques than could be used for 
single-hazard events. However, as discussed above, the use of repair costs once a piece of 
infrastructure has been damaged beyond a certain threshold masks the previous incremental 
damage and can apportion the accumulated damage of several sequential events to just one event 
in that chain. Adjusting for this could necessitate techniques of estimating not-yet-revealed 
damage prior to repair; or of revising previous cost estimates of damaging events to apportion 
some amount of subsequent repair costs once they are revealed.  
One common factor across all the case studies is that they are based in developed data-rich 
countries and a constraint from multi-hazard cost estimation in other less developed countries 
could be the high levels of informality in recording data on things such as housing, infrastructure 
and livelihoods. To correct for this could require significant on-the-ground evidence-gathering. 
                                                 
2https://www.theguardian.com/uk-news/2018/mar/03/freezing-weather-storm-emma-cost-uk-economy-1-billion-
pounds-a-day 
3 https://www.independent.co.uk/news/uk/home-news/economy-feels-chill-as-uk-grinds-to-a-halt-2164827.html 
4 https://www.independent.co.uk/news/uk/home-news/economy-feels-chill-as-uk-grinds-to-a-halt-2164827.html 
5 https://pwc.blogs.com/press_room/2015/12/updated-estimates-on-cost-of-storm-desmond-pwc.html  
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A significant gap in both Forzieri et al. (2018) and Pielke et al. (2008) is the lack of impacts which 
are analysed relative to our full ideal cost model. This is consistent with the remaining literature 
which was reviewed in our search, but not selected for analysis in this chapter. Pielke et al. (2008) 
uses insured losses which do not account for many of the impacts in our ideal costing framework 
and Forzieri uses historical loss data focused on impacts to infrastructure. The reason why EA 
2018 does include the majority of impacts could be due to the EA being a government agency that 
uses evidence to inform policy-making at a societal level. Other analyses tend to focus on 
particular losses, often financial costs or financial losses adjusted to become economic costs. This 
could be because the larger part of the analysis is the modelling of the multi-hazard and its impacts 
and the costing of numerous impacts including non-marketed outcomes like pain, grief and 
suffering can add significant complexity. 
A key factor in the under-estimation of total economic costs is the assumption that financial costs 
comprise both the price paid in markets and the social welfare provided by these financial goods. 
Forzieri et al. (2018) base the value of social infrastructure on the amount of public expenditure 
which would almost certainly lead to under-estimates, as we expect these infrastructures to have 
social and economic benefits well beyond the cost of supply. EA 2018 also misses some social 
welfare costs even though they adjust financial costs into economic costs, however they highlight 
that their assumptions are also likely to lead to under-estimating the true economic cost. Pielke et 
al. (2008) method (the insured losses x2 approach) is not discussed in any detail and so is unclear 
whether this seeks to represent just uninsured losses or attempts some valuation of social welfare. 
Accounting for the social welfare costs should be present in any future economic analysis of a 
multi-hazard event.  
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3. Industry & Policy Practitioner’s Views on Multi-hazards 
3.1 STAKEHOLDER IDENTIFICATION & MAPPING 
 
In the framework of this review, stakeholders are defined as individuals, groups or institutions 
involved in and/or affected by multi-hazard events and their associated risks, who can influence 
or be influenced by the outcome of this project. To address the objectives of this study, a 
stakeholder mapping exercise was undertaken to identify representatives from the academia, 
industry and policy areas involved in and/or affected by multi-hazard events. Each stakeholder has 
a different social and cultural background, interests and motivations and resources. Although we 
are aware that the list of relevant stakeholders is longer than the one used in this work, we have 
aimed to identify academic, industry and policy representatives, whether they represent the 
interests of multiple organisations or of a single individual. Due to time limitations, we were not 
able to include representatives from the insurance sector, emergency managers and Local 
Resilience Forums (LRF) while other interested actors were deliberately excluded from the 
analysis, as their participation would not serve the scope of the project (e.g. media, population, 
etc.). 
 
3.1.1 Objectives and methodology 
The aim of this analysis was to derive insights from qualitative and quantitative data (stakeholder’s 
role, specialization, sector, willingness to engage, etc.) and elicit stakeholder requirements and 
knowledge in line with a project’s aim. In this study, the stakeholder analysis objectives are to: 
• Understand the general landscape of stakeholders that are involved in managing multi-
hazard risks; 
• Identify the relevant sectors and actors affected by or which can influence the development, 
testing and implementation of multi-hazard research and risk assessments in policy and 
industry. 
An initial list of stakeholders was provided by NERC based on their experience of involvement on 
similar initiatives, such as the 2017 ERIIP Workshop on “Multi-hazards for Infrastructure” (ERIIP, 
2017). In addition, a number of contacts from universities, not-for-profit organisations, 
construction, energy, transport industries, utility companies, public bodies, engineering 
consultancies and government departments were added using the project partners’ networks. The 
compiled stakeholder list was distributed among consortium partners for consultation and to the 
Technical Steering Committee for validation. Finally, the list was submitted to NERC for final 
approval.  
The selection of participants in any stakeholder analysis is essential (Bryson, 2004). Due to the 
project’s lifetime, we had to limit the number of participants and period in which their feedback 
could be used as input in this analysis. Nevertheless, we attempted to balance different schedules 
and trade-offs between early and late participation based on one or more of the following: 
representation, accountability, legitimacy and the ability to provide a significant input to the study. 
As a result, we accommodated a few later additions but had to decline others who were unable to 
contribute in time. Throughout the stakeholder identification and selection process, we were 
guided by impartiality and transparency. Table 3.1 illustrates the main stakeholder categories and 
their specialism (a complete list is provided in Appendix 6). 
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Table 3-1 Type and specialism of stakeholders per sector 
Organisation type Specialization Examples 
Research  
University, private 
company, research 
centre, not-for-profit, 
research institution 
Geoscience research and innovation, 
marine science, climate change 
research, space technology and 
applications 
King’s College London, UKRI/BGS, 
University of Portsmouth, National 
Oceanography Centre, Satellite Space 
Catapult, Practical Action, CIRIA, 
NCAS/DEFRA 
Industry/Practitioners 
(Non-departmental) 
public body (weather, 
transport, environment, 
health & safety), 
private companies, 
independent 
consultants 
Railway infrastructure and asset 
management, highways authority, 
electricity and gas utilities, energy, 
safety regulation for civil nuclear 
industry, engineering consulting and 
management, DRR, resilience, 
environmental protection, public 
water and sewerage services, hydro-
meteorological services 
Environment Agency, Met Office, National 
Grid, Transport Scotland, Network Rail, 
HSE, Office for Nuclear Regulation, 
Scottish Water, Anglian, Water, Jacobs 
Eng. Group, Mott MacDonalds, ARUP, 
SSE, Highways England, Temple Group, 
Atkins, Flood Forecasting Centre, HR 
Wallingford, NHBC, HS2, WSP, Yorkshire 
Water, London Underground 
Policy 
Public body (climate, 
environment, food, 
rural affairs, health), 
government 
department, not-for-
profit organisation, 
government 
Management of natural resources, 
government agency, 
telecommunications, railway safety 
and standards, governmental advisor 
on climate change adaptation, 
transport network, supporting 
agency for resilience to 
emergencies, government advisory 
for science policy 
Cabinet Office, Scottish Government 
(Resilience Division), SEPA, Department 
for Communications, Media and Sport 
(DCMS), Natural Resources Wales, 
UKWIR, Historic Environment Scotland 
 
The Stakeholder Mapping Tool 
The first part of the analysis was to identify the stakeholders focusing not only on the 
organisational group or the position title, but also on the individual’s expertise and their role in the 
organisation. This was because individuals will have different levels of influence and status within 
an organisation and will likely also have different levels of expertise. In some instances, more than 
one person was contacted within an organisation to ensure fair representation. 
Subsequently, we have used a number of criteria to prioritize stakeholders in terms of how critical 
they could be in contributing to the outcomes of the next steps of this project. The criteria were 
related to either the “power” to make the changes to incorporate multi-hazard approaches and risk 
assessments in practice or the “expertise” to develop, guide or advise the process. Each criterion 
was scored and used to calculate a total and an overall relevance score for each stakeholder 
organisation. The latter two scores (total and overall relevance) were used for an initial 
discrimination between stakeholders, whereas the former two (power and expertise) served for a 
more detailed comparison using a matrix. The total score was calculated by summing up all 
criteria scores registered for a particular stakeholder, while the overall relevance score 
represented the ratio between the total score and the maximum score possible (see Table 3.2 and 
Appendix 6). The following list of criteria was used to assess the stakeholders: 
a. Contribution to the study: what is the relevance and/or amount of relevant 
information provided by the stakeholder. It is measured on a scale from 1 to 4, where 1 is no 
contribution, 2 – limited contribution, 3 – moderately relevant contribution, 4 – relevant 
contribution with additional inputs (e.g. reports, papers, contact names, etc.). 
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b. Legitimacy on the subject: based on the stakeholders current portfolio or current 
business strategy; or, if they are recognized as a “legitimate voice” by peers. It is measured 
on a scale from 1 to 3, where 1 is no portfolio or business strategy on single or multi-hazard 
investigation and risk assessment, 2 – current portfolio or business strategy on advanced 
single hazard investigation and risk assessment, 3 – current portfolio or business strategy on 
multi-hazard investigation and risk assessment. 
c. Willingness to engage: defined by the level of stakeholder’s level of involvement with 
the current study. It is measured on a scale from 1 to 3, where 1 is no feedback, 2 – positive 
feedback, 3 – positive feedback with openness to follow-up contact. 
d. Influence: the capacity of the stakeholder to determine actors within their or other 
sectors that could adapt multi-hazard approaches and risk assessment or consider it as part 
of their agenda. It is measured on a scale from 1 to 3, where 1 is low (stakeholder that “plays 
by the industry standards” or has an agenda that does not attend the immediate needs of the 
industry), 2 – medium (stakeholder with attributed reputation by peers; their input is valued 
and respected by end-users, for example advisory public bodies, independent consultants 
with a “high voice”, established private companies, etc.), 3 – high (actors that would demand 
a change in the industry or establish a new set of standards; for example, private or public 
corporations with autonomy to set their own agenda and direct funding). 
e. Necessity of involvement: based on the general aim of the project, which is to 
consider and define future research and innovation funding (p.8, Tender Document). It is 
measured on a scale from 1 to 3, where 1 is low (stakeholders that might adopt the outcomes, 
if required, such as those in the industry sector), 2 – medium (actors that would adopt tools 
or processes or that would develop, validate or test tools (e.g. non-for-profit organisations, 
universities, private organisations, etc.), 3 – high (actors that would facilitate the 
incorporation of multi-hazard research, risk assessment approaches and tools within 
legislative frameworks, strategies and public guiding policies (e.g. government agencies, 
regulators, public bodies, etc.). 
 
The stakeholder matrix tool (Figure 3.3) was adapted from Kennon et al. (2010) and directed at 
improving project planning and implementation. The tool features a 16 square matrix with 
 
Power = (d + e)/( d maximum score + e maximum score)               (Eq. 1) 
On the x-axis, where d is the influence and e is necessity of involvement and 
 
Expertise = (a + b)/(a maximum score + b maximum score)              (Eq.2) 
On the y-axis, where a is contribution to the study and b is legitimacy. 
 
A score varying between 1 and 4 was attributed to each criteria for each stakeholder, as a result of 
the feedback (positive or negative) after receiving a formal request of participation to the semi-
structured interview. In case of no response from any individual within an organisation, the 
stakeholder organisation was then ranked by its public profile and scores where attributed 
according to the expert knowledge within the project technical team. Listed stakeholders with more 
than one point of contact were verified and in case of two or more positive feedbacks, the results 
of the individual with the highest total or overall score was plotted in the matrix.  
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3.1.2 Results and discussion 
The stakeholder list contains 91 contacts from 61 institutions. All listed contacts were requested 
to participate in a survey focused on identifying what approaches are being used in industry and 
by policy-makers to understand and assess the risk from multi-hazards. The methodology and 
obtained results are presented in detail in section 3.2. 
Overall, one third of the 91 contacts (33 representing 25 stakeholder organisations) responded 
positively to the semi-structured interview, which is commendable given the limited time to 
feedback, and the need for some to coordinate responses at an organisational level. Figure 3.1 
shows their distribution per sector category. The addition of representatives from the research 
sector was intended to ensure a benchmark for future analysis of the survey results; for this reason 
they comprised the smallest percentage from the total 33 (21%). The industry sector contacts 
represented 52% of the total, while the policy stakeholders 27%. The response rate indicates the 
high relevance and interest of the practitioners, especially for the policy sector, in multi-hazard 
research and risk assessment approaches. 
 
Figure 3-1 Stakeholder contacts participation response rate 
The results of the criteria scoring for each stakeholder are summarized in Appendix 6 and 
illustrated in Figure 3.2. For example, Stakeholder 1 has a high power with respect to the adoption 
and implementation of multi-hazard approaches and risk assessments in the industry. Stakeholder 
2 has a higher degree of expertise than Stakeholder 1, but less power. With an equal overall 
relevance score, both would be equally important for this study, providing different perspectives 
according to their specialism. However, this indicator does not give enough insight with respect to 
their different attitudes and influencing power. To obtain such information, the power and 
expertise scores were calculated and plotted as indicated in Table 3.2. 
 
Table 3-2 Example of scoring and comparison between stakeholders using the power/expertise 
scores 
  
 
In Figure 3.2, the yellow dots represent contacts who did not reply to the survey participation 
request. Conversely, the green dots represent contacts from the 25 organisations whose positive 
feedback is analysed in WP3. The size of the dot indicates the number of contacts represented by 
the symbol. 
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Figure 3-2 Power - Expertise Matrix (61 stakeholders, 91 contacts). Dot size indicates the 
number of contacts represented by the symbol 
On a scale of relative importance from A to P, with A being the highest and P the lowest, one can 
rank the stakeholders in terms of their overall relevance, power (i.e., influence and necessity of 
involvement) and expertise (i.e., contribution to the study and legitimacy) in relation to multi-
hazard approaches and risk assessments. The results (Table 3.2) indicate that a limited number of 
stakeholders, mostly publicly funded organisations, possess both the highest power and expertise 
to influence and shape future research and its adoption into practice (zone A). The stakeholders 
that score highest in overall relevance in zone A (0.94) are the Cabinet Office, HSE and Office for 
Nuclear Regulation (ONR). Second to this category is a group of stakeholders that have either 
higher power (zone B) or expertise (zone C) in multi-hazard research and risk assessment 
approaches. These stakeholders complement each other and could support the early integration 
between various disciplines and approaches into practice. The stakeholders that score highest in 
relevance in zone B and C (0.81) are Environment Agency, Flood Forecasting Centre, Network 
Rail, King’s College London and National Oceanography Centre. 
 
Table 3-3 Ranking of stakeholders in terms of power and expertise in zones A to D 
Matrix zone* Stakeholder 
A Cabinet Office, Environment Agency, Met Office, UKRI/BGS, SEPA, HSE, ONR, Energy 
company** 
B Network Rail, Scottish Government, FFC, CCC, PHE, CEH 
C KCL, University of Portsmouth, National Oceanography Centre 
D Practical Action, NCAS, CIRIA, Loughborough University, Leeds University, HR 
Wallingford, National Grid, Transport Scotland, NRW, Government department for 
transport**, DCMS 
*Stakeholders in zones E to K are listed in the Stakeholder Database (Appendix 6). **Anonymous and non-identifiable 
stakeholder 
 
Zone D is represented by all sectors (research, industry, policy) and the highest number of 
stakeholders. Overall, they have higher expertise (0.57 - 0.71) than power (0.50 – 0.67) scores, 
which means they could be early adopters or developers of knowledge with the capacity to generate 
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large public support or impact. The stakeholders that score highest in relevance in zone D (0.75) 
are the National Grid, Transport Scotland and Department for Transport. 
3.1.3 Summary observations from analysis 
The main scope of the current stakeholder mapping exercise was to contextualize and set the 
boundaries for the review performed in this study, particularly with respect to the industry and 
policy practitioner’s view on multi-hazards (section 3.2). From the results of section 3.1.2, we 
made a number of observations: 
• Multi-hazards are of concern. There is a significant interest in multi-hazard research and 
risk assessment approaches amongst the selected practitioners in industry and policy, 
across management and organisational levels. One third (33 out of 91 contacts) of all 
stakeholders contributed directly to the results of this review, with more input if additional 
time and resources were available. In order to ensure data-rich interviews, the selection of 
participants was based on their experience and relevance to the research objectives (i.e. 
purposeful sampling, Palinkas et al. 2015) rather than a random approach. 
• The stakeholders with the highest overall relevance, ranked using the methodology above, 
pertain to different stakeholder communities: the Cabinet Office, Office for Nuclear 
Regulation and HSE. They are complementary in terms of power and expertise (e.g. 
government department, non-departmental public body specialized in health & safety and 
public body specialized in regulation of the civil nuclear industry).  
• Roles and responsibilities match across stakeholders. Although, a full stakeholder analysis 
for strategic planning (e.g. accounting for stakeholders roles, potential risks, network 
relationships, etc.) was outside the scope of this project, the matrix indicates a positive 
outcome with respect to the contributing stakeholders: overall, decision-makers and senior 
management have slightly lower level of expertise than technical staff and experts. 
• A further detailed review and mapping of the multi-hazards expertise amongst practitioners 
is needed. The distribution of stakeholders into zones of relative importance indicates a 
high number of actors whose expertise score is lower than 0.6. This is mainly due to the 
contribution criterion, which reflects their lack of participation in the survey, but can also 
be linked to their legitimacy on the topic (as defined above). Further investigations could 
define more clearly their level of knowledge of multi-hazard research and risk assessments 
and interest in moving from an “outer-layer organisation” to a “contributing organisation” 
(Bryson, 2004). 
3.2 STAKEHOLDER SURVEY 
Stakeholder engagement in multi-hazard research has received increasing attention in recent years. 
From stakeholders involved in governance to those providing specialized knowledge and advice 
in support of operational capabilities, the solicitation of their knowledge, priorities and needs early 
on in the decision-making processes can contribute to learning, innovation and promote a greater 
acceptance of decisions. 
 
This section presents the results of a stakeholder survey predominantly designed to analyse the 
industry and policy practitioner’s view on multi-hazard research and risk assessment in practice. 
This method was selected due to its (i) efficiency in capturing critical information from numerous 
and geographically dispersed stakeholders, (ii) external validity in terms of producing findings, 
which can to some extent be generalized to a wider population and (iii) capacity to access directly 
the participant’s understanding, judgement and experience on a given problem. Undoubtedly, there 
are also limitations in using stakeholder surveys. Depending on the chosen method (e.g. interview, 
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questionnaire, focus group, etc.), these include: the potential for interviewer’s subconscious bias; 
time-consuming data collection and analysis and incorporation of potential inconsistencies. 
Finally, the survey results are significantly dependent on the chosen sampling technique and the 
success of the techniques used to acquire the information required. 
 
3.2.1 Objectives and methodology 
The specific objectives of the stakeholder survey were to: 
• Analyse the industry and policy practitioner’s level of knowledge about multi-hazard 
processes and risk assessment methodologies used in research and practice; 
• Evaluate the interest in and use of current multi-hazard risk assessment methodologies and 
approaches in different industry and policy sectors; 
• Identify common barriers/enablers and current gaps in knowledge and skills for 
understanding multi-hazard events and their impact in a given sector; 
• Inform the needs and future requirements for adopting methodologies and approaches for 
multi-hazards identification, characterisation and risk assessment in practice. 
Data collection 
Two methods of collecting survey data were used, namely telephone interviews and 
questionnaires. Telephone interviews and questionnaires are an effective and economical way of 
collecting data and particularly useful if the respondents are widely geographically distributed or 
busy professionals. Questionnaires are also a useful option to consider when respondents need to 
consult with peers or want to spend more time on investigating the researched problem. For this 
review both methods were simultaneously used to ensure a higher response rate as limited time 
was available for gathering evidence. 
 
The survey was aimed at two stakeholder groups, namely UK industry and policy practitioners. 
Academia participants were included in order to allow a direct comparison of the three groups 
participating in this research. Identification and selection of survey participants is described in 
section 3.1. We used a non-random sampling technique (purposeful sampling) with a sample size 
depending on an assumed response rate of <50%. The total number of participants was 91 
(representing 61 stakeholder institutions). 
 
Questionnaire and telephone interview design 
Initially, a draft questionnaire was devised taking into account the objectives of the study and the 
stakeholders’ profile. The questionnaire was distributed amongst consortium partners for 
consultation and the Technical Steering Committee for review and evaluation. The open-ended 
questionnaire contained an explanatory note and 11 questions classified in four categories: self-
assessment, state-of-the art, multi-hazard risk assessment and gaps in knowledge (see Appendix 
8). Topics covered included: 
• Plausible multi-hazard scenarios for a given sector 
• Level of knowledge about multi-hazard processes, impacts and risk assessment 
methodologies in research and practice 
• Use of multi-hazard methodologies and approaches in own organisation 
• State-of-the art in current methodologies to undertake multi-hazard research 
• Enablers and barriers for developing multi-hazards risk assessment in own sector 
• Gaps in knowledge and skills to better understanding and assess risk to multi-hazards in 
own sector 
The questionnaire was emailed together with a covering letter and an Ethical Policy document 
(Appendix 7) to all participants identified through the stakeholder mapping (section 3.3.1). The 
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latter contained an information sheet and a consent form explaining the research problem, the aim 
of the study and use of the information that was provided. Participants were asked to choose their 
preferred survey method, how they would like to be identified and if they agree with the phone 
interview being audio recorded. To ensure a reasonable response rate, reminder emails were sent 
to recipients who had not completed the survey within the initial deadline. 
 
The semi-structured telephone interview was based on the open-ended questionnaire and aimed at 
exploring more systematically and comprehensively the respondent’s knowledge. Technically, the 
interview was a 45 minutes structured conversation around the 11 core questions with associated, 
pivotal questions and/or necessary clarifications. The audio recordings and hand note contents 
were used to generate clean transcripts of the interviews (Appendix 11). 
 
Limitations of the analysis 
• External validity. The results of this analysis represent the views and experiences of a 
limited number of stakeholders from a limited number of industry and policy sectors. 
Although the total (36%) and sectorial response rate (54% - research, 47% - policy, 30% - 
industry) ensured an adequate sample for statistical analysis, the generalization of findings 
per sector should be made with caution 
• One questionnaire for all. A single questionnaire was designed for all participants 
irrespective of provenience sector. This might have reduced the potential to capture the 
diversity of perspectives, experience and perceptions amongst stakeholder groups 
• Inconsistencies in collected data. The questionnaire was used both in a self-administered 
form as well as being instrumented by two interviewers in the telephone interviews. This 
might have resulted in inconsistencies due to (no) access to explanatory questions, 
possibility to add clarifying points and exposure to different interviewing techniques 
• Inconsistencies in communication/no real feedback/short response time. Great care was 
taken to ensure a coherent and clear communication between stakeholders and the survey 
team. Yet, instances of miscommunications occurred. It is therefore likely that some of the 
stakeholders were not fully satisfied with the survey experience. Due to the lack of time, a 
feedback inquiry was not performed and the engagement request was noted as being 
expeditious. 
 
3.2.2 Results and discussion of findings 
One third of the 91 contacts (33 representing 25 stakeholder organisations) responded positively 
to the semi-structured interview (see Figure 3.1). Figure 3.3 illustrated the stakeholder map per 
field of activity and sector. 
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Figure 3-3 Stakeholder map per sector of activity 
 
The response rate to each question in the survey varies both by sector and question type/category. 
Overall, the response rate is between 82% - 100%, with maximum values for Q1 (related with 
multi-hazard scenarios relevant for own sector) and Q8 (related with barriers and enablers for 
undertaking robust multi-hazard risk assessment). The lowest overall response rates are associated 
with questions regarding advantages and pitfalls of current methodologies (Q5) and the 
accessibility, applicability and usefulness of current multi-hazard methods (Q6). Survey results for 
each question category (A to D, see Appendix 8) follow. 
 
A. Self-assessment 
Self-assessment questions focused on: 
• multi-hazard scenarios relevant for each sector (Q1); 
• the respondents’ knowledge with regards to multi-hazard processes and risk assessment 
methodologies in research and practice (Q2); 
• methods and approaches used in own organisation/sector to understand the processes 
underlying multi-hazard events, their impacts and risk (Q3); 
• Impacts and economic costs of multi-hazards, including the awareness of evidence or 
best-practice guidance to support such analysis (Q4). 
(Q1) Overall, participants identified 36 multi-hazard scenarios, pertaining to all hazard 
relationship types. The respondents focused on multi-hazard scenarios most relevant for their 
sector (see Table 3.4), which could overlap, to some extent, with those of their greatest concern. 
It should be noted, however, that this is an assumption and the identified scenarios represent only 
a temporary snapshot, as interest and priorities are expected to change. 
 
Participants identified largely triggering multi-hazard relationships (47%), followed by 
amplification effect (36%) and compound type (17%). The weight of interest across sectors lies 
with four multi-hazard scenarios: storm surges and flooding (identified by 21.2% of respondents), 
extreme rainfall triggering landslides (15.2%), river and coastal flooding (15.2%), and strong 
winds, snow, ice and extreme cold (12.1%). Stakeholders representing the transport, energy and 
geotechnical engineering services find most relevant combinations of geological (e.g., landslides, 
sinkholes, rockfalls), atmospheric (e.g., storms, rainfall) or/and hydrological hazards (e.g., river 
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and groundwater flooding), while the policy sector is focused on a wider range of possible multi-
hazards, both natural and anthropogenic.  
Table 3-4 Relevant multi-hazard scenarios identified by stakeholders (ordered by 
frequency of selection) 
Stakeholder(s) Relationship 
type 
Multi-hazard Scenario % of 
respondents 
Government department for 
transport, EA, National Grid, 
ONR, Cabinet Office, Dept. for 
Communication, Media and Sport 
(DCMS) 
Compound Storm surges and flooding 21.2 
BGS, National Grid, Network 
Rail, geotechnics company 
Triggering Extreme rainfall triggers landslides 15.2 
Energy company, EA, SEPA Compound River and coastal flooding 15.2 
Met Office, National Grid, 
Network Rail, geotechnics 
company 
Compound Strong winds, snow, ice and 
extreme cold 
12.1 
Network Rail, geotechnics 
company, SEPA 
Triggering Extreme rainfall trigger 
river/surface flooding 
9.1 
BGS, Met Office, geotechnics 
company 
Triggering Landslide blockage triggers 
flooding 
9.1 
Historic Environment Scotland, 
Met Office, Natural Resources 
Wales 
Compound Fluvial, pluvial and groundwater 
flooding 
9.1 
Historic Environment Scotland, 
Met Office, ONR 
Compound Rainfall and windstorm 9.1 
Network Rail, ONR, geotechnics 
company 
Amplification Storms and (coastal) erosion 9.1 
Met Office, NCAS Amplification Heatwave, poor air quality, high 
pollen count 
6.1 
National Grid, Cabinet Office Compound Cyber-attacks and terrorist attacks 6.1 
Network Rail, DCMS Amplification Extreme high temperatures and 
wildfires 
6.1 
UKWIR, geotechnics company Amplification Drought and shrink-swell 6.1 
Geotechnics company, DCMS Amplification Wildfires and landslides 6.1 
UKWIR, SEPA Triggering Flooding and environmental 
hazards 
6.1 
BGS Triggering Extreme rainfall triggers 
groundwater flooding 
3.0 
CIRIA Triggering Flooding triggers landslide 3.0 
BGS Triggering Geomagnetically induced currents 
triggered by magnetic (solar) 
storms 
3.0 
NOC Triggering Submarine landslides trigger 
tsunami 
3.0 
ONR Triggering Earthquake triggers tsunami 3.0 
SEPA Triggering Landslide triggers reservoir 
overtopping 
3.0 
NOC Triggering Tropical cyclones trigger turbidity 
currents 
3.0 
NOC Triggering Earthquakes trigger landslides 3.0 
NOC Triggering River flooding leads to increased 
sediment transport offshore and 
high turbidity currents activity 
3.0 
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Geotechnics company Amplification Warm winds trigger snowmelt, 
which leads to landsliding 
3.0 
Geotechnics company Triggering Strong wind leading to root jacking 
and subsequent rockfall 
3.0 
SEPA Amplification Snowmelt and flooding 3.0 
Historic Environment Scotland Triggering Coastal flooding and landslides 3.0 
Met Office Amplification Space weather and extreme cold 3.0 
Met Office Amplification Volcanic ash and poor air quality 3.0 
National Grid Amplification Extreme temperatures, drought, 
wildfires 
3.0 
Natural Resources Wales Triggering Reservoir failure and landslide 3.0 
NCAS Amplification Drought and wildfire 3.0 
NCAS Amplification Air quality and cold weather 3.0 
NCAS Amplification Air quality and volcanic eruptions 3.0 
Geotechnics company Triggering Sinkholes and extreme rainfall 3.0 
 
(Q2) With respect to stakeholders’ knowledge of multi-hazard methodologies used in research and 
practice, Figure 3.4 illustrate the perceived levels of knowledge across sectors. Overall, 33.3% of 
all participants evaluated their knowledge of multi-hazard methodologies used in research as fair, 
whereas only 27.3% have the same level of knowledge for methodologies used in practice.  
 
Figure 3-4 Stakeholders’ level of knowledge about multi-hazard methodologies used in 
research and practice (NA – respondents did not answer) 
The proportion is inversed when looking at respondents with a good and very good knowledge of 
multi-hazard approaches. Participants have a better knowledge of approaches and methods used 
in practice than in research (30.3% vs. 18.2%, for good knowledge; 15.2% vs. 12.1%, respectively 
for very good knowledge). This is apparent also when results are analysed per sector category. 
Figure 3.5 (A and B) indicates that 33.3% of policy stakeholders have a fair knowledge of methods 
used in research and practice. However, none indicated a good/very good knowledge of methods 
available in research, as opposed to 22.2% and 11.1%, respectively, that are aware of methods 
used in practice.  
Over on third (35.3%) of the industry representatives have a fair knowledge of methods available 
in research, while 23.5% and 11.8% recognize a good and very good level, respectively. It is worth 
noting that, 18.8% of industry participants indicated no or limited knowledge about methodologies 
or approaches used in practice. This indicates the need for a better transfer of existent multi-hazard 
approaches and methods in practice between industry stakeholders. 
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Figure 3-5 Stakeholders’ level of knowledge about multi-hazard methodologies used in 
research (A) and practice (B) 
 
(Q3) Survey participants were asked to state if they use multi-hazard approaches and procedures 
in their own organisation. From the total number, 42% answered positively, 46% negatively and 
12% did not answer the question directly (Figure 3.6). The range of multi-hazard methodologies 
used by policy, industry and academia representatives are classified according to the typology 
proposed in section 2.1.1.2. 
 
     
Figure 3-6 Use of multi-hazard methodologies/approaches (left) and their typology per 
sector of activity (right) 
 
Figure 3.6 also shows that the number of research, industry and policy stakeholders employing 
qualitative methods is equal. This might suggest that qualitative methods are fairly accessible and 
readily usable in all sectors. This is not the case for statistical and stochastic methods, which are 
most used in industry or physical models, employed solely by one research representative. One 
common finding between the research and industry sectors, noted also in the review of academic 
literature (section 2.1.1.3), is that both sectors integrate multiple methods to develop an 
understanding of multi-hazard processes and their associated risks. For instance, UKRI/BGS 
employs both empirical observations (both in natural and experimental regimes) and probabilistic 
methods to develop hazard risk scenarios. Similarly, the National Oceanography Centre uses 
primarily observational (empirical) methods through direct monitoring and repeat sensing backed 
up by statistical and hindcast analysis. In studies of air pollution performed by NCAS, the 
atmospheric modelling accounts for meteorological processes in order to understand the 
representativity of air pollution measurements and to interpret the variations observed. For this 
purpose, both modelling and measurement data are used. Finally, energy companies use statistical 
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techniques to estimate joint probability of multi-hazards (specifically copulas and multivariate 
extreme value statistical distributions) together with numerical models (e.g. hydrodynamic models 
such as TELEMAC and TOMOWAC) that can simulate, for example, coastal flooding processes 
such as waves, storm surges, tides, wind, etc. 
 
(Q4) When asked to identify impacts multi-hazards can have on their sector, respondents’ answers 
were specific according to their main activity. A list of most important impacts is provided in 
Figure 3.7. 
 
Figure 3-7 Examples of multi-hazard impact identified by stakeholders per sector of 
activity 
 
Generally, there is a lack of awareness about specific studies that have attempted to quantify the 
costs of multi-hazard in comparison to single hazards events (not aware – 5, aware – 1, no answer 
– 27 respondents). Few stakeholders identified studies as evidence of best-practice or guidance for 
multi-hazard consequences assessment (8 respondents). However, some of these studies are not 
relevant to the remit of this work, examining either cascading consequences (e.g., chain failures 
and associated costs of the Buncefield fire) or do not focus on economic costs assessment. For 
instance, the ENA’s Engineering Technical Report (ETR 132) provides guidance on improving 
electric network performance under abnormal weather conditions by enhancing the resilience of 
the network.  
Respondents commonly agree that:  
 
(1) The understanding of multi-hazard events lags behind the understanding of single hazard ones; 
(2) There is an increasing interest in the impact of multi-hazards across sectors as demonstrated 
by recent events (e.g. the 2011 Fukushima disaster), but  
(3) There are significant challenges with quantifying associated impacts and economic costs. 
Nuclear industry • Direct damage to infrastructure
• Safety of operatives working on site
Environment
• Danger to life
• Direct economic costs
Health & Safety • Danger to life
Offshore industry • Damage to infrastructure
Transport industry
• Increased maintenance and repair costs
• Increased delays and compensation costs
• Decreased reputation
• Increased safety risks
• Direct damage to infrastructure
• Loss of revenue and public confidence
NGOs • Increased need of resources for response
Government
• Direct and indirect impact on the tourism industry
• Stretch of capabilities for local and national emergency 
response
Telecommunications • Loss of revenue and business continuity
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Lastly, respondents recognise that no universally accepted methodology for the quantification of 
costs or impacts exists and there is considerable research required to develop good-practice and 
standardised methodologies. 
B. State-of-the-art 
Questions in this category focus on the: 
• Advantages and pitfalls of current methodologies and approaches used to undertake 
multi-hazard risk assessments (Q5); 
• Accessibility, applicability and usefulness of current methodologies and approaches (Q6). 
 
Table 3.4 summarizes the advantages and pitfalls of current methodologies and approaches used 
to undertake multi-hazard risk assessments as indicated by the respondents. When asked to assess 
these methods (Q6), 45.5% of respondents did not answer the question directly. Of those that did 
(54.5%), 21.2% found that current methodologies are accessible, while 15.2% found them to be 
useful. A lower percentage found them applicable (6.1%), while the same percentage characterised 
them as not applicable/not accessible (6%) or to a very low and low degree of accessibility and 
applicability (6%). If accessible (mostly those stemming from academic research), current 
methodologies are difficult or impossible to apply in practice at large, especially when using 
complex models and simulations. Other methodologies, such as gathering case studies, are very 
accessible but difficult to apply due to human power and lack of data. 
Regarding specific methodological approaches, deterministic methods are now superseded by 
probabilistic models that are better equipped to assess the uncertainties associated with data and 
modelling results. The quality/quantity of these outputs, however, is challenged by data 
availability and computational power. One other noted limitation of both qualitative and 
quantitative approaches is that they fail to take into account the low probability high magnitude 
events (e.g., large earthquakes in Kenya). 
 
Finally, participants recognized there is a lack of practical guidance on how/when to use existing 
methodologies and approaches for those without a technical background (e.g. NGOs, government, 
etc.). Moreover, methodologies and approaches that are accessible and useful might not always be 
applicable to different regions or case studies, therefore they need to be tested on a case-by-case 
basis to know if they can result in a better outcome or decision-making.  
C. Multi-hazard risk assessment 
Questions in this category investigate: 
• If and how existing risk assessment methodologies in own organisation take into account 
multi-hazards (Q7); 
• Barriers (Q8) and enablers (Q9) for undertaking or developing robust multi-hazard risk 
assessment in own organisation/sector. 
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Table 3-5 Summary of advantages (left) and pitfalls (right) of current methodologies and 
approaches used to undertake multi-hazard risk assessments 
 
 
(Q7) From the total number of respondents, 36% stated that their organisation takes into account 
multi-hazards (21.2% for industry, 9% for policy, 5.8% research), whereas 6% (3% policy, 3%, 
research, none for industry) answered negatively. Some respondents from the energy and transport 
sectors stated that their organisation partially takes into account multi-hazard risk assessment 
(6%), while for 3% of the policy representatives this is still work in progress. Finally, 58% from 
the total number of respondents did not answer the question directly. 
The methodologies and approaches employed by stakeholders vary from qualitative (e.g. narrative 
descriptions) to quantitative (probabilistic, scenario based, statistical), as categorized in section 
2.1.1.2. For example, stakeholders representing the energy sector use screening processes for 
combined (paired) hazards, whilst transport sector representatives strive to incorporate multi-
hazards into asset management systems and resilience strategy plans (without developing a full 
risk assessment). For strategic resilience planning at national scale, government departments use 
a “reasonably worse-case scenario” approach to assess the cascading risks and how they might 
impact a whole range of sectors. The environmental sector uses for instance probabilistic risk 
assessment approaches (e.g. joint probability analysis for river and coastal flooding) and multi-
variate analysis. The health and safety sector uses a combined approach of hazard and risk zoning 
and scenario analysis (see Box 1.)  
 
- Inform improved decision-making
- Defensible response plans
-Estimate of the joint probability of 
multiple hazards occuring
- Becoming more widely used and the 
literature is becoming more organised and 
mature for some specific hazard 
relationships
- Current methodologies are reasonably 
good at identifying and screening possible 
combinations of hazards
- Potentially better response, 
preparedness, mitigation
- Can reduce unknowns and "swiss cheese" 
effect of cascading disasters 
- Opportunity for inter-disciplinary 
collaborations
- Computational capacity
- Limited foresight due to reliance on past 
events
- The existance of different approaches which 
provide different answers and are case study 
specific
- Many of the current approaches are bivariate 
only and fail to take into account every-day 
natural hazards (e.g. heat increase)
- Lack of understanding of spatial - temporal 
contexts
- Lack of current currency in terms of 
consequences and risk metrics
- Insufficient data and knowledge to work with 
low probability events
- Many current approaches fail to take into 
account dynamic vulnerability and uncertainty
- Distinguishing between combined hazards 
and combined impacts
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Respondents were asked to identify barriers (Q8) and enablers (Q9) that hinder or support them in 
performing robust multi-hazard risk assessment within their organisation. These could be 
interpreted as possible drivers or motivators behind action/inaction (Table 3.5). They are 
categorised as follows: 
a. Collaboration and knowledge transfer. Respondents recognise that hazards experts are 
often siloed within organisations, i.e., they are experts in just ‘one’ hazard, and do not think 
across multiple hazards. This leads to a lack of understanding of which single hazards 
might affect a given region and time period and how these might interact. There is a need 
for more dialog between those involved in the fundamental science and those concerned 
with assessing impacts, particularly the less measurable ones, such as loss of productivity 
or psychological impact. Moreover, there is a lack of initiatives across UK research 
councils (research, training and knowledge exchange) that address the existing knowledge 
and skills gaps. Accordingly, a wider institutional partnerships and effective collaboration 
between disciplines and experts nationally and internationally (encouraged through across 
UK research council funding of research, training and knowledge exchange) is needed. 
b. Evidence-based research/knowledge. The lack of firm evidence on the need for multi-
hazard research (not enough research that demonstrates the usefulness of multi-hazard 
approaches) makes it difficult for industry stakeholders to provide a solid “needs case” for 
investing in multi-hazard research and development. Respondents also acknowledge the 
limited number of systematic reviews of current methodologies being used to understand 
multi-hazards. Therefore, more systematic reviews, evidence-based research and easier 
access to projects that provide new methodologies and approaches that help built consensus 
between academia and practice are needed. 
c. Data and uncertainties. Lack of data from reasonably well documented events (i.e. 
evidence that supports developments in science) and for changing vulnerability. 
Box 1 Case study: HSE’s Approach on multi-hazards 
The hazards (for COMAH) that HSE are interested in fall into three groups: thermal, overpressure 
and toxic. For modelling purposes, the first two are assessed from a hazard perspective by 
calculating thermal dose and pressure (bar) respectively, while toxic (describing the release of a 
toxic substance into the atmosphere) takes into account different release scenarios and is assessed 
based on risk. The levels of hazard and risk calculated are used to define geographical zones that 
delineate HSE’s dangerous dose (http://www.hse.gov.uk/chemicals/haztox.htm). There are three 
zones – inner, middle, outer – which are used for land use planning purposes. 
For sites that hold multiple substances, or store substances in different locations around a site, 
there is a need to construct combined zones on a site-by-site basis. Where the assessment is based 
on hazards only (e.g. multiple tanks holding the same substance, or sites with thermal and 
overpressure hazards), the zones are combined using a worse-case approach. This means that 
triggering, amplification, and compounding of hazards is not explicitly calculated. Where the 
assessment is based on risk (i.e. the likelihood of receiving a dangerous dose), the risk is combined 
by summing the likelihoods of the multiple hazards. 
For sites that combine toxic (risk) and thermal/pressure (hazard), the assessment combines the 
zones. 
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Uncertainties are inherently linked with the data and models used to assess and characterise 
vulnerability, exposure and hazard cascades. 
d. Resources. Lack of resources (time, computing power, specialist skills, funding for/from 
partner agencies to support development and pull through into information services of 
multi-hazard impact assessments), competing priorities and access to data due to 
confidentiality or commercially-sensitivity projects. 
e. Guidance. Participants note the lack of clarity from the regulator on which particular set of 
multi-hazard scenarios or which hazard combinations they should investigate. Therefore, 
they acknowledge the need for legislative incentives and guidance on how to apply multi-
hazard risk assessments, especially in industry. 
 
D. Gaps in knowledge and skills 
The last survey questions address current gaps in knowledge and skills for better understanding 
multi-hazard events and their impact (Q10) on one hand, and undertaking multi-hazard risk 
assessments (Q11) on the other hand. Stakeholders’ answers are classified and summarised below: 
a. Collaboration and knowledge transfer. Participants recognised the limited amount of 
knowledge transfer between multi-hazard professionals (academics and practitioners) and 
the lack of cross-hazard research to understand the relationships and interactions between 
processes. 
b. Process understanding. The primary gap in multi-hazard knowledge relates to the poor 
understanding of critical processes and associated uncertainties, as well as the physical, 
chemical and biological regimes within which they occur and potentially interact. Hazards 
do differ by their nature, intensity, return period and the effect they may have on exposed 
assets. Our knowledge about their physical manifestation is limited due to, for example, 
data limitations and measurement errors (epistemic uncertainty), or their natural variability 
(aleatory uncertainty). As a result, our understanding of process relations and interactions 
(i.e., understanding how one process influences the manifestation of another) is very 
limited. 
c. Lack of interoperability of hazard models and data. One limitation of the current methods 
and models is posed by the need to compare hazards with different process characteristics 
across different spatial scales. Few approaches to overcome this problem have been 
proposed. For instance, the Global Earthquake Model (GEM), have sought to standardise 
methodologies with partner organisations that focus on non-earthquake hazards - such as 
the Global Volcano Model (GVM), the Global Tsunami Model (GTM) and the global flood 
partnership (GFP). However, these approaches are possibly restricted to other organisations 
due to data and model availability, training and wider capacity issues. 
d. Receptor and impact information. Participants recognise there is a lack of impact and 
receptor data (exposure, vulnerability) collected in a consistent and systematic manner, 
which can then be used to analyse multi-hazard events and importantly help to understand 
the spatial and temporal dynamic processes associated with multi-hazard cascades. 
e. Resources and skills. Lack of skilled multi-hazard professionals (academics and 
practitioners) that have experience of understanding multi-hazards relationships, applying 
and developing appropriate multi-hazards risk assessment methodologies based on the 
available data and information. Moreover, there is limited experience and understanding of 
how to communicate the results of multi-hazard assessments to differing stakeholder 
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communities. Lastly, there is a need for more time and resource to review multi-hazard 
events after they have happened, and learn from these situations to help generate real 
modelled examples of multi-hazard processes.  
f. Governance. Stakeholders identified a lack of knowledge around the interdependencies 
between different agencies and government departments within the assessment of multi-
hazards processes. General guidance on what multi-hazard scenarios could affect the UK 
is also required. This could be a synthesis of the available information from academic and 
industrial sources dealing with the probabilities of multi-hazard events occurring. The 
synthesis could address all different types of impacts (e.g. human health, social, physical, 
etc.) and the dissemination of the information to a range of stakeholders. Finally, 
respondents acknowledge that the regulatory or legislative framework is currently not well 
adapted for the assessment of multi-hazards.  
 
3.2.3 Summary observations and gaps analysis 
The stakeholder survey provides a means to ground-truth the adoption of current research on multi-
hazards and evaluate the feasibility of risk assessment methodologies and approaches in practice. 
A number of summary observations result from the above analysis: 
• Stakeholders perceive the science of multi-hazard assessment as being immature. 
Although they generally have a reasonably good understanding of the range of scenarios 
that may be possible in their own sector, they regard the science and quantitative 
techniques to characterise these as poorly understood and developed. Therefore, the 
application of multi-hazard methodologies in real life is scarce. 
• While we can say that practitioners and scientists may understand most hazards 
individually, there is a lack of understanding on how these processes influence, trigger 
and/or amplify each other. Process understanding is acknowledge as being the primary 
gap in implementing multi-hazards risk assessments, which affects the capacity to test 
existing models or develop innovative ones. 
• If knowledge about the combined effect of interacting hazards is limited, the existing 
knowledge about methodologies and approaches used to quantify economic costs of 
multi-hazards is very scarce. Systematic data collection about exposure, vulnerability, 
impact and their dynamic modelling is key for advancing the state-of-the-art of multi-
hazard approaches in research and practice. Currently, in industry, such data is often 
lacking, not readily available or completely inaccessible. 
• Industry provides a limited number of examples where multi-hazard risk assessment 
approaches are taken into account. The energy sector provides a good case due to its 
experience in using a wide range of methods and tools (qualitative, quantitative, semi-
quantitative). Multi-hazard frameworks in policy on the other hand, focus on qualitative 
and semi-quantitative methods, which corresponds to their end purpose in most if not all 
the cases.  
• Current methodologies are difficult or impossible to apply in practice at large, especially 
when using complex models and simulations. There is a lack of practical guidance on 
how/when to use existing methods for those without a technical background (e.g. NGOs, 
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government, etc.). Moreover, methodologies and approaches that are accessible and 
useful might not always be applicable to different regions or case studies, therefore they 
need to be tested on a case-by-case basis to know if they can result in a better outcome or 
aid decision-making. 
• Private - public partnerships represent a good ground for transferring knowledge on multi-
hazard models and methods used across sectors, as demonstrated by the recent ETI 
Natural Hazards Project (ETI, 2018). Stronger collaboration and knowledge transfers 
between experts, institutions and sectors is recognised as an incentive for further 
development. 
• The barriers and enablers to effectively implement multi-hazard risk assessments are 
found in both the science and practice domains as well as between those sectors. The most 
common drivers behind action or inaction are related with the lack or state of existent 
collaboration and knowledge transfer; evidence-based research; uncertainties in the 
natural variability of processes, data and models; available resources and guidance (see 
Q8 and Q9 for details).   
 
• Accordingly, the gaps in knowledge and skills for the development and application of 
multi-hazard risk assessments are associated with the current process understanding; data, 
methods and models; existent information about exposure and impact; resources and 
skills needed to undertake the analysis; collaboration and knowledge transfer between 
stakeholders and the governance framework (see Q10 and Q11 for details). 
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4. Outcomes from the multi-hazard review 
4.1 CONCLUSIONS 
From the reviews and analysis undertaken as part of this study, and presented in detail in Sections 
2 and 3, there are a number of common conclusions that have been identified. These have been 
grouped into common themes and are outlined below: 
Multi-hazard approaches and assessment methodologies 
• There are many examples of single hazard risk assessment approaches in both the academic 
and grey literature, which treat natural hazards as independent phenomena, not recognising a 
range of potential relationships between hazards. Literature describing approaches to 
understand multi-hazard interactions is limited, with clear scope for further research and 
innovation, especially around understanding the physical processes which underlie the 
interactions between hazards and the assessment of the social economic impact of multi-hazard 
events. 
• The most developed multi-hazard assessment methods were found within the civil/structural 
engineering - applied to bridges and other critical infrastructure, and energy (nuclear power 
generation and electricity/gas distribution) communities. These methods currently focus on 
earthquake, wind and erosion hazards. 
• Many of the methods described are applied to simulated environments, rather than to actual 
geographical extents. This is due to the availability and quality of data needed to test methods 
in a real world context.  
• Many of the quantitative methods identified in Section 2.1.1.2 are developed and applied to a 
specific combination of two hazards. Real multi-hazard situations often involved multiple 
hazard types, and a range of interaction types. This approach can lead to a distortion of 
management priorities, an increased vulnerability to other spatially relevant hazards, or an 
underestimation of risk. 
• Interdependencies of receptors (e.g. people, infrastructure) are not explicitly modelled, 
especially in the social economic case studies, due to a lack of metrics and models that capture 
these relationships; rather they have been assumed that they are captured in some way in the 
reported damage, being based on actual prior events where interdependencies between 
receptors would have been observed. As such, there is a risk that the total cost of the impacts 
may be under-estimated. 
• Current methodologies are difficult or impossible to apply in practice at large, especially when 
using complex models and simulations. There is a lack of practical guidance on how/when to 
use existing methods for those without a technical background (e.g. NGOs, government, etc.). 
Moreover, methodologies and approaches that are accessible and useful might not always be 
applicable to different regions or case studies, therefore they need to be tested on a case-by-
case basis to know if they can result in a better outcome or decision-making. 
Multi-hazard risk assessment 
• Stakeholders have a need to better assess risk to multi-hazards by analysing the processes of 
cascading consequences. There needs to be better understanding and integration of hazards 
relationships and cascading consequences. 
• A comprehensive understanding of multi-hazard risk involves many stages, and therefore is a 
multidisciplinary and multi-method activity. Many of the studies characterised in this review 
integrated multiple methods to build understanding of multi-hazard relationships. 
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• The most appropriate level of information to generate a multi-hazard risk assessment will 
depend both on data availability and the end purpose. While a quantitative assessment of risk 
may be preferable in some contexts, other groups will prefer the development of maps or 
scenarios. Organisational discussion around these can help to guide institutional understanding 
of multi-hazard relationships, and build capacity to respond appropriately. 
• The hazard combinations of greatest interest across sectors lies with four multi-hazard 
scenarios: storm surges and flooding, extreme rainfall triggering landslides, river and coastal 
flooding, and strong winds, snow, ice and extreme cold. Stakeholders representing the 
transport, energy and geotechnical engineering services find most relevant combinations of 
geological (e.g., landslides, sinkholes, rockfalls), atmospheric (e.g., storms, rainfall) or/and 
hydrological hazards (e.g., river and groundwater flooding), while the policy sector is focused 
on a wider range of possible multi-hazards, both natural and anthropogenic.  
• Industry provides a limited number of examples where multi-hazard risk assessment 
approaches are taken into account. The energy sector provides a good case due to its experience 
in using a wide range of methods and tools (qualitative, quantitative, semi-quantitative). Multi-
hazard frameworks in policy on the other hand, focus on qualitative and semi-quantitative 
methods, which corresponds to their end purpose in most if not all the cases. 
• The barriers and enablers to effectively implement multi-hazard risk assessments are found in 
both the science and practice domains as well as between those sectors. The most common 
drivers behind action or inaction are related with the lack or state of existent collaboration and 
knowledge transfer; evidence-based research; uncertainties in the natural variability of 
processes, data and models; available resources and guidance.  
Economic costs of multi-hazards 
• A common theme from the academic papers is that there is no detail about how the economic 
costs were estimated, which makes it difficult to analyse and compare methods. Economic 
figures given in the case studies are only indicative and are subject to numerous uncertainties 
such as not accounting for increases of capital over time, which would raise costs, or the 
uncertainty and bias associated with loss data due to the wide variety of sources from which it 
is collected and by the multiple methods of collection (particularly with disaggregated 
information from the insurance industry). 
• There are practical difficulties in distinguishing between different multi-hazard processes and 
the associated impact. To estimate costs, we need to understand the unit cost to each impact 
and be able to multiply to the number of assets or people affected. Also, need to ensure that 
costs are being adjusted to represent full economic costs rather than solely financial costs. 
• Damage to infrastructure is often sequential and gets worse over time meaning that the impacts 
from one or multiple hazards could have been made worse due to several preceding hazards. 
In many of the case studies costs are gathered from repair work and insurance costs which may 
reflect impacts over time. Therefore, it is difficult to elicit the actual impacts from an event or 
distinguish between hazard impacts in an event, as the methods to estimate costs do not reflect 
this. There needs to be a method to adjust costs so that they reflect the true cost of the event 
being analysed. 
Terminology 
• Some stakeholders define multi-hazards to be the cascading consequences of one or more 
hazards, due to their focus on the impact of events on their particular industry (e.g. power 
shortage as a result of a wind storm). 
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4.2 GAPS (KNOWLEDGE/SKILLS) 
 From the conclusion and observations made in this review there are a number of gaps that have 
been identified and are outlined briefly below. Where relevant, potential opportunities have been 
highlighted to address the gaps: 
• Gap 1: Understanding of multi-hazard processes.  
The primary gaps in multi-hazard knowledge relate to our poor understanding of critical 
processes (and associated uncertainties), as well as the physical, chemical and biological 
regimes within which they occur. 
Opportunity: Research to understand physical processes behind multi-hazards. 
• Gap 2: Testing of multi-hazard assessment methodologies. More work is needed to test all 
the various multi-hazard assessment methodologies, outlined in Section 2.1.1.2, with more 
complex multi-hazard scenarios. Extending methods to more than two hazards could lead to 
much more complicated analyses and many scenarios in long-term risk assessments. 
Opportunity: Trial existing assessment methodologies to more complicated or alternative 
multi-hazard scenarios. 
• Gap 3: Understanding of multi-hazard concepts. Multi-hazards need to be thought of as 
seamless holistic processes that incorporate both natural and anthropogenic causes and are 
assessed through a joined up risk assessment methodology, where the hazards can initiate 
independently or dependently and then interact (e.g. trigger, amplify, coincide) as outline in 
Appendix 2. 
Opportunity: Sharing of best practice for joined-up approaches. 
• Gap 4: Limited understanding of UK multi-hazards. Some general guidance on what multi-
hazard scenarios could affect the UK. This would help to focus multi-hazard research into the 
most relevant areas and provide evidence for risk assessment approaches. 
Opportunity: Development and dissemination of guidance on UK multi-hazards 
• Gap 5: Accounting for differences between single and multi-hazards. Failure to look 
explicitly at the interdependencies between interacting hazards; rather they look at the 
summing up of single hazard events, which may occur at the same time. This is a common 
finding among the academic and grey literature reviewed and it seems it is more to do with a 
lack of models which can fully capture these multi-impacts systematically and consistently. 
• Gap 6: Assessing creeping changes in vulnerability associated with multi-hazards. Multi-
hazard risk assessments are often more qualitative than quantitative and do not incorporate 
temporal changes in vulnerability during successive hazards, resulting in an under estimation 
of the potential impacts. This highlights a large knowledge gap in understanding the natural 
physical processes and their interaction with potential receptors (e.g. infrastructure, buildings, 
people). As a result there is very little good practice documented in the UK and internationally 
to help guide and bridge this gap. 
• Gap 7: Lack of data for understanding costs. There is a lack of impact and receptor data 
collected, in a consistent and systematic manner, which can be analysed relative to the 
recommend full ideal cost model outlined in this report (Section 2.2.1). The impacts and the 
costing of numerous impacts including: non-marketed outcomes like pain, grief and suffering 
need to be considered, but will add significant complexity. 
• Gap 8: Lack of in-depth case studies. Case studies based on actual prior events where 
interdependencies between different receptors are known would be an advantage and produce 
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better social economic case studies that look at the true total cost of impacts and hence not 
under-estimate them. 
Opportunity: Develop more case studies accounting for interdependencies 
• Gap 9: Assessment of cost differences. None of the social economic case studies, in this 
review (Section 2.2), could prove if the sum of the impacts and the associated full economic 
costs of a multi-hazard event would be greater than the sum of the individual hazards due to 
accumulation of damage.  
Opportunity: Simulations should be used to prove a way to look at multi-hazards as if they 
occurred independently of one another and compare the impacts and the associated full 
economic costs with a multi-hazards scenario. 
• Gap 10: Better links between science and industry/policy. Greater dialogue between natural 
hazard scientists and other professionals working with risk assessment methodologies (e.g. 
civil/structural engineers). 
Opportunity: Facilitate further collaboration between academia and industry/policy. 
• Gap 11: Baseline knowledge of multi-hazards. Lack of skilled multi-hazard professionals 
(academics and practitioners) that have experience of understanding multi-hazards 
relationships, applying and developing appropriate multi-hazards risk assessment 
methodologies based on the available data and information.  
• Gap 12: Knowledge transfer and communication. Limited amount of knowledge transfer 
between multi-hazard professionals (academics and practitioners). Limited experience and 
understanding of how to communicate the results of multi-hazard assessments to differing 
stakeholder communities. 
• Gap 13: Lack of regulatory or legislative framework. A framework would help to ensure 
the application and assessment of multi-hazards by Government and industry. 
4.3 RECOMMENDATIONS 
From this review, in light of the barriers and enablers identified in Section 3.2.2 and gaps in 
knowledge and skills indicated above, a number of recommendations have been identified: 
• Workshop to share best practice identified in this review (including contributions from those 
applying best practice). 
• Build a multi-hazard community that brings together academic, industry and policy 
representatives from the scientific, social science, engineering and other professional 
disciplines to address the multidisciplinary and multi-method nature of multi-hazards risk 
assessment methodologies. In Appendix 9, we note the range of disciplines that could be 
involved in multi-hazard work, and in Appendix 10, we note select forums, conferences and 
networks that could help to build a multi-hazard community. A multi-hazard community would 
aim to develop more integrated hazards and disaster research, and bridge silos within and 
between research, industry and policy communities. A multi-hazard community is being 
proposed within the European Geosciences Union, which if accepted could help to foster 
dialogue between hazards researchers, with a view to engaging with those outside of academia. 
A community of practice, coordinated by a professional body (e.g., Institute of Civil Engineers) 
could also help to bring together stakeholders from diverse sectors, but would have to ensure 
diverse disciplines were also represented. If effective, a multi-hazard community could lead to 
agreement of common/accepted/standard terminology across disciplines and industries and 
knowledge exchange of the methods used to assess point source receptors (e.g. bridges) or 
spatially extensive receptors (spatial considerations). There could also be knowledge exchange 
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on how to deal with the difference between the fast and slow on-set of multi-hazards events 
(temporal considerations).  
• Some general guidance on what multi-hazard scenarios could affect the UK. 
• Guidance on multi-hazard methodologies and approaches used to assess them. This could be a 
synthesis of the available information from academic and industrial sources and provide a 
common framework for aiding multi-hazard assessment methodologies into practice. 
• Case studies based on actual prior events where interdependencies between different receptors 
would be an advantage and produce better social economic case studies that look at the true 
total cost of impacts and hence not under-estimate them. 
• Funding call (and /or special issue peer-review publications) to encourage publishing and 
capture of multi-hazard approaches/applications.
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 Project outcomes 
For this study, we used a research data management informed by an objective and comprehensive 
assessment of the evidence base, together with the need to make the most of existing knowledge. 
The approach that was followed used the principles outlined by Collins et al. (2015) in “The 
Production of Quick Scoping Reviews and Rapid Evidence Assessments”. The outcomes of the 
project and their associated WP are listed below. 
 
Table A1. Project deliverables associated with the methodology illustrated in Fig 1.1. 
WP Deliverables Section/Appendix 
1 Successful delivery of this project (D11 in Fig. 1.1) Project report, 
workshop 
1 A database of stakeholders involved with multi-hazard assessments in 
academia and practice (industry and policy) and their landscape mapping (D1 
in Fig. 1.1) 
Appendix 6, Section 
3.1 
2 A review of terminology and definitions around multi-hazard events and risk 
assessments (D2 in Fig .1.1) 
Appendix 2 
2 A database of existing literature – including past/current projects – and 
past/current evidence from practice (industry/policy) on multi-hazards 
research & innovation (D3 in Fig. 1.1) 
Appendix 3 
2 A list of disciplines which could inform multi-hazard research and risk 
assessment 
Appendix 9 
2 A list of relevant initiatives, forums and conferences  Appendix 10 
2 Identification of case studies for the analysis of socio-economic impacts from 
multi-hazard events (D4 in Fig. 1.1) 
Section 2.2, Appendix 
4 
2 Summary observations from the analysis of past and current academic and 
practice (industry and policy) based projects, research and approaches in 
multi-hazard processes, impact and risk assessment (D5 in Fig. 1.1) 
Section 2.1.1.3, 
2.1.2.3, 2.2.4 
3 An overview of the current industry and policy awareness of and approaches 
used to assess multi-hazard risks (D6 in Fig. 1.1) 
Section 3 
3 Transcripts of interviews and questionnaires Appendix 11 
4 A review and summary of gaps, barriers and potential future enablers to 
progress multi-hazard research in the UK (D8 to D10 in Fig. 1.1) 
Section 3 and Section 
4 
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 Definition of multi-hazard & associated 
terminology 
A1. Overview 
In this Appendix, we first evaluate ‘multi-hazard’ definitions in the peer-review and grey literature, 
and the extent to which others then refer to these definitions (Section A2). We examine 
consistencies/differences with the working definition proposed in the UKRI ‘invitation to quote’ 
document (UKRI, 2018):  
“‘Multi-hazard’ is the succession of the same hazard, or combinations of different hazards that 
occur within a time and/or space window that generate an impact that is different to that of the 
individual hazards in isolation, through one or more of the following mechanisms:  
(1) Interact with each other to change the impact  
(2) Change the background conditions thus changing the likelihood or severity of subsequent 
hazards  
(3) Interact with the infrastructure network at different points or times, which may change the 
resilience/flexibility of the network.  
Importantly, the outcome of the impact will be different to a scenario where the hazards 
occurred in isolation. This may be an amplified, modified or even reduced impact to that 
expected by a single hazard.”  
We also discuss variation in terminology associated with hazard relationships (Section A3). 
A2. Definitions of Multi-Hazard 
a. Review Context 
‘Multi-hazard’ approaches have long been advocated for (e.g. Hewitt and Burton, 1971), and are 
now widely encouraged by major frameworks to facilitate disaster risk reduction (DRR). For 
example, both the UN Hyogo Framework (2005–2015) and Sendai Framework for Disaster Risk 
Reduction (2015–2030) advocate for DRR to be ‘multi-hazard’ (UNISDR, 2015). Despite this 
encouragement of multi-hazard approaches, the term is rarely explicitly defined. This has resulted 
in some academics (e.g. Kappes et al., 2012; Garcia-Aristizabal et al., 2013; Duncan, 2014; Gill 
and Malamud, 2014; Liu et al., 2015) commentating that ‘multi-hazard’ (or ‘multihazard’) is 
frequently being used to mean different things by different authors. 
In 2017, the UNISDR therefore added ‘multi-hazard’ to their list of defined terminology, ensuring 
those implementing and monitoring progress against the Sendai Framework for Disaster Risk 
Reduction (SFDRR) have clarity regarding what is necessary to fulfil its aim and guiding 
principles. Their definition is: 
“Multi-hazard means (1) the selection of multiple major hazards that the country faces, and (2) 
the specific contexts where hazardous events may occur simultaneously, cascadingly or 
cumulatively over time, and taking into account the potential interrelated effects.” (UNISDR, 
2017) 
In this context, multi-hazard approaches are considered to include but extend beyond the collation 
(or overlay) of distinct information for multiple single natural hazards (or ‘multi-layer single 
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hazard’ approaches), to also characterise different relationships (see Section A3) between natural 
hazards. This definition aligns with the UKRI (2018) definition, and some (but not all) uses of the 
term ‘multi-hazard’ in the literature. It is currently unclear if an agreed UNISDR definition of 
multi-hazard will help to improve consistency in the use of this term within the broader natural 
hazards and DRR communities. 
b. Review Methodology and Characterisation of Results 
In this section, we describe and present the results of a short review to determine how ‘multi-
hazard’ is defined in academic (peer-review and grey) published literature, and the extent to which 
these definitions are consistent with other proposed definitions (e.g. UNISDR, 2017; UKRI, 2018). 
We completed a search for short phrases that are logically followed or preceded by a definition of 
‘multi-hazard/s’ or ‘multihazard/s’, in order to ensure explicit attempts to define these terms were 
included. We note nine search terms in Table A1, together with the number of returned results. 
Table A1. Nine search terms used to understand the definition of multi-hazard in peer-review and grey literature. 
All searches were done with Google Scholar, and a search date of 9 August 2018.  
Search Term 
Returned results where ‘x’ = … 
multi-hazard multi-hazards multihazard multihazards 
“define x” 5 1 0 0 
“definition of x” 13 0 3 0 
“defined x” 6 0 0 0 
“x can be defined” 0 0 0 0 
“x definition” 0 1 1 0 
“x means” 2 0 0 0 
“x is” 50 37 7 7 
“z suggests” 0 0 0 0 
“the term x” 21 7 10 1 
 
These searches returned 172 results, of which 144 were unique papers and reports. Of the 144 
unique results, these included 54 journal articles, 28 Masters and PhD theses, 24 conference 
papers, 15 books/book chapters, 15 technical reports, and 8 miscellaneous items of literature 
(workshop reports, presentations, patent applications, legal documents). The 144 unique results 
were largely published after 2010, as illustrated in Figure A1. We outline our analysis of the 
context of the 144 unique search results in the next section. 
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Figure A1. Number of unique search results (using the terms in Table A1) by year. 
 
While a context analysis of any paper referring to multi-hazard/multihazard (16,500 returns on 
Google Scholar, 15 August 2018) could allow us to determine the implicit way in which many 
more authors’ use this term, and thus highlight other definitions of the term multi-hazard, this is 
beyond the scope of our review. We believe our search approach, focusing on more explicit 
definitions, captures a range of ways in which the term is used. While it is possible that additional 
search terms could identify further definitions of ‘multi-hazard’, it is more likely that they would 
generate additional examples of definitions already included within our search results. The 
significant number of returns not explicitly defining the term multi-hazard highlights the challenge 
of this being a term that is frequently used, but rarely defined (Kappes et al., 2012; Garcia-
Aristizabal et al., 2013; Duncan, 2014; Gill and Malamud, 2014). Approximately 172 (or just over 
1%) of the 16,500 returns for multi-hazard/multihazard include a definition (either original or 
referenced) of what they mean by the term.  
c. Review Analysis 
Of the 144 unique results, access was available to 126 (88%) of these articles with others restricted 
by language, embargoes, or paywall barriers. Using the 126 available results, we first assessed 
these for relevance to the specific question ‘how is multi-hazard defined in the context of natural 
hazards and/or risk?’ and then captured the proposed definition and if and how this relates to other 
definitions in the literature. We found that 30 (24%) of the 126 results clearly define multi-hazard, 
either in their own words (19 of the results) or by referencing an existing definition (11 of the 
results). The remaining results are either not relevant to the question, use the term multi-hazard 
but not in a context where it is defined within the paper, or refer to a piece of software (Hazus-
MH, or Hazus MultiHazard) produced by the US Federal Emergency Management Agency 
(FEMA).  
The 30 results defining multi-hazard are presented in Table A2, placed into two groups according 
to how they define multi-hazard. The first group includes nine definitions that focus on multiple 
hazard types that could spatially overlap, but that are generally treated as being independent. The 
second group includes 21 definitions that focus on multiple hazard types that could spatially 
overlap, with relationships between these hazards (i.e., non-independence). 
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Table A2. Definitions of the term multi-hazard used in the academic (peer-review and grey) literature, including 
referenced work if the definition is extracted from elsewhere. 
a. More than one hazard type, independent occurrence of hazards, or overlap of single hazards. 
Source Definition Used Referenced Work 
USA Public Law 
106-390 (2000) 
'Multihazard advisory map' means a map on which hazard data 
concerning each type of natural disaster is identified simultaneously for 
the purpose of showing areas of hazard overlap. 
N/A 
Lee et al. (2003) The newly defined "multi-hazard engineering" is meant to emphasize an 
integrated and cost-effective disaster operation against all types of serious 
hazards. 
N/A 
Franklin County 
(2011)  
“Multi-Hazard” was used where the initiative would apply to more than 
one hazard type. 
N/A 
Ballarin-Denti and 
Oliveri (2011) 
We can define multi-hazard assessment as the evaluation of the 
occurrence probability of dangerous events arising from a variety of 
sources/processes in the same site. 
N/A 
van Westen 
(2012). 
[Multi-hazard] is often used to indicate all relevant hazards that are 
present in a specific area, while in the scientific context it frequently 
refers to “more than one hazard”. 
N/A 
Corominas et al. 
(2014) 
Multi-hazard assessment should, sensu stricto, refer to the joint 
probability of independent events occurring in the same area in a given 
time span. 
N/A 
Eshrati et al. 
(2015) 
Multi‑hazards risk can be interpreted as the consideration of multiple (if 
possible all relevant) hazards posing risk to a certain area under 
observation. 
N/A 
Klibi et al. (2018) 'Multi-hazard' is used to refer to area exposed to several natural disasters 
of different types during the planning horizon 
N/A 
Clark-Ginsberg et 
al. (2018) 
We understand multi-hazard risk assessments as the process of 
identifying, categorizing by a normalized probability and impact, and 
comparing risks found within the same context or circumstance. 
N/A 
 
b. Multiple hazards and relationships between these hazards. 
Source Definition Used Referenced Work 
King (1995) Multi-hazard refers to the consideration of ground shaking and the 
secondary site effects of soil amplification, liquefaction, landslide, and 
surface fault rupture. 
N/A 
May (2007) This new concept [multihazard] related multiple hazards to each other 
through causation sequences. 
N/A 
Wylie (2008) The concept of the multi-hazard is presented, as hazards seldom occur in 
isolation, one often induces another. 
N/A 
 53 
Source Definition Used Referenced Work 
Kappes et al. 
(2012) 
Delmonaco et al. (2006b, p. 15) define multi-hazard analyses as the 
“[i]mplementation of methodologies and approaches aimed at assessing 
and mapping the potential occurrence of different types of natural hazards 
in a given area.” The employed methods “have to take into account the 
characteristics of the single hazardous events […] as well as their mutual 
interactions and interrelations (e.g. landslide induced earthquake, floods 
and landslides triggered by extreme rainfall, natural disasters as 
secondary effect from main disaster types)” (Delmonaco et al., 2006b, p. 
15). 
Delmonaco et al. 
(2006) 
Garcia-Aristizabal 
and Di Ruocco 
(2013) 
Multi-hazard… can be defined as “the process to determine the 
probability of occurrence of different hazards, either occurring at the 
same time or shortly following each other, because they are dependent 
upon one another or because they are caused by the same triggering event 
or hazard, or merely threaten the same elements at risk without 
chronological coincidence” (European Commission, 2010; Garcia-
Aristizabal et al., 2012). 
European 
Commission (2010); 
Garcia-Aristizabal et 
al. (2012) 
Garcia-Aristizabal 
et al. (2013) 
Multi-hazard is a wide concept that, in general terms, can be split into 
two possible lines of applications: (1) multi-hazard assessment may be 
seen as the process of assessing different (independent) hazards 
threatening a given (common) area, and (2) it represents the process of 
assessing possible interactions and/or cascade effects among the different 
hazardous events. 
N/A 
Xu et al. (2014) Multi-hazards are multiple hazards that occur in a certain region during a 
particular period of time, whether the hazards are related in consequence 
or not. 
Hewitt and Burton 
(1971); Kappes 
(2011) 
Duncan (2014) Multi-hazard is defined as comprising two key components, which 
require determination through an analysis of varying temporal and spatial 
scales: (1) more than one hazard, (2) interrelations between hazards. 
N/A 
Echevarria (2014) It could be argued that multihazard implies multiple hazards acting 
simultaneously or sequentially, but it could also be argued that 
multihazard implies that a structural component has the inherent ability 
to resist multiple hazards without specific hardening for each separate 
hazard. 
N/A 
Gill and Malamud 
(2014) 
We also use the term [multihazards] to refer to all possible and relevant 
hazards, and their interactions, in a given spatial region and/or temporal 
period. 
N/A 
Chen et al. (2015) [Multi-hazard] is regarded as all hazard scenarios that possibly occur in 
bridge life-cycle, including hazard scenarios of a single hazard and 
hazard scenarios of hazard combination. 
N/A 
Liu (2015) It [multi-hazard] takes into account the characteristics of each hazardous 
event (e.g. probability, frequency, magnitude), and their mutual 
interactions and interrelations (e.g. one hazard may occur repeatedly in 
time; different hazards may independently occur in the same place; 
different hazards may occur dependently in the same place) (Kappes et 
al., 2012; Marzocchi et al., 2012). 
Kappes et al. (2012); 
Marzocchi et al. 
(2012) 
PHAROS (2015) [We] consider the term multi-hazard to be a holistic one, stressing the 
necessity for a broader approach (spatially, scientifically, technically), 
taking into account effects and relationships beyond the pure (limited) 
scope of a single hazard. 
Gill and Malamud 
(2014) 
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Source Definition Used Referenced Work 
Bibi and Rahman 
(2015) 
The term “multi-hazards” refers to all expected and related hazards, and 
their interactions, in a given spatial region over a temporal period (Gill 
and Malamud, 2014). It is used in most cases closely related to the 
objective of risk reduction (Kappes et al. 2012). 
Gill and Malamud, 
(2014); Kappes et al. 
(2012) 
Liu et al. (2015) ‘Multi-hazard assessment’ may be understood as the process: "to 
determine the probability of occurrence of different hazards either 
occurring at the same time or shortly following each other, because they 
are dependent from one another or because they are caused by the same 
triggering event or hazard, or merely threatening the same elements at 
risk without chronological coincidence. (European Commission 2010)". 
European 
Commission (2010) 
Harbitz et al. 
(2016) 
Multi-hazard… can be defined as “the process to determine the 
probability of occurrence of different hazards, either occurring at the 
same time or shortly following each other, because they are dependent 
upon one another or because they are caused by the same triggering event 
or hazard, or merely threaten the same elements at risk without 
chronological coincidence” (European Commission, 2010). Following 
this definition, multi-hazard analysis comprises both the process of 
analysing different (independent) hazards threatening a given (common) 
area, and the process of analysing possible interactions and/or cascade 
effects among the different types of hazardous events. 
European 
Commission (2010) 
Hart and Dawke 
(2016) 
A useful example framework for what constitutes a multi-hazard 
approach has been described by Gill and Malamud (2014), as illustrated 
in Figure 3. This approach involves four key steps that form a critical 
pathway for moving from a multi-layer ‘single hazard’ approach to a 
‘multi-hazard’ approach. 
Gill and Malamud 
(2014) 
Gill and Malamud 
(2017) 
The term multi-hazard was defined as meaning “all possible and relevant 
hazards and their interactions, in a given spatial region and/or temporal 
period” 
Gill and Malamud 
(2014) 
Marasco et al. 
(2017) 
The concept of multihazard is defined as the “implementation of 
methodologies and approaches aimed at assessing and mapping the 
potential occurrence of different types of natural hazards in a given area. 
The employed methods have to take into account the characteristics of 
the single hazardous events as well as their mutual interactions and 
interrelations” (Delmonaco et al. 2007). 
Delmonaco et al. 
(2007) 
Christou et al. 
(2017) 
“Multihazard” refers to hazards that can be either correlated or 
uncorrelated, and either sequential or nonsequential. 
N/A 
Espinosa-Vega et 
al. (2017) 
Multi-hazard describes the presence of more than one relevant hazard in 
the geosystem with different levels of interaction. 
N/A 
 
Eleven results in Table A2 refer to definitions of multi-hazard expressed by others, drawing on 7 
publications (5 of which are in addition to those listed above, and 2 of which are included above): 
Hewitt and Burton (1971); Delmonaco et al. (2007); European Commission (2010); Kappes 
(2011); Marzocchi et al. (2012); Garcia-Aristizabal et al. (2012); and Gill and Malamud (2014). 
While Kappes et al. (2012) is also referenced, this itself refers back to Delmonaco et al. (2007). 
We outline these definitions in Table A3.  
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Table A3. Cited definitions of multi-hazard in the search results outlined in Table A2. 
Source Definition Used 
Hewitt and Burton 
(1971) 
[N.B. Uses the term ‘cross-hazard’ rather than ‘multi-hazard’] A review of the literature 
quickly reveals that most work has been on single hazards, whereas the expanded concern 
demands a more systematic cross-hazard approach. It was with this in mind that the “all-
hazards-at-a-place” research design was formulated…. Hazards may be “simple”, “compound”, 
or “multiple”.  
Delmonaco et al. 
(2007) 
Implementation of methodologies and approaches aimed at assessing and mapping the potential 
occurrence of different types of natural hazards in a given area. Analytical methods and mapping 
have to take into account the characteristics of the single hazardous events (e.g. affected area, 
intensity/magnitude, frequency of occurrence) as well as their mutual interactions and 
interrelations (e.g. landslide-induced earthquake, floods and landslides triggered by extreme 
rainfall, natural disasters as secondary effect from main disaster types). 
European 
Commission 
(2010) 
Multi-hazard assessments determine the likelihood of occurrence of different hazards either 
occurring at the same time or shortly following each other, because they are dependent from 
one another or because they are caused by the same triggering event or hazard, or merely 
threatening the same elements at risk (vulnerable/ exposed elements) without chronological 
coincidence. 
Kappes (2011) The totality of relevant hazards in a defined area, whereby relevant has to be clearly defined 
according to the specific situation and setting. 
Marzocchi et al. 
(2012) 
Multi-risk assessment… requires the use of the same space-time window, the same metric for 
losses evaluation, and to account for the possible interactions among the risks, both in terms of 
probabilistic hazard and vulnerability. 
Garcia-Aristizabal 
et al. (2013) 
Multi-hazard is a wide concept that, in general terms, can be split into two possible lines of 
applications: (1) multi-hazard assessment may be seen as the process of assessing different 
(independent) hazards threatening a given (common) area, and (2) it represents the process of 
assessing possible interactions and/or cascade effects among the different hazardous events. 
Gill and Malamud 
(2014) 
We also use the term [multihazards] to refer to all possible and relevant hazards, and their 
interactions, in a given spatial region and/or temporal period. A multihazard risk assessment 
should identify all possible and relevant hazards and the valid comparison of their contributions 
to hazard potential, including the contribution to hazard potential from hazard interactions and 
spatial/temporal coincidence of hazards, while also taking into account the dynamic nature of 
vulnerability to multiple stresses. 
 
From Tables A2 and A3 we note that definitions proposed generally fall into one of two groups 
(multiple independent hazards, multiple hazards and their interactions), with only little variation 
in the detail included within the definition. The majority of the definitions in Tables A2 and A3 
fall into the latter category, including relationships between natural hazards. This aligns with the 
UNISDR (2017) and UKRI (2018) definitions.  
Spatial considerations (hazards affecting the same site) are more frequently highlighted than 
temporal considerations (hazards occurring one after another, whether due to causation effects or 
not). Most of the definitions recognise that multiple hazards (whether related or not) can occur in 
a specific region (e.g. van Westen, 2012; Xu et al., 2014; Gill and Malamud, 2014; Eshrati et al., 
2015; Klibi et al., 2018) and this results in calls to assess areas of hazard overlap (e.g. USA Public 
Law 106-390, 2000). Fewer definitions characterise the temporal implications of a multi-hazard 
scenario, although this factor is more prevalent in the definitions where relationships between 
hazards are included (e.g. Garcia-Aristizabal and Di Ruocco, 2013; Xu et al., 2014; Duncan, 2014; 
Gill and Malamud, 2014; Chen et al., 2015; Christou et al. (2017).  
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Both the UNISDR (2017) and UKRI (2018) definitions incorporate spatial and temporal 
considerations, linking to the occurrence of natural hazards in a defined time and/or space window. 
UNISDR (2017) focuses on national spatial scales, and UKRI (2018) focuses on ‘infrastructure 
networks’ which can range from local, regional, national or multi-national scales. Both note 
relationships occurring over time, but neither places limitations on the temporal scale that 
relationships can occur. It is important that any definition is not too restrictive, as relevant multi-
hazard relationships could have an impact days, weeks, months or years after the occurrence of a 
primary hazards. For example, an earthquake may change slope conditions so as to immediately 
trigger landslides (minutes to hours afterwards) or to increase the likelihood of landslides during 
a following monsoon (weeks to months afterwards).  
Although some of the definitions relate their definition to ‘impact’ or ‘elements at risk’ (e.g. 
Garcia-Aristizabal et al., 2013; Liu et al., 2015), most of the definitions are limited to 
characterising hazard processes (e.g. Wylie, 2008; Duncan, 2014; Gill and Malamud, 2014; Xu et 
al., 2014; Christou et al., 2017; Espinosa-Vega et al., 2017). This contrasts with the UKRI (2018) 
definition, which specifically relates multi-hazard events to an impact that is different to that of 
individual hazards occurring in isolation. Impacts can vary, and could include damage to 
infrastructure, loss of lives, injuries, loss of livelihoods, economic losses, or changes to 
institutional responses. We suggest that any general definition of multi-hazard, recognises this 
range of potential impacts, and is not too restrictive on what the cumulative impacts of multiple 
hazards must be for a situation to be regarded as multi-hazard.  
A3. Hazard Interaction Types and Terminology 
In addition to returning definitions of ‘multi-hazard’, the search outlined in Section A2 concurred 
with Kappes et al. (2012) and van Westen et al. (2014) that there is wide variation in the 
terminology used to describe relationships between natural hazards (e.g. interactions, 
interrelationships) and specific types of relationship (e.g. triggering, cascading, coincident). 
Kappes et al. (2012) note that these different terms are also rarely defined. Some authors have 
characterised these relationships and developed taxonomies to describe different ways by which 
one hazard may relate to another hazard, as outlined in Table A4. 
Table A4. Four taxonomies of hazard relationships presented in the academic literature. 
Paper Taxonomy of Hazard Relationships 
Kappes et al. (2010) i. One process triggers the next (cascades, domino effects). 
ii. Changes to the disposition (e.g. frequency, magnitude alterations) of one 
hazard is altered by another. 
Duncan (2014) i. Causation (hazards generate secondary events, which may occur immediately 
or shortly after the primary hazard, including cascading hazards). 
ii. Association (hazards increase the probability of secondary events, but it is 
difficult to quantify this link and therefore confirm causation). 
iii. Amplification or alleviation (hazards exacerbate or reduce future hazards). 
iv. Coincidence (hazards occur in the same place simultaneously, or closely 
timed, resulting in compounded effects or secondary hazards). 
Gill and Malamud (2014); 
Gill and Malamud (2016) 
i. Triggering relationships (extending beyond hazard pairs to result in linear or 
non-linear networks of hazard interactions).  
ii. Changes in the background conditions to change the likelihood (increase or 
decrease) of a further hazard. 
iii. Spatial and/or temporal coincidence of two hazards. 
van Westen et al. (2014) i. Coupled hazards (different hazard types triggered by the same event). 
ii. Changes to the disposition of one hazard by the actions of another hazard. 
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iii. Chains, with one hazard causing the next and resulting in cascades or 
concatenated hazards. 
 
While each author presents a slightly different taxonomy, there are strong commonalities between 
them with three emerging types of hazard relationship. They all describe triggering as one hazard 
relationship where one hazard causes another hazard to occur. This can result in chains, networks 
of cascades of hazards. They also all note an amplification effect, whereby the occurrence of one 
hazard can change the likelihood and/or magnitude of additional hazards in the future. While this 
could be a reduction in likelihood/magnitude, of more pertinence to disaster risk reduction are 
situations where one hazard results in an increase in the likelihood and magnitude of another 
hazard. The third type of hazard relationship is compound hazards, described in terms of hazards 
coinciding in space and/or time with impacts greater than the sum of the two. This could be due to 
a primary hazard triggering multiple secondary hazards within a given timeframe, or the 
coincidence of two independent hazards. The latter includes situations where hazards occur 
consecutively, with one hazard changing the vulnerability so as to make exposed assets more 
susceptible to the impacts of a following hazard. 
A4. Conclusions 
While a range of definitions of multi-hazard exist, many of these share two critical factors in 
common: (a) recognition that a region may be susceptible to multiple hazards, (b) recognition these 
multiple hazards may relate to one another through different relationship types (i.e., triggering, 
amplification, compound hazards). The UNISDR (2017) definition of multi-hazard captures these 
two critical components.  
“Multi-hazard means (1) the selection of multiple major hazards that the country faces, and (2) 
the specific contexts where hazardous events may occur simultaneously, cascadingly or 
cumulatively over time, and taking into account the potential interrelated effects.” (UNISDR, 
2017) 
While some definitions articulate the importance of assessing multi-hazard relationships (e.g. we 
do this because the impacts may be greater than the sum of their parts), this is more generally 
included in the narrative around the definition rather than as a substantial part of the definition.  
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 Database of existing academic literature 
and past/current evidence from practice (Industry & 
Policy) 
[See separate file A3_NERC_Multi-Hazard_Literature Compilation_Academia and 
A3_NERC_Multi-Hazard_Literature Compilation_Practice.xls) 
  
AUTHORS TITLE PUBLICATION VOL. NO. PAGES YEAR PUBLISHER HYPERLINK ABSTRACT
Bhartia, Binod Kumar; 
Vanmarcke, Erik H; 
Multi-hazard risk analysis: case of a simple 
offshore structure
NATIONAL CENTER 
FOR EARTHQUAKE 
ENGINEERING 
RESEARCH, Technical 
Report NCEER-88-
0023 1988
National 
Center for 
Earthquake 
Engineering 
Research
https://nehrpsearch.nist.gov/static/files
/NSF/PB89145213.pdf
This report develops and illustrates methodology for multi-mode, multi-hazard risk assessment. The case 
study involves an offshore structure subjected to earthquake shaking and storm-generated wind, wave, 
and current loads. Two classes of risks are calculated: (1) conditional failure probabilities under short-
term loads; and (2) long-term or overall risks, which depend on occurrence patterns of loads of different 
intensities. This report shows that the relative importance of different loads depends on the limit states 
and on the load and structural characteristics. For a flexible offshore structure, the storm loads 
dominates in the case of a displacement limit state, but is unimportant compared to the earthquake load 
in relation to an acceleration limit state. Parameter uncertainty is shown to always increase the long-
term risk; in the case study, the increase is more pronounced for the displacement limit state than for 
the acceleration limit state. Also, it is shown that the ambient load increases the risk due to earthquake 
loads alone, especially at the lower resistance levels.
Bhartia, BK; Vanmarcke, EH; 
Multi-hazard risk assessment of an offshore 
structure
Structural Safety and 
Reliability 447-454 1989 ASCE
http://cedb.asce.org/CEDBsearch/recor
d.jsp?dockey=0064335
This paper develops and illustrates a methodology for multi-hazard modal risk assessment. The case 
study involves assessing risk to an offshore structure in a load environment consisting of earthquakes 
and seastorms. The risks, both short-term and long-term, are assessed in function of two limit states 
defined respectively in terms of the allowable displacement and acceleration at the deck of the structure. 
A clear distinction is made between the physical and parameter uncertainty present in the system, and 
the effect of the latter explicitly quantified on the response statistics as well as on risks. The paper also 
determines the influence of ambient load on the earthquake safety and performs sensitivity analyses.
Van Westen, Cees J; Montoya, 
Lorena; Boerboom, Luc; Badilla 
Coto, Elena; 
Multi-hazard risk assessment using GIS in 
urban areas: a case study for the city of 
Turrialba, Costa Rica
Proc. Regional 
workshop on Best 
Practise in Disaster 
Mitigation, Bali 120-136 2002
https://www.researchgate.net/profile/
CJ_Westen/publication/228809150_Mu
lti-
Hazard_Risk_Assessment_using_GIS_in
_urban_areas_A_case_study_for_the_ci
ty_of_Turrialba_Costa-
Rica/links/0c9605238d87160e2300000
0.pdf
In the framework of the UNESCO sponsored project on “Capacity Building for Natural Disaster 
Reduction” a case study was carried out on multi-hazard risk assessment of the city of Turrialba, located 
in the central part of Costa Rica. The city with a population of 33,000 people is located in an area, which 
is regularly affected by flooding, landslides and earthquakes. In order to assist the local emergency 
commission and the municipality, a pilot study was carried out in the development of a GIS –based 
system for risk assessment and management. The work was made using an orthophoto as basis, on 
which all buildings, land parcels and roads, withinthe city and its direct surroundings were digitized, 
resulting in a digital parcel map, for which a number of hazard and vulnerability attributes were collected 
in the field. Based on historical information a GIS database was generated, which was used to generate 
flood depth maps for different return periods. For determining the seismic hazard a modified version of 
the Radius approach was used and the landslide hazard was determined based on the historical landslide 
inventory and a number of factor maps, using a statistical approach. The cadastral database of the city 
was used, in combination with the various hazard maps for different return periods to generate 
vulnerability maps for the city. In order to determine cost of the elements at risk, differentiation was 
made between the costs of the constructions and the costs of the contents of the buildings. The cost 
maps were combined with the vulnerability maps and the hazard maps per hazard type for the different 
return periods, in order to obtain graphs of probability versus potential damage. The resulting database 
can be a tool for local authorities to determine the effect of certain mitigation measures, for which a cost-
benefit analysis can be carried out. The database also serves as an important tool in the disaster 
preparedness phase of disaster management at the municipal level.
Khatsu, Petevilie; Van Westen, 
CJ; 
Urban multi-hazard risk analysis using GIS and 
remote sensing: a case study from Kohima 
town, Nagaland India
ACRS 2005: 
proceedings of the 
26th Asian 
conference on 
remote sensing, ACRS 
2005, 7-11 November 
2005, Hanoi, 
Vietnam. Hanoi: 26th 
Asian Conference on 
Remote Sensing and 
2nd Asian Space 
Conference, volume 
1. ISBN: 978-1-60423-
751-1. pp. 603-611 2005 ACRS
https://webapps.itc.utwente.nl/library
www/papers_2005/msc/ereg/khatsu.p
df Not Available
Fleischhauer, Mark; Greiving, 
Stefan; Schlusemann, Benedikt; 
Schmidt-Thomé, Philipp; Kallio, 
Hilkka; Tarvainen, Timo; Jarva, 
Jaana; 
Multi-risk assessment of spatially relevant 
hazards in Europe
ESPON, ESMG 
symposium, 
Nürnberg 14 2005
https://www.researchgate.net/profile/P
hilipp_Schmidt-
Thome/publication/255667455_Multi-
risk_assessment_of_spatially_relevant_
hazards_in_Europe/links/58b6c7a2a6fd
cc2d14d6c5e6/Multi-risk-assessment-of-
spatially-relevant-hazards-in-Europe.pdf
Disasters like earthquakes, coastal and river floods or nuclear power plant accidents show that physical 
structures and regional development more generally may be severely threatened by natural and 
technological hazards.
The impacts of such hazardous events are often exacerbated by interactions with other hazards or by 
taking place in areas with a high economic and/or social vulnerability. All these conditions converge in 
particular places thus
highlighting the need for a spatially oriented risk assessment. The task of such a risk assessment is not 
only to find out where risk related problems are located, but also to quantitatively or qualitatively 
determine the significance
of risks (Smith, 2001). Thus, a spatially oriented risk assessment has to take into account all risks that are 
related to a specific area. This paper describes the Integrated Risk Assessment of Multi-Hazards approach 
and presents selected results of the European Spatial Planning Observation Network (ESPON) project 
1.3.1 “The spatial effects and management of natural and technological hazards in general and in 
relation to climate change” which are based on this methodology.
Greiving, Stefan; Multi-risk assessment of Europe's regions
Measuring 
vulnerability to 
natural hazards: 
Towards disaster 
resilient societies 210-26 2006
United Nations 
University 
Press Tokyo, 
New York
https://books.google.co.uk/books?hl=e
n&lr=&id=ICzUxp-
BiSEC&oi=fnd&pg=PA210&dq=info:3HK
wf7Mh0lwJ:scholar.google.com&ots=bn
4tpZ3-
RK&sig=DmcjzoNyRgFrUtmoNyFzrGI1jI
w&redir_esc=y#v=onepage&q&f=false
This chapter presents a methodology for assessing the risk potential of a certain area by means of 
aggregating all spatially relevant risks that are caused by natural and technological hazards. The approach 
was elaborated and applied Europe-wide in the context of the project" Spatial effects of natural and 
technological hazard in general and in relation to climate change", which is part of the European Spatial 
Planning Observation Network (ESPON, see www. espon. lu). An aggregated hazard map, an integrated 
vulnerability map and an aggregated risk map are the key results of this research project. Vulnerability is 
recognised as the key component of risk and consists of the two elements: degree of exposure to hazard, 
one the one hand, and coping capacity on the other.
Asprone, D; Jalayer, F; Prota, A; 
Manfredi, G; 
Multi-Hazard Risk Assessment of Structures 
Subjected to Seismic Excitation and Blast for 
the Limit State of Collapse
AIP Conference 
Proceedings 1020 1
1677-
1684 2008 AIP
https://s3.amazonaws.com/academia.e
du.documents/43280162/MultiHazard_
Risk_Assessment_of_Structure2016030
2-8715-
3p4c29.pdf?AWSAccessKeyId=AKIAIWO
WYYGZ2Y53UL3A&Expires=1534262702
&Signature=ddbZUWTwUExpom1WY3v
D8voPB2I%3D&response-content-
disposition=inline%3B%20filename%3D
Multi-
hazard_risk_assessment_of_structur.pd
f
Multi-hazard approach represents a convenient way to address structural reliability of a critical 
infrastructure. Objective of the present paper is to present a multi-hazard methodology for evaluation of 
the risk associated with the limit state of collapse for a reinforced concrete (RC) structure subject to both 
seismic and blast threats. Blast fragility can be defined as the probability of progressive collapse given a 
blast event has taken place and its evaluation is here suggested via a Monte Carlo procedure, generating 
different possible blast configurations. For each blast scenario, the consequent damages occurring to the 
investigated structure are identified and an updating of the structure is then performed. The structural 
stability under gravity loading is then verified by employing a kinematic plastic limit analysis. The 
conditional probability of collapse or the blast fragility is then calculated as the mean value of the 
collapse indicator variable over the number of cases generated by the simulation procedure. Therefore, 
the seismic fragility is also determined via classical methods described elsewhere and the total risk of 
collapse is evaluated as the sum of blast and seismic contributions.
Thierry, Pierre; Stieltjes, Laurent; 
Kouokam, Emmanuel; Nguéya, 
Pierre; Salley, Paul M; 
Multi-hazard risk mapping and assessment on 
an active volcano: the GRINP project at Mount 
Cameroon Natural Hazards 45 3 429-456 2008 Springer
https://link.springer.com/article/10.100
7/s11069-007-9177-3
To help improve the safety of its population faced with natural disasters, the Cameroon Government, 
with the support of the French Government, initiated a programme of geological risk analysis and 
mapping on Mount Cameroon. This active volcano is subject to a variety of hazards: volcanic eruptions, 
slope instability and earthquakes. Approximately 450,000 people live or work around this volcano, in an 
area which includes one of Cameroon’s main economic resources. An original methodology was used for 
obtaining the information to reply to questions raised by the authorities. It involves several stages: 
identifying the different geological hazard components, defining each phenomenon’s threat matrix by 
crossing intensity and frequency indices, mapping the hazards, listing and mapping the exposed 
elements, analysing their respective values in economic, functional and strategic terms, establishing 
typologies for the different element-at-risk groups and assessing their vulnerability to the various 
physical pressures produced by the hazard phenomena, and establishing risk maps for each of the major 
element-at-risk groups (population, infrastructures, vegetation, atmosphere). At the end of the study we 
were able (a) to identify the main critical points within the area, and (b) provide quantified orders of 
magnitude concerning the dimensions of the risk by producing a plausible eruption scenario. The results 
allowed us to put forward a number of recommendations to the Cameroon Government concerning risk 
prevention and management. The adopted approach corresponds to a first level of response to the 
authorities. Later developments should make it possible to refine the quality of the methodology.
Bovolo, C Isabella; Abele, Simon 
J; Bathurst, James C; Caballero, 
David; Ciglan, Marek; Eftichidis, 
George; Simo, Branislav; 
A distributed framework for multi-risk 
assessment of natural hazards used to model 
the effects of forest fire on hydrology and 
sediment yield
Computers & 
Geosciences 35 5 924-945 2009 Elsevier
https://www.staff.ncl.ac.uk/isabella.bov
olo/Bovolo-et-al-MEDIGRID.pdf
Within the European Commission-funded MEDIGRID project, Grid computing technology is used to 
integrate various natural hazard models and data sets, maintained independently at different centres in 
Europe, into a single system, accessible to users over the internet. Each centre forms a process 
(application) or data storage node and has been fitted with the Globus toolkit, which provides the 
distributed computing environment functionality that is required for the system set up. In addition, 
several Grid data management components were developed to allow the system to operate on different 
computing platforms. Access to the data and application management services is enabled through a Grid 
Portal. A series of portlets enable users to access the system, providing a personalised interface to the 
Grid. Integration of the individual models required them to be modified as web services, so as to be run 
remotely over the internet. As the models have different data characteristics, a common data format was 
adopted for creating harmonised data sets and allowing the exchange of data between the models. As an 
example, the Fire Spread Engine model is used to derive a map of areas that have been burnt by fire. This 
forms an input to the SHETRAN hydrology, soil erosion and landslide model, which in turn could provide 
data for other models such as vegetation regeneration. The use of the system is demonstrated for a site 
in south-west Spain where a large forest fire occurred on 2 August 2003. The MEDIGRID system marks an 
advance in the integration of independently constructed models to provide improved hazard assessment 
technology.
Marzocchi, W; Mastellone, 
Maria Laura; Novelli, P; Romeo, 
E; Gasparini, P; Principles of multi risk assessment EU Report 2009
EUROPEAN 
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In this document, we propose a new quantitative procedure for multi-risk assessment that makes easier 
the comparison among different threats and accounts for possible triggering effects. We consider only 
the major threats typical for Southern Europe, which were the objectives of the EC FP6 NaRaS (Natural 
Risk Assessment) Project. Forest fires, snow avalanches, wind storms, heat waves are not specifically 
considered, although the general methodology we propone can be applied to evaluate risk related to 
these adverse events. In this part of the document, a clarification of the used terminology and a 
homogenization of the concepts used by the scientists and practitioners in the different risks areas are 
proposed. This effort does not aim at providing ‘the solution’ of the lack of homogeneity in terminology, 
but just at being a useful reference to clarify the meaning of the terms used here. At the end of part 1, 
we report the principles and rationales that stand behind our procedure for multi-risk assessment. In 
part 2, a short description of the most advanced procedures generally adopted to estimate individually 
natural and anthropogenic risks representing major threats for Southern Europe is provided. In part 3, 
we tackle directly the problem of multi-risk assessment applying innovative procedures and protocols to 
the case study of a town close to Naples (Casalnuovo). The multi-risk problem is split in two distinct 
phases: in a first phase, the whole set of risks is homogenized to facilitate their comparison ranking; in 
the second phase, we explore in detail possible “triggering” effects, showing how they can increase 
significantly the risk in a specific site. We want to underline that the logical sequence of the multi-risk 
procedure is contained in Parts 1 and 3, which are self-consistent. Part 2 contains several details on the 
actual way to compute different parameters. Anyway it can be omitted by readers who are interested 
only in the logical process we have followed.
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In this thesis, some methodologies for multi-risk assessment are presented, that can be applied to 
regional or local scale. At the local scale, the problem of uncertainty propagation in risk assessment is 
treated, testing different methodology for calculation. The work is organised in four parts:
1. Multi risk analysis at the regional scale in Lombardy (PRIM project, 2007). The methodology integrates 
information with different degree of accuracy into an indicator based approach, in order to develop a 
regional scale multirisk assessment and to identify “hot spot” risk areas for more detailed analysis. 
Eventually, the sensitivity of weights is investigated, and the effect on risk assessment of different 
individual attitudes and perception (i.e., expert, social, political, risk aversion).
2. Quantitative multi risk assessment (QRA) at the local scale on the hot spots, for lower Valtellina and 
the area of Brescia and lower Val Trompia, Val Sabbia, and Valcamonica. The methodology is based on 
the use of historical data and modelling to assess for each threat the expected number of casualties and 
the expected economic damage.
3. Quantitative risk assessment (QRA) for floods, earthquakes and industrial accidents in the area of 
Brescia (420 km2), with uncertainty propagation analysis. Frequency-damage curves were calculated. 
Three methods were used and compared to calculate the uncertainty of the expected economic losses: 
Monte Carlo Simulation, First Order Second Moment approach, and Point Estimate.
4. Realization of a tool based on a system of indicators aimed at assigning a priority for the realization of 
new mitigation works, at the evaluation of efficacy of existent works, and at the comparison of different 
alternatives for the same risk scenario. Indicators are referred to the risk scenario, to the most recent 
and most significant event occurred in the analysed area, to the planning stage of the work, and to the 
technical characteristics of realization and maintenance of the work itself.
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The analysis of multi-hazard risk requires the use of models that are very data demanding. Data is 
needed of the areas that might be affected and the characteristics of the hazard, but also of the 
elements at risk that might be impacted, and their vulnerability. In the framework of two European 
projects (FP6-PEOPLE-2006-ITN Marie curie Mountain risks and FP7 SafeLand) a training package has 
been developed on the use of spatial information for the assessment and management of mountain 
risks. This training package explains the procedures to collect, analyze and evaluate spatial information 
for risk assessment from natural hazards in a mountainous environment. It aims at researchers and 
practitioners that have to carry out risk assessments at a medium scale, and use the risk information in 
disaster risk reduction planning. The training package guides the participants through the entire process 
of risk assessment, on the basis of a case study of an area exposed to multiple hazards in Barcelonnette, 
France. In order to achieve maximum applicability the training package is made for use with Open Source 
software. Three-dimensional stereoscopic image interpretation using images downloaded from Google 
Earth is used to familiarize the participants with the hazard phenomena. These are then used in either a 
statistical or heuristic approach for modelling the initiation areas for landslides, debris flows, snow 
avalanches and rockfalls. The source areas are used for run-out modelling on a medium scale using a 
routing-spreading model and the results are converted into impact maps. Flood hazard assessment is 
done using a 1D-2D flood propagation model and flood impulse is calculated for different return periods. 
The source maps and run-out maps for mass movements and the flood maps are then used in a 
quantitative multi-hazard risk assessment, by calculating the exposed elements at risk, the temporal and 
spatial probability and the vulnerability of the elements at risk. Also emphasis is given to the evaluation 
of uncertainty in the risk assessment process. A qualitative method for multi-hazard risk assessment is 
also included, using Spatial Multi-Criteria Evaluation, in which a hazard index and a vulnerability index 
are generated. The final part of the training package deals with the use of risk information for disaster 
risk management, e.g. by incorporating the risk information in preparedness planning, cost-benefit 
analysis for the planning of remedial measures, and land use zoning. 
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It is desirable to verify the structural performance based on a multi-hazard approach, taking into account 
the critical actions the structure in question could be subjected to during its lifetime. This study presents 
a proposal for a probabilistic model for multi-hazard risk associated with the limit state of collapse for a 
reinforced concrete (RC) structure subjected to blast threats in the presence of seismic risk. The annual 
risk of structural collapse is calculated taking into account both the collapse caused by an earthquake 
event and the blast-induced progressive collapse. The blast fragility is calculated using a simulation 
procedure for generating possible blast configurations, and verifying the structural stability under gravity 
loading of the damaged structure, using a kinematic plastic limit analysis. As a case study, the blast and 
seismic fragilities of a generic four-storey RC building located in seismic zone are calculated and 
implemented in the framework of a multi-hazard procedure, leading to the evaluation of the annual risk 
of collapse.
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Beach management has traditionally concentrated on recreational uses and geomorphologic processes, 
overlooking environmental values. Traditional risk analysis also overlooks environmental services 
focusing on socio-economic damages and only accounting for a part of the total risk. To overcome this 
situation, a systemic approach dealing with ecological and social dimensions is required. This paper 
proposes a risk analysis framework in which coastal hazards and beach ecosystem services are jointly 
considered. The first phase consists of the definition of the risk profile. This is done by building the beach 
Pathway of Effect, where links between coastal hazards and ecosystem services are identified following 
the DPSIR approach. The second phase, risk assessment, includes risk valuation and hazard prioritization, 
which will help managers to decide where to allocate resources to cope with hazards affecting beach 
functionality. The methodology was validated at S’Abanell beach (Spanish Mediterranean coast), which 
provides several ecosystem services and is subjected to a variety of hazards.
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This paper introduces a generic framework for multi-risk modelling developed in the project ‘Regional 
RiskScape’ by the Research Organizations GNS Science and the National Institute of Water and 
Atmospheric Research Ltd. (NIWA) in New Zealand. Our goal was to develop a generic technology for 
modelling risks from different natural hazards and for various elements at risk. The technical framework 
is not dependent on the specific nature of the individual hazard nor the vulnerability and the type of the 
individual assets. Based on this generic framework, a software prototype has been developed, which is 
capable of ‘plugging in’ various natural hazards and assets without reconfiguring or adapting the generic 
software framework. To achieve that, we developed a set of standards for treating the fundamental 
components of a risk model: hazards, assets (elements at risk) and vulnerability models (or fragility 
functions). Thus, the developed prototype system is able to accommodate any hazard, asset or fragility 
model, which is provided to the system according to that standard. The software prototype was tested 
by modelling earthquake, volcanic ashfall, flood, wind, and tsunami risks for several urban centres and 
small communities in New Zealand.
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Analysis of natural risks in mountainous regions includes several typical natural processes such as snow 
avalanches, floods, earthquakes, and different types of landslides. Separate investigations of single 
processes only might lead to a misjudgement of the general natural risks for these areas. To avoid this 
trap, natural risk assessments should not focus on a singular process but on multiple processes. Within 
this study a general methodology is developed to analyse natural risk for multiple processes. The method 
is applied in Bíldudalur, NWIceland. In particular snow avalanches, rock falls and debris flows pose a 
hazard to the village of 300 inhabitants. The natural risk calculation is a function based on the input 
parameters hazard, vulnerability, probability of the spatial impact, probability of the temporal impact, 
probability of the seasonal occurrence and damage potential. First, the risk posed by each process is 
calculated. Results are presented as individual risk and object risk to life, and as economic risk for each 
process. Finally, single process risk maps are combined into multi-hazard risk maps. In the study area the 
highest risks throughout all of the analyses (individual risk to life, object risk to life and economic risk) are 
caused by debris flows, followed by snow avalanches and rock falls. It is demonstrated that risk varies 
heavily depending on the process considered. The total risk to life caused by snow avalanches, debris 
flows, rock falls and multi-hazards is 0.19, 0.63, 0.009 and 0.83 deaths per year, respectively. Multi-
hazard approaches are not only valuable to get an overview on the overall risk but have also a high 
significance for planning effective countermeasures. It can be concluded that the newly developed 
method is applicable to other natural processes as well as to further catchments in Iceland as well as in 
other countries with different environmental settings.
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The assessment of the impact of different catastrophic events in a given area requires innovative 
approaches that allow risks comparison and that account for all the possible risk interactions. In the 
common practice, the risk evaluation related to different sources is generally done through independent 
analyses, adopting disparate procedures and time--space resolutions. Such a strategy of risks evaluation 
has some evident major drawbacks as, for example, it is difficult (if not impossible) to compare the risk of 
different origins, and the implicit assumption of independence of the risk sources leads to neglect 
possible interactions among threats and/or cascade effects. The latter may amplify the overall risk, and 
potentially the multi-risk index could be higher than the simple aggregation of single-risk indexes 
calculated considering each source as independent from the others. In this paper, we put forward some 
basic principles for multi-risk assessment, and we consider a real application to Casalnuovo municipality 
(Southern Italy), in which we face the problem to make different hazards comparable, and we highlight 
when and how possible interactions among different threats may become important.
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Many areas of the world are prone to several natural hazards, and effective risk reduction is only possible 
if all relevant threats are considered and analyzed. However, in contrast to single-hazard analyses, the 
examination of multiple hazards poses a range of additional challenges due to the differing 
characteristics of processes. This refers to the assessment of the hazard level, as well as to the 
vulnerability toward distinct processes, and to the arising risk level. As comparability of the single-hazard 
results is strongly needed, an equivalent approach has to be chosen that allows to estimate the overall 
hazard and consequent risk level as well as to rank threats. In addition, the visualization of a range of 
natural hazards or risks is a challenging task since the high quantity of information has to be depicted in a 
way that allows for easy and clear interpretation. The aim of this contribution is to give an outline of the 
challenges each step of a multi-hazard (risk) analysis poses and to present current studies and 
approaches that face these difficulties.
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A variety of natural extreme events, including earthquakes, landslides, volcano eruptions, tsunamis, river 
floods, winter storms, wildfire, and coastal phenomena, threaten different regions in the world. 
European planners and policymakers, as well as scientists who inform their judgment, usually treat the 
hazards and risks related to such events separately from each other, without consideration of 
interdependencies between the different types of phenomena, as well as the importance of risk 
comparability. In this paper we focus on the institutional aspects of the management of multiple hazards. 
The benefits anticipated by the adoption of this approach are numerous, such as:
1. Multi-hazard risk assessment may have relevant policy implications and could emphasize, for example 
that efficient mitigation actions do not necessary need to be focused on reduction of the highest risk but 
on the risks that could be mostly reduced;
2. Addressing multiple hazards may lead to significant costs reductions and improvement in the 
efficiency of risk mitigation and management measures, comparatively to cases when hazards are 
treated separately from each other;
3. This approach may help to develop a better coordination and interfacing between different specialized 
authorities and agencies which each deal with specific hazards or risks without developing an overview 
of the knock-on, domino and cascading effects (EN 2009:28).
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The assessment and management of natural hazards has received a greater attention in the European 
Union during the last years. This can be explained by an increase in disastrous events in the EU due to 
natural hazards which resulted in tremendous economic losses and loss of human lives. The key to 
decrease impacts is to address the vulnerability of our communities by using mitigation and adaptation 
measures. These hazard management strategies aim to build on resilience and sustainability. For not 
ignoring certain risks a multi-hazard approach is necessary. Policies and guidelines concerning the natural 
hazard assessment and management are set up on different scale levels. This research work provides a 
critical review on the current EU policy framework. The analysis addresses the weaknesses and 
challenges and leads to a proposal of a conceptual multi-hazard framework for natural hazard mitigation 
and adaptation in the EU policy framework. It is proposed to set up basic standards in a new directive 
and combine those with official EU guidelines to assist the Member States in achieving those standards.
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Multi-risk approaches have been recently proposed to assess and compare different risks in the same 
target area. The key points of multi-risk assessment are the development of homogeneous risk 
definitions and the treatment of risk interaction. The lack of treatment of interaction may lead to 
significant biases and thus to erroneous risk hierarchization, which is one of primary output of risk 
assessments for decision makers. In this paper, a formal statistical model is developed to treat 
interaction between two different hazardous phenomena in long-term multi-risk assessments, 
accounting for possible effects of interaction at hazard, vulnerability and exposure levels. The 
applicability of the methodology is demonstrated through two illustrative examples, dealing with the 
influence of (1) volcanic ash in seismic risk and (2) local earthquakes in tsunami risk. In these 
applications, the bias in single-risk estimation induced by the assumption of independence among risks is 
explicitly assessed. An extensive application of this methodology at regional and sub-regional scale would 
allow to identify when and where a given interaction has significant effects in long-term risk 
assessments, and thus, it should be considered in multi-risk analyses and risks hierarchization.
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Hazard mapping in poorly known volcanic areas is complex since much evidence of volcanic and non-
volcanic hazards is often hidden by vegetation and alteration. In this paper, we propose a semi-
quantitative method based on hazard event tree and multi hazard map constructions developed in the 
frame of the FP7 MIAVITA project. We applied this method to the Kanlaon volcano (Philippines), which is 
characterized by poor geologic and historical records. We combine updated geological (long-term) and 
historical (short-term) data, building an event tree for the main types of hazardous events at Kanlaon and 
their potential frequencies. We then propose an updated multi-hazard map for Kanlaon, which may 
serve as a working base map in the case of future unrest. The obtained results extend the information 
already contained in previous volcanic hazard maps of Kanlaon, highlighting (i) an extensive, potentially 
active ~5 km long summit area striking north–south, (ii) new morphological features on the eastern flank 
of the volcano, prone to receiving volcanic products expanding from the summit, and (iii) important 
riverbeds that may potentially accumulate devastating mudflows. This preliminary study constitutes a 
basis that may help local civil defence authorities in making more informed land use planning decisions 
and in anticipating future risk/hazards at Kanlaon. This multi-hazard mapping method may also be 
applied to other poorly known active volcanoes.
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We present a model framework for the regional-scale analysis of high-mountain multi-hazard and -risk 
indicators, implemented with the open-source software package GRASS GIS. This framework is applied to 
a 98 300 km2 study area centred in the Pamir (Tajikistan). It includes (i) rock slides, (ii) ice avalanches, (iii) 
periglacial debris flows and (iv) lake outburst floods. First, a hazard indicator is assigned to each relevant 
object (steep rock face, glacier or periglacial slope, lake). This indicator depends on the susceptibility and 
on the possible event magnitude. Second, the possible travel distances, impact areas and, consequently, 
impact hazard indicators for all types of processes are computed using empirical relationships. The 
impact hazard indicators are finally superimposed with an exposure indicator derived from the type of 
land use, resulting in a raster map of risk indicators finally discretized at the community level. The 
analysis results are presented and discussed at different spatial scales. The major outcome of the study, a 
set of comprehensive regional-scale hazard and risk indication maps, shall represent an objective basis 
for the prioritization of target communities for further research and risk mitigation measures.
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As populations increase, especially in urban areas, the number of people affected by natural hazards is 
growing, as many regions of the world subject to multiple hazards. Although the volume of geophysical, 
sociological and economic knowledge is expanding, so are the losses from natural catastrophes. The slow 
transfer of appropriate knowledge from theory to practice may be due to the difficulties inherent in the 
communication process from science to policy-making, including perceptions by stakeholders from 
disaster mitigation practice regarding the usability of any developed tools. As scientific evidence shows, 
decision-makers are faced with the challenge of not only mitigating against single hazards and risks, but 
also multiple risks, which must include the consideration of their interrelations. As the multi-hazard and 
risk concept is a relatively young area of natural risk governance, there are only a few multi-risk models 
and the experience of practitioners as to how to use these models is limited. To our knowledge, scientific 
literature on stakeholders' perceptions of multi-risk models is lacking. In this document, we identify the 
perceptions of two decision-making tools, which involve multi-hazard and multi-risk. The first one is a 
generic, multi-risk framework based on the sequential Monte Carlo method to allow for a 
straightforward and flexible implementation of hazard interactions which may occur in a complex 
system. The second is a decision-making tool that integrates directly input from stakeholders by 
attributing weights to different components and constructing risk ratings. Based on the feedback from 
stakeholders, we found that interest in multi-risk assessment is high, but that its application remains 
hampered by the complexity of the processes involved.
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We propose a long-term probabilistic multi-hazard assessment for El Misti Volcano, a composite cone 
located <20 km from Arequipa. The second largest Peruvian city is a rapidly expanding economic centre 
and is classified by UNESCO as World Heritage. We apply the Bayesian Event Tree code for Volcanic 
Hazard (BET_VH) to produce probabilistic hazard maps for the predominant volcanic phenomena that 
may affect c.900,000 people living around the volcano. The methodology accounts for the natural 
variability displayed by volcanoes in their eruptive behaviour, such as different types/sizes of eruptions 
and possible vent locations. For this purpose, we treat probabilistically several model runs for some of 
the main hazardous phenomena (lahars, pyroclastic density currents (PDCs), tephra fall and ballistic 
ejecta) and data from past eruptions at El Misti (tephra fall, PDCs and lahars) and at other volcanoes 
(PDCs). The hazard maps, although neglecting possible interactions among phenomena or cascade 
effects, have been produced with a homogeneous method and refer to a common time window of 1 
year. The probability maps reveal that only the north and east suburbs of Arequipa are exposed to all 
volcanic threats except for ballistic ejecta, which are limited to the uninhabited but touristic summit 
cone. The probability for pyroclastic density currents reaching recently expanding urban areas and the 
city along ravines is around 0.05 %/year, similar to the probability obtained for roof-critical tephra 
loading during the rainy season. Lahars represent by far the most probable threat (around 10 %/year) 
because at least four radial drainage channels can convey them approximately 20 km away from the 
volcano across the entire city area in heavy rain episodes, even without eruption. The Río Chili Valley 
represents the major concern to city safety owing to the probable cascading effect of combined threats: 
PDCs and rockslides, dammed lake break-outs and subsequent lahars or floods. Although this study does 
not intend to replace the current El Misti hazard map, the quantitative results of this probabilistic multi-
hazard assessment can be incorporated into a multi-risk analysis, to support decision makers in any 
future improvement of the current hazard evaluation, such as further land-use planning and possible 
emergency management.
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Many regions of the world are exposed to and affected by several types of natural hazard. The 
assessment and mitigation of the risk posed by multiple natural and man-made threats at a given 
location requires a multi-risk analysis approach that is able to account for the possible interactions 
among the threats, including possible cascade events. Performing quantitative multi-risk analysis using 
the methodologies available today presents many challenges (e.g., Kappes et al., 2012, Marzocchi et al., 
2012). The risks associated with different types of natural hazards, such as volcanic eruptions, landslides, 
floods, and earthquakes, are often estimated using different procedures and the produced results are 
not comparable. Furthermore, the events themselves could be highly correlated (e.g., floods and debris 
flows could be triggered by an extreme storm event), or one type of threat could be the result of another 
(e.g., a massive landslide that is triggered by an earthquake, an example of a cascade effect). It is obvious 
that a mathematically rigorous approach to multi-risk assessment that addresses all the challenges 
named above, as well as the uncertainties in all steps of the analysis, will be complicated and require 
resources and expertise. On the other hand, in many  situations, the decision-maker in charge of risk 
management can identify the optimum alternative among the possible options without undertaking a 
detailed, rigorous multi-risk analysis. Therefore, the framework recommended herein is based on a multi-
level approach where the decision-maker and/or the risk analyst will not need to use a more  
sophisticated model than what is required for the problem at hand, or what would be reasonable to use 
given the available information.
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This section discusses the analysis of multi-hazards in a mountainous
environment at a medium scale (1:25,000) using Geographic Information Systems. Although the term 
‘multi-hazards’ has been used extensively in literature there are still very limited approaches to analyze 
the effects of more than one hazard in the same area, especially related to their interaction. The section 
starts with an overview of the problem of multi-hazard risk assessment, and indicates the various types 
of multi-hazard interactions, such as coupled events, concatenated events, and events changing the 
predisposing factors for other ones. An illustration is given of multi-hazards in a mountainous 
environment, and their interrelationships, showing triggering factors (earthquakes, meteorological 
extremes), contributing factors, and various multi-hazard relationships. The second part of the section 
gives an example of a medium scale multi-hazard risk assessment for the Barcelonnette Basin (French 
Alps), taking into account the hazards for landslides, debris flows, rockfalls, snow avalanches and floods. 
Input data requirements are discussed, as well as the limitations in relation to the use of this data for 
initiation modeling at a catchment scale. Simple run-out modeling is used based on the energy-line 
approach. Problems related to the estimation of temporal and spatial probability are presented and 
discussed, and methods are shown for estimating the exposure, vulnerability and risk, using risk curves 
that expressed the range of expected losses for different return periods. The last part presents a 
software tool (Multi-Risk)
developed for the analysis of multi-hazard risk at a medium scale.
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Dynamic risk processes, which involve interactions at the hazard and risk levels, have yet to be clearly 
understood and properly integrated into probabilistic risk assessment. While much attention has been 
given to this aspect lately, most studies remain limited to a small number of site-specific multi-risk 
scenarios. We present a generic probabilistic framework based on the sequential Monte Carlo Method to 
implement coinciding events and triggered chains of events (using a variant of a Markov chain), as well as 
time-variant vulnerability and exposure. We consider generic perils based on analogies with real ones, 
natural and man-made. Each simulated time series corresponds to one risk scenario, and the analysis of 
multiple time series allows for the probabilistic assessment of losses and for the recognition of more or 
less probable risk paths, including extremes or low-probability–high-consequences chains of events. We 
find that extreme events can be captured by adding more knowledge on potential interaction processes 
using in a brick-by-brick approach. We introduce the concept of risk migration matrix to evaluate how 
multi-risk participates to the emergence of extremes, and we show that risk migration (i.e., clustering of 
losses) and risk amplification (i.e., loss amplification at higher losses) are the two main causes for their 
occurrence.
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The MATRIX project aimed to develop methodologies to assess and compare some of the different 
natural risks that society has to face. Hence, in order to address multi-risks, one has to take into account 
the different interactions that might exist between the risks. These interactions, at the hazard and the 
vulnerability levels, might happen with different delays. It is, therefore, necessary to consider the 
temporal aspect of such interactions to properly
assess multi-risk. The time dependencies might involve the following:
• The repetition of events over time.
• The concomitance of simultaneous-yet-independent events.
• The succession of dependent phenomena (cascading events).
The study of the time-dependency of vulnerability was the objective of work package 4 of the MATRIX 
project.
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In risk assessment research and policy, there is currently much debate on multi-type hazard and risk 
assessment and the definition and use of realistic scenarios. This debate has been evoked, not least, by 
several specific disasters in recent years that have resulted in extremely high numbers of fatalities and 
massive damage to properties and infrastructure. Recent examples are the Super Typhoon Haiyan, which 
hit the Philippines in November 2013, causing floods and landslides, and the Tohoku earthquake that 
struck Japan in March 2011, with the resulting devastating tsunami and nuclear accident. The research 
undertaken in MATRIX Work package 6 “Decision support for mitigation and adaptation in a multi-hazard 
environment” aimed at providing guidance on how to maximize the benefits arising from, and overcome 
the barriers to, the implementation of a multi-hazard and risk assessment approach within current risk 
management regimes. This reference report focuses on the synthesising the identified benefits and 
barriers to multihazard mitigation and adaption9. It is addressed to practitioners within the 
public/private sector working in communities exposed to multiple risks as well as to those active at the 
science-policy interface, thus including researchers, policy and decision makers in risk and
emergency management.
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interference and overlap of natural events both as triggering factors for both the domino effect. The 
classic methodological analysis methodologies for single process types are increasingly integrated
frequently in Multi-Hazard systems, where the phenomena do not they are simply superimposed but are 
considered for several potential new interactions. The validation system it results to the realization of a 
MultiRISK platform prototype, based on a modeling module, of integrated modeling, and a Visualization 
module, for a concrete analysis by experts of the proposed results, through simple web services. The 
operational steps therefore have as their objective to offer a complete modeling system but at the same 
time one clear strategy for understanding and using the product data.
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This paper presents a method for the development of bridge fragility functions that are able to account 
for the cumulated impact of different hazard types, namely earthquakes, ground failures and fluvial 
floods. After identifying which loading mechanisms are affecting which bridge components, specific 
damage-dependent component fragility curves are derived. The definition of the global damage states at 
system level through a fault-tree analysis is coupled with a Bayesian Network formulation in order to 
account for the correlation structure between failure events. Fragility functions for four system damage 
states are finally derived as a function of flow discharge Q (for floods) and peak ground acceleration PGA 
(for earthquakes and ground failures): the results are able to represent specific failure configurations 
that can be linked to functionality levels or repair durations.
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The Caribbean is known to be one of the most hazard-prone regions in the world. Hurricanes, flooding, 
storm surges, earthquakes and landslides lead to extensive material, human and economic losses in the 
region. The growing intensity of these hazards, combined with the consequences of climate change, 
rapidly increases the concern among decision makers.
Although many researchers have succeeded in developing a single-hazard risk assessment that accurately 
estimates the risk of one type of hazard, the complexity of the relation between the different types of 
hazards is causing difficulties in the development of a multi-hazard risk analysis. This research aims to 
develop such a model. In a first step, the consequences of each type of hazard will be assessed 
individually, starting with riverine flooding. In the next step, the methodology used in this tool will be 
assessed and modified to fit other types of hazards. Finally, all single-hazard tools will be combined into a 
generic multi-hazard risk assessment tool for the region.
In Jamaica, local governments use a flood risk methodology that is based on building water defence 
structures to evacuate the water as quickly as possible. This methodology, however, causes bigger 
damages downstream. Another method, based on minimizing the consequences of the overall flood, is 
already in use in many countries. In the Flemish region of Belgium, it is implemented in a tool called 
LATIS and has already proven to decrease losses after a flood event. Therefore, this risk-based 
methodology is used as the base for developing the Jamaican flood risk tool. The biggest concern during 
this research is the lack of data in the region. The methodology used, is based on the Flemish flood risk 
tool and the acquired data is thus very elaborate. During the implementation of the methods for the 
Caribbean, especially the lack of sufficient rainfall data and adequate damage functions has proven to 
result in less accurate damage and vulnerability maps.
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Hurricane flood impacts to residential buildings in coastal zones are caused by a number of hazards, such 
as inundation, overflow currents, erosion, and wave attack. However, traditional hurricane damage 
models typically make use of stage-damage functions, where the stage is related to flooding depth only. 
Moreover, these models are deterministic and do not consider the large amount of uncertainty 
associated with both the processes themselves and with the predictions. This uncertainty becomes 
increasingly important when multiple hazards (flooding, wave attack, erosion, etc.) are considered 
simultaneously. This paper focusses on establishing relationships between observed damage and 
multiple hazard indicators in order to make better probabilistic predictions. The concept consists of (1) 
determining Local Hazard Indicators (LHIs) from a hindcasted storm with use of a nearshore 
morphodynamic model, XBeach, and (2) coupling these LHIs and building characteristics to the observed 
damages. We chose a Bayesian Network approach in order to make this coupling and used the LHIs 
‘Inundation depth’, ‘Flow velocity’, ‘Wave attack’, and ‘Scour depth’ to represent flooding, current, wave 
impacts, and erosion related hazards.The coupled hazard model was tested against four thousand 
damage observations from a case site at the Rockaway Peninsula, NY, that was impacted by Hurricane 
Sandy in late October, 2012. The model was able to accurately distinguish ‘Minor damage’ from all other 
outcomes 95% of the time and could distinguish areas that were affected by the storm, but not severely 
damaged, 68% of the time. For the most heavily damaged buildings (‘Major Damage’ and ‘Destroyed’), 
projections of the expected damage underestimated the observed damage. The model demonstrated 
that including multiple hazards doubled the prediction skill, with Log-Likelihood Ratio test (a measure of 
improved accuracy and reduction in uncertainty) scores between 0.02 and 0.17 when only one hazard is 
considered and a score of 0.37 when multiple hazards are considered simultaneously. The LHIs with the 
most predictive skill were ‘Inundation depth’ and ‘Wave attack’. The Bayesian Network approach has 
several advantages over the market-standard stage-damage functions: the predictive capacity of multiple 
indicators can be combined; probabilistic predictions can be obtained, which include uncertainty; and 
quantitative as well as descriptive information can be used simultaneously.
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Natural risk assessment for urban areas and infrastructures is important for the definition of 
management and prevention plans against consequences of natural events. In this paper we present the 
results of a multi-risk assessment for the Cuneo Province road network. The study defined specific risk 
levels with regard to landslides, floods, torrential floods, debris-flows, snow-avalanches, earthquakes and 
forest fires. Consequences for infrastructures were assessed by quantifying exposed elements value and 
vulnerability. All acquired data are then combined in order to produce specific hazard and risk maps. 
Specific risk levels were then processed to produce a multi-risk map for the Cuneo province road 
network. Landslide runout was numerically simulated in a GIS environment, for a comparison with 
hazard assessment results obtained following the methodology here proposed. Multi-risk assessment 
represents a valuable tool for enhancing scheduling activities related to the implementation of mitigation 
structure/measures and for supporting the coordination of risk management procedures at a cross 
border level.
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The effective management of the risks posed by natural and man-made hazards requires all relevant 
threats and their interactions to be considered. This paper proposes a three-level framework for multi-
risk assessment that accounts for possible hazard and risk interactions. The first level is a flow chart that 
guides the user in deciding whether a multi-hazard and risk approach is required. The second level is a 
semi-quantitative approach to explore if a more detailed, quantitative assessment is needed. The third 
level is a detailed quantitative multi-risk analysis based on Bayesian networks. Examples that 
demonstrate the application of the method are presented.
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Multi-hazards pose a serious threat to human life. It can cause considerable damages. The evaluation of 
the expected losses due to multi-hazards requires a risk assessment. Multi-hazards risk assessment allow 
the identification of the most endangered areas and suggest where further detailed studies have to be 
carried out. Aim: This study aims to give a new methodology for Multi-hazard risk assessment that makes 
easier the comparability analysis of vulnerability for different hazards and accounts for possible 
triggering (domino) effects. Materials and Methods: Methods used in this paper are based on theoretical 
approach and documentation. Two types of hazards will be assessed, namely earthquake and fire 
following earthquake. Statistical Analysis: Semi-quantitative and quantitative approach would assess risk 
rates at both regional and local levels. Result: In this study, representation of a new methodology for 
multi-hazards risk assessment includes determination of a model with parameters, consideration of the 
indicator-based pattern of vulnerability assessment that selected of all the relevant indicators and 
presented new classification of indicators based on comparison to different hazards and possible 
triggering (domino) effects. This means a potential multi-hazard indicator could be higher than the 
simple aggregation of single risk indicators calculation. Conclusion: The focus is on establishing a general 
overview of the emerging issues, and indicating how hazard relations can be considered in multi-hazard 
studies. The hazard relation is identified and studied by means of a new method and the overlay of 
hazard areas to determine overlaps in final multi-hazards map.
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This paper presents the complete Coastal Hazard Wheel (CHW) system, developed for multi-hazard-
assessment and multi-hazard-management of coastal areas worldwide under a changing climate. The 
system is designed as a low-tech tool that can be used in areas with limited data availability and 
institutional capacity and is therefore especially suited for applications in developing countries. The CHW 
constitutes a key for determining the characteristics of a particular coastline, its hazard profile and 
possible management options, and the system can be used for local, regional and national hazard 
screening and management. The system is developed to assess the main coastal hazards in a single 
process and covers the hazards of ecosystem disruption, gradual inundation, salt water intrusion, erosion 
and flooding. The system was initially presented in 2012 and based on a range of test-applications and 
feedback from coastal experts, the system has been further refined and developed into a complete 
hazard management tool. This paper therefore covers the coastal classification system used by the CHW, 
a standardized assessment procedure for implementation of multi-hazard-assessments, technical 
guidance on hazard management options and project cost examples. The paper thereby aims at 
providing an introduction to the use of the CHW system for assessing and managing coastal hazards.
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A criterion for the estimation of losses of a structure exposed to several hazards is presented. It includes 
an expression to obtain the probability density function of the total damage that may be generated by 
the superposition of the effects of several simultaneous hazardous events that can be associated with a 
main primary event. It considers the probabilistic correlation of damage or failure of a structure due to 
the combined action of those simultaneous associated hazards. Finally, the intensities and times of 
occurrence of all relevant events of different natural origin that may significantly contribute to the risk 
for the structure of interest are taken into account, considering them as independent, with a negligible 
probability of producing simultaneous groups of significant associated hazardous events.
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Therefore, the aim of this master project study is to apply a range of statistical methodology for analysis 
of simultaneously occurring extreme hazards for coastal and urban flooding. The study area where this 
methodology was applied is the Elwood Catchment, which is a highly urbanised catchment located in the 
city of Port Phillip, Melbourne, Australia. Previous mapping has detected that the areas circumjacent the 
Elwood Canal are especially vulnerable to storm surge and sea level rise.
The first part of the investigation deals with the marginal extreme distributions. Two approaches to 
extract extreme value series were applied and different probability distribution functions performed to 
fit the observed sample. Results obtained by the Generalised Pareto distribution demonstrate the ability 
of the Pareto family to model the return period of the extreme events. Advancing into multivariate 
extreme analysis, the prior aim consisted of an investigation regarding the asymptotic properties of an 
extremal dependence. As a weak positive asymptotic dependence between the bivariate extreme pairs 
was found, the Conditional method proposed by Heffernan and Tawn (2004) was adopted for the 
investigation. This approach is suitable to bivariate extreme values which are relatively unlikely to occur 
together.
The results show that the probability of an extreme storm surge occurring during a one-hour intensity 
extreme precipitation event (or vice versa) can be twice as great as what would occur when assuming 
that the events are independent. Therefore, presuming independence between these two variables 
would result in future undervaluation of flooding risk at the study area.
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Risk assessment plays an important role in disaster risk management. Existing multi-hazard risk 
assessment models are often qualitative or semi-quantitative in nature and used for comparative study 
of regional risk levels. They cannot estimate directly probability of disaster losses from the joint impact of 
several hazards. In this paper, a quantitative approach of multi-hazard risk assessment based on 
vulnerability surface and joint return period of hazards is put forward to assess the risk of crop losses in 
the Yangtze River Delta region of China. The impact of strong wind and flood, the two most prominent 
agricultural hazards in the area, is analyzed. The multi-hazard risk assessment process consists of three 
steps. First, a vulnerability surface, which denotes the functional relationship between the intensity of 
the hazards and disaster losses, was built using the crop losses data for losses caused by strong wind and 
flood in the recent 30 years. Second, the joint probability distribution of strong wind and flood was 
established using the copula functions. Finally, risk curves that show the probability of crop losses in this 
multi-hazard context at four case study sites were calculated according to the joint return period of 
hazards and the vulnerability surface. The risk assessment result of crop losses provides a useful 
reference for governments and insurance companies to formulate agricultural development plans and 
analyze the market of agricultural insurance. The multi-hazard risk assessment method developed in this 
paper can also be used to quantitatively assess multi-hazard risk in other regions.
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In order to assess the vulnerability of structural systems to multiple hazards occurring simultaneously, it 
is necessary to carry out a multi-hazard analysis of the system. Over time, and under continuous, albeit 
varying cyclic loading from wind forces, there may be a reduction in the structural integrity of structural 
systems due to fatigue that increases their vulnerability to additional non-typical loads such as seismic 
and impact. This results in multi-hazard loading scenario not typically considered in current design. This 
paper aims to present research directed towards numerically estimating the possible effect of a seismic 
load (earthquake) on a wind turbine foundation that has undergone fatigue over time from constant 
exposure to wind forces. Although the practical effect of wind induced fatigue on foundations may be 
relatively small, its cumulative behavior over time reduces the foundation’s capacity making it more 
susceptible to high impact loads such as seismic events. The analysis is done by considering the two 
loading events in a fault tree analytical procedure with each event taken as independent and combined 
together in series. Reliability analysis utilizing the computational tools MATLAB and finite element 
analysis (using ANSYS) is carried out to understand the behavior of the structure under each specific and 
combined load effects. The resulting analyses carried out using reliability analysis methods such as first 
order second moment reliability method and Monte Carlo simulations show a definite decrease in the 
foundation’s performance and a concurrent increase in its probability of failure within the structure’s 
design life. The results of this study will help understand the behavior of a simplified structure under the 
combined effect of these load types thus leading to a more accurate depiction of the actual behavior of 
structures.
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A multi-hazard life-cycle methodology is used to assess the effects of flood-induced scour on the seismic 
system failure performance of bridge systems. Based on a case-study for a simple bridge system 
supported by shallow foundation systems, our results show that scour effects are time-varying: during 
the first 45 years, scour has insignificant effect on modifying the seismic vulnerability of the bridge in 
terms of two levels of system failures (i.e. extensive system damage or system collapse); after 65 years, 
scour dominates the cause to system failure; and while between 45 to 65 years, bridge scour and 
earthquakes jointly contribute to system failure. This result implies that caution is necessary for 
managing aging bridges serving in both seismicity and flooding active regions.
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This paper reviews the 4D dynamic models for multi natural hazard risk assessment. It is important to 
review the characteristic of the different dynamic models and to choose the most suitable model for 
certain application. The characteristic of the different 4D dynamic models are based on several main 
aspects (e.g. space, time, event or phenomenon etc.). The most suitable 4D dynamic model depends on 
the type of application it is used for. There is no single 4D Dynamic model suitable for all types of 
application. Therefore, it is very important to define the requirements of the 4D Dynamic model. The 
main context of this paper is spatio temporal modelling for multi hazards.
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West Africa is a region considered highly vulnerable to climate change and associated with natural 
hazards due to interactions of climate change and non-climatic stressors exacerbating the vulnerability of 
the region, particularly its agricultural system (IPCC, 2014b). Taking the Western Sudanian Savanna as 
our geographic target area, this paper seeks to develop an integrated risk assessment framework that 
incorporates resilience as well as multiple hazards concepts, and is applicable to the specific conditions 
of the target area. To provide the scientific basis for the framework, the paper will first define the 
following key terms of risk assessments in a climate change adaptation context: risk, hazard, exposure, 
vulnerability, resilience, coping and adaptation. Next, it will discuss the ways in which they are 
conceptualized and employed in risk, resilience and vulnerability frameworks. When reviewing the 
literature on existing indicator-based risk assessment for West African Sudanian Savanna zones, it 
becomes apparent that there is a lack of a systematic and comprehensive risk assessment capturing 
multiple natural hazards. The paper suggests an approach for linking resilience and vulnerability in a 
common framework for risk assessment. It accounts for societal response mechanism through coping, 
adaptation, disaster risk management and development activities which may foster transformation or 
persistence of the social ecological systems. Building on the progress made in multi-hazard assessments, 
the framework is suitable for analyzing multiple-hazard risks and existing interactions at hazard and 
vulnerability levels. While the framework is well grounded in theories and existing literature, and 
advances the knowledge by including and linking additional elements, it still remains to be tested 
empirically. 
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from long-term climate trends and disasters triggered by weather extremes. Till now, a hazard by hazard 
approach was considered in risk assessment for evaluating the consequences of individual natural and 
climate-related hazards (e.g. heavy precipitation events, droughts, floods, debris flows, landslides, storm 
surges) on vulnerable systems, without any consideration of an integrated assessment of multiple risks 
triggered by different forces. Starting from an initial review of existing multi-risk assessment concepts 
and tools applied by international organisations and projects, the main aim of the thesis was to develop 
and apply an advanced and interdisciplinary multi-risk methodology, allowing a sound assessment and 
communication of the multi-faceted threats posed by a variety of climate-related hazards across regions 
and sectors. A multi-hazard assessment was developed to analyze the relationships of multiple hazards 
(e.g. sea-level rise, coastal erosion, storm surge) happening in the same spatial and temporal area, using 
an influence matrix and the disjoint probability. Then, the multi-vulnerability of different exposed 
receptors (e.g. natural systems, beaches, agricultural and urban areas) was estimated trough a variety of 
vulnerability indicators (e.g. vegetation cover, sediment budget, % of urbanization) associated to 
different hazards. Finally, the multi-risk assessment was performed by integrating the multi-hazard with 
the multi-vulnerability index for the exposed receptors, thus supporting the development of information 
useful to stakeholders in the definition of adaptation strategies. The methodology was tested in the 
North Adriatic coast producing GIS-based multi-hazard, exposure, multi-vulnerability and multi-risk 
maps. The results of the analysis showed that the areas affected by higher multi-hazard scores are 
located close to the coastline where all the investigated hazards are present. Multi-vulnerability assumes 
relatively high scores in the whole case study, showing that beaches, wetlands, protected areas and river 
mouths are the more sensible targets. Finally, the multi-risk map presents a similar trend of the multi-
hazard map, highlighting beaches as the receptor more affected by multi-risk with a relevant percentage 
of surface (i.e. 60%) in the very high and high multi-risk classes. The final estimate of multi-risk for coastal 
municipalities provides useful information for local public authorities to set future priorities for 
adaptation and define future plans for shoreline and coastal management in view of climate change. In 
conclusion, the proposed multi-risk methodology is a step forward to traditional single risk assessments, 
providing a more comprehensive – even if relative - assessment of the multiple impacts and risks 
affecting the same area. Moreover, moving from the multi-risk methodologies generally developed for 
Liu, Baoyin; 
Modelling multi-hazard risk assessment: a case 
study in the Yangtze River Delta, China Doctoral Thesis 2015
University of 
Leeds http://etheses.whiterose.ac.uk/11544/
Multi-hazard risk assessment (MHRA) has become a major concern in the risk study area, but existing 
approaches do not adequately meet the needs of risk mitigation planning. The main research gap in the 
existing approaches was identified that they cannot consider all hazard interactions when calculating 
possible losses. Hence, an improved MHRA model, MmhRisk-HI (Model for multi-hazard Risk assessment 
with a consideration of Hazard Interaction), was developed. This model calculates the possible loss 
caused by multiple hazards, with an explicit consideration of interaction between different hazards. A 
more complete perspective, the regional disaster system perspective, was selected as the basic theory, 
and two categories of multi-hazard risk expressions were combined in the model construction. Hazard 
identification, hazard analysis, hazard interaction analysis, exposure analysis and vulnerability analysis 
are the five basic modules of the developed model. The concept of hazard-forming environment was 
introduced into the MHRA research as the basis for hazard identification, hazard analysis, and hazard 
interaction analysis. The methods used for exposure analysis depend on the scale of the region to be 
addressed and the assessment units. A Bayesian Network was adopted to calculate the loss ratio in the 
vulnerability analysis. This developed model was applied into the Yangtze River Delta (YRD) and validated 
by comparison with an observed multi-hazard sequence. The validation results (simulation results are 
consistent with observed results in 76.36% of the counties, and the deviation of an estimated aggregate 
loss value from its actual value is less than 2.79%) show that this model can more effectively represent 
the real world, and that the outputs, possible loss caused by multiple hazards, obtained with the model 
are reliable. The outputs can additionally help to identify which area is at greatest risk (of loss), and allow 
a determination of the reasons that contribute to the greatest losses. Hence, it is a useful tool which can 
provide further information for planners and decision-makers concerned with risk mitigation. 
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The complexity of the task of protecting the electricity transmission system is increasing, taking into 
account multiple trans-boundary risks, factors influencing its vulnerability, grids' changing architecture 
and patterns of public opposition or support for upgrading existing lines or construction of new ones. 
Several best practices have been developed based on different research projects supported by the 
European Commission, addressing each phase of risk reduction for critical infrastructure, such as risk 
assessment, mitigation and …
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The overarching objective of this study is to examine and compare the vulnerabilities of bridges 
combining effects of earthquake-induced ground shaking, ground failure (e.g., landslides and lateral 
spreading), and tsunami inundation. A parametric study is performed to understand the sensitivity of 
economic loss and traffic capacity with respect to the demand, resistance, and dispersion of the fragility 
functions of bridges for the combined hazards. The predicted damage varies substantially based on the 
selected fragility functions for the bridge structure. Additionally, when ground failure models are 
considered, there is an overwhelming increase in bridge damage and economic loss estimates, 
reinforcing the need for more refined ground failure analyses to reduce epistemic uncertainty. The loss 
estimates are significantly sensitive to fragility parameters, particularly the resistance models, 
emphasizing the need to develop more specific and systematic fragility functions suitable for an entire 
bridge inventory. Economic loss estimates based on these cascading hazards are ultimately provided with 
the M9.0 Cascadia Subduction Earthquake Zone scenario.
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This paper presents a method for the multi-risk assessment of infrastructure systems, which 
concentrates on the harmonization of losses from different hazard types. Within a bridge, each type of 
structural component has a different exposure and susceptibility to different hazard types, such as 
earthquakes, ground failures and floods. Therefore hazard-specific component fragility curves are 
derived in order to quantify the occurrence of these failure modes for each combination of hazard and 
component. In parallel, functionality losses, which are crucial metrics for the performance assessment of 
infrastructure systems, are estimated for each component failure mode through an expert-based survey. 
System failure modes can then be defined from combinations of component damage states to lead to 
consistent levels functionality losses. The derived system fragility functions have then the potential to 
treat various multi-hazard configurations, such as independent or cascading events, while being directly 
associated to functionality losses. This approach is tested on a virtual yet realistic road network, where 
the effects of multi-risk interactions are quantified. The synergistic effect of joint hazard events is 
especially observed for extreme events. Network analysis tools and restoration models are finally applied 
in order to estimate the resilience of the infrastructure system.
Chen, HX; Zhang, Shuai; Peng, 
Ming; Zhang, Li Min; 
A physically-based multi-hazard risk 
assessment platform for regional rainfall-
induced slope failures and debris flows Engineering Geology 203 15-29 2016 Elsevier
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Rainfall-induced slope failures and debris flows are two major hazards in mountainous areas. A physically-
based multi-hazard risk assessment platform for regional rainfall-induced slope failures and debris flows 
has been developed in this study. The platform enables prompt assessment of risks posed by regional 
rainfall-induced slope failures and debris flows across multiple catchments, which is required in landslide 
risk management in a large area. It considers the contribution of slope failures to debris flows and the 
scenario of a location impacted by multiple slope failures or debris flows or both. The contribution of 
slope failures to debris flows is considered by adding the increased amount of channel deposit from 
slope failures to the source material of debris flows. The platform is applied to a highway near the 
epicentre of the 2008 Wenchuan earthquake. The platform predicts the impact areas and runout 
distances of regional debris flows reasonably well. The risk assessment results indicate that both slope 
failures and debris flows pose a great danger to travellers along the road shortly after the earthquake 
due to the presence of a large amount of loose landslide deposits on steep terrains. The materials from 
the slope failures triggered during a storm substantially increase the channel deposit volume, leading to 
significantly increased debris flow volume and risk. A multi-hazard risk assessment approach is necessary 
to consider the scenario of a location impacted by multiple slope failures or debris flows or both, since 
assessing risks of slope failures and debris flows separately may underestimate the risk.
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Extreme rainfall events are the main triggering causes for hydro-meteorological hazards in mountainous 
areas, where development is often constrained by the limited space suitable for construction. In these 
areas, hazard and risk assessments are fundamental for risk mitigation, especially for preventive 
planning, risk communication and emergency preparedness. Multi-hazard risk assessment in 
mountainous areas at local and regional scales remain a major challenge because of lack of data related 
to past events and causal factors, and the interactions between different types of hazards. The lack of 
data leads to a high level of uncertainty in the application of quantitative methods for hazard and risk 
assessment. Therefore, a systematic approach is required to combine these quantitative methods with 
expert-based assumptions and decisions. In this study, a quantitative multi-hazard risk assessment was 
carried out in the Fella River valley, prone to debris flows and flood in the north-eastern Italian Alps. The 
main steps include data collection and development of inventory maps, definition of hazard scenarios, 
hazard assessment in terms of temporal and spatial probability calculation and intensity modelling, 
elements-at-risk mapping, estimation of asset values and the number of people, physical vulnerability 
assessment, the generation of risk curves and annual risk calculation. To compare the risk for each type 
of hazard, risk curves were generated for debris flows, river floods and flash floods. Uncertainties were 
expressed as minimum, average and maximum values of temporal and spatial probability, replacement 
costs of assets, population numbers, and physical vulnerability. These result in minimum, average and 
maximum risk curves. To validate this approach, a back analysis was conducted using the extreme hydro-
meteorological event that occurred in August 2003 in the Fella River valley. The results show a good 
performance when compared to the historical damage reports.
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Breil, Margaretha; 
Multi-hazard risk assessment of two Hong Kong 
districts
International journal 
of disaster risk 
reduction 19 311-323 2016 Elsevier
https://www.sciencedirect.com/science
/article/pii/S2212420916301935
The assessment of multi-hazard risks in urban areas poses particular difficulties due to the different 
temporal and spatial scales of hazardous events, and the potential interactions between hazards and 
socio-economic fragilities. Yet this exercise is important, as identifying the spatial distribution and 
concentration of risks in urban areas helps determine where and how preventive and corrective actions 
can reduce levels of vulnerability and exposure of urban populations. This article presents the results of a 
GIS-based assessment of present day risk to socio-natural hazards in two socio-economically distinct 
districts of Hong Kong (PRC) by utilizing indicators to describe the hazards and vulnerabilities. Hong Kong 
is a densely populated coastal metropolis exposed to multiple intense and potentially overlapping hydro-
meteorological hazards, including heat waves, typhoons, and landslides. Mapping hazards and 
vulnerabilities in this urban area helps to visualize the spatial distribution and concentrations of risk 
located throughout the city, and thereby facilitate the tailoring of measures that can reduce risk at the 
very local scale. This approach has the potential of providing city planners and policy makers with visual 
guidance in prioritizing risk management and adaptation actions with respect to current and future risks 
existing in specific parts of the city, taking into account more than one hazard at the time. We found that 
the two districts considered have comparable and distributed levels of risk being both exposed to 
multiple hazards and notwithstanding the socio-economic groups. However, elements of criticality are 
potentially more widespread in the less wealthy parts of the city.
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Coastal inundation due to multiple hazards was analysed for a potential manufacturing plant at the Batu 
Kawan Industrial Park in Penang state, Malaysia. The analysis accounted for river floods, rainfall and flash 
floods, cyclones, tides, storm surges, sea-level rise, and tsunamis. Earthquakes, volcanoes, and the 
effects of climate changes were also briefly evaluated. The proposed site elevation of 2.60 m LSD (land 
survey data level; 30 cm above mean sea level) will probably be reached by both the 100-year flood and 
the 100-year combined tide and storm surge. The flooding risk is low, but coincidence with storm surge 
or high tide will aggravate the situation. Sea level rise over the next 100 years is assumed less than 0.55 
m. The relative level for the other hazards was found to be lower. A further comparison of the various 
hazard levels is not meaningful without considering also the consequences (i.e., the risk).
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Electric power systems are susceptible to damage due to natural hazards such as hurricanes and 
earthquakes. Considerable effort has been made to develop methodologies for assessing the reliability of 
electric power systems under a single hazard such as hurricanes or earthquakes. However, there are 
parts of the world, such as the coastal areas of South Carolina, which are affected by both hazards. In 
such regions, more comprehensive risk assessment can be achieved when the focus is shifted from single-
hazard to multihazard analysis. There is, therefore, a need to develop methods for quantifying the risk 
posed by the combined effect of multiple hazards on structures and infrastructure systems in these 
regions. This paper presents a framework for multihazard risk assessment of electric power systems 
subjected to seismic and hurricane wind hazards. The framework includes hazard and structural 
component vulnerability models, system reliability analysis, and multihazard risk assessment. A notional 
electric power network assumed to be located in Charleston, New York, and Seattle is used to 
demonstrate the proposed framework. The framework can be used for predisaster preparation, 
mitigation, and postdisaster response planning.
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Bridge infrastructure is susceptible to damage from a large host of threats including natural hazards, 
aging and deterioration, and demands that increase with population growth and urbanization. Life cycle 
management of bridge infrastructure requires an understanding of the relative contribution of these 
threats to the risk of damage or impending consequences, such as life cycle costs. Traditionally, limited 
attention has been given to understanding the hazard risk profile to bridge infrastructure, defined as the 
relative risks posed by multiple hazards and the synergies or trade-offs in protecting for different 
hazards. Furthermore, effective strategies are needed to jointly consider cumulative damage (e.g., from 
aging) and punctuated damage (e.g., from natural hazards) when assessing the influence of design or 
upgrade decisions that may mitigate risks from multiple potentially competing hazards. This chapter 
utilizes metamodels as an efficient strategy for developing parameterized time-dependent bridge 
fragilities for multiple hazards, thereby facilitating multi-hazard risk assessment and life cycle 
management. Threats considered in the case studies include earthquakes, hurricanes, aging and 
deterioration, and live loads. The applications illustrate the relative contribution of earthquake and 
hurricane hazards to the risk of losses given variation in bridge parameters, the influence of considering 
aging when assessing the hazard risk profile, and the impact of concurrent threats (e.g., truck and 
earthquake) on the life cycle risk.
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Hurricanes are among the most costly natural hazards affecting communities
worldwide. The landfall of a hurricane involves different hazard sources
(i.e., wind, wind-borne debris, flood, and rain) that interact to generate the hazard scenario for a given 
structure. Thus, hurricanes can be viewed and must be analyzed as multi-hazard scenarios. In this 
chapter, a probabilistic Performance-Based Hurricane Engineering (PBHE) framework is used for the risk 
assessment of a residential structure subjected to hurricane hazard. The general multilayer Monte Carlo 
simulation (MCS) approach is specialized for the risk assessment of preengineered or non-engineered 
buildings. A case study of a hypothetical residential house subjected to the combined hazards of wind, 
wind-borne debris, flood, and rainfall is considered to illustrate the sequential procedure for the 
probabilistic risk assessment. The results obtained from the application example include the annual 
probability of exceedance of repair cost for the target residential building due to each hazard and their 
combined effects. These results highlight the importance of
considering the interaction between different hazard sources.
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Coastal zones are often prone to several natural hazards, and where the coastal zone has high population 
density and infrastructural assets, these hazards can render severe loss to both life and properties. The 
present paper reports a comprehensive assessment of the multi-hazard and multi-risk (keeping in view 
the population and assets exposed to multi-hazards) in the Balasore coast, situated in the state of 
Odisha, India, facing the Bay of Bengal immediately to its east. In most of the multi-hazard and multi-risk 
assessments, the importance of any one hazard in relation to others is often determined arbitrarily. To 
overcome this limitation, this work presents a multi-criteria analysis implemented on six hazards, namely 
coastal erosion, storm surge, sea level rise, coastal flooding, tsunami, and earthquake. The respective 
hazards were ranked according to their relative weight computed by pair-wise comparison, and the 
overall multi-hazard map of the coast was prepared using weighted overlay technique in GIS 
environment. In order to assess the exposure, population density and urban assets of the study area 
were also mapped. Finally, the population and urban density data were overlain on the multi-hazard map 
in order to derive the final map portraying the multi-risk of the Balasore coast. Coastal erosion and storm 
surge inundation are the two most substantial natural hazards that regularly affect this coast. It is also 
observed that hazard from the perspective of coastal erosion is spatially concentrated along the central 
part of the coast, while in the southern part, the effect of storm surge is higher. The area in and around 
Chandipur, which is situated in the central portion of the Balasore coast, has been found to have the 
highest multi-risk, which also happens to be a popular tourist destination.
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This paper was aimed to provide a quantitative failure probability analysis for multiple hazards. To 
achieve this, the 1724-kPa (250 Psi) gas pipelines of one of the district neighborhoods of Tehran 
metropolitan are analyzed to establish the probability of damage against earthquake, fire and 
liquefaction as a multi-hazard case study. The pipeline is approximately 4 km long and is divided into 14 
segments, each of which has 300 m length. We used probabilistic analysis to identify the sources of 
earthquakes in the area. We calculated the probability that an earthquake with a given maximum 
magnitude will occur, the probability of liquefaction, that of post-earthquake fires, and the probability of 
pipeline failure for each segment. In order to take into account uncertainty in the location of epicenters, 
different points on the North Ray fault were randomly selected as epicenters, and the analysis was 
carried out for each point. Finally, based on the proposed method, the upper bound of failure probability 
of the main pipeline resulting from multiple hazards was estimated to be 65.7 %. If ductile pipelines were 
installed, this amount could be reduced to 32.7 % which shows a reduction of 51.79 % of the upper 
bound of failure probability.
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This paper develops a systematic hazard interaction classification based on the geophysical environment 
that natural hazards arise from – the hazard-forming environment. According to their contribution to 
natural hazards, geophysical environmental factors in the hazard-forming environment were categorized 
into two types. The first are relatively stable factors which construct the precondition for the occurrence 
of natural hazards, whilst the second are trigger factors, which determine the frequency and magnitude 
of hazards. Different combinations of geophysical environmental factors induce different hazards. Based 
on these geophysical environmental factors for some major hazards, the stable factors are used to 
identify which kinds of natural hazards influence a given area, and trigger factors are used to classify the 
relationships between these hazards into four types: independent, mutex, parallel and series 
relationships. This classification helps to ensure all possible hazard interactions among different hazards 
are considered in multi-hazard risk assessment. This can effectively fill the gap in current multi-hazard 
risk assessment methods which to date only consider domino effects. In addition, based on this 
classification, the probability and magnitude of multiple interacting natural hazards occurring together 
can be calculated. Hence, the developed hazard interaction classification provides a useful tool to 
facilitate improved multi-hazard risk assessment.
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This article proposes an approach for the derivation of multi-hazard fragility functions, through the use 
of system reliability methods and Bayesian Networks. A bridge system is broken down into its 
constitutive components to isolate specific failure mechanisms and damage states at the component 
level. At the system level, the probability of occurrence of failure modes (i.e. various configurations of 
component damage states) is estimated thanks to a Bayesian analysis. These system fragility functions 
can then be directly related to harmonized functionality levels in order to get accurate predictions of 
downtime or traffic reduction. The applicability of the Bayesian Network formulation is compared to the 
matrix-based system reliability method, in terms of accuracy and computation time, while modeling 
strategies are proposed in the case of large systems with complex failure modes or multi-state 
components. Finally, the proposed approach is applied to a bridge system that is exposed to multiple 
hazard events (earthquakes, ground failures and floods): using the Bayesian framework, four 
functionality loss levels can be predicted with fragility surfaces that are expressed as a function of peak 
ground acceleration and flow discharge, taking into account multi-hazard interactions at the vulnerability 
level (i.e. cumulated damage events).
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Natural hazards can cause serious disruption to societies and their transport infrastructure networks. The 
impact of extreme hazard events is largely dependent on the resilience of societies and their networks. 
The INFRARISK project is developing a reliable stress test framework for critical European transport 
infrastructure to analyse the response of networks to extreme hazard events. The project considers the 
spatio-temporal processes associated with multi-hazard and cascading extreme events (e.g. earthquakes, 
floods, landslides) and their impacts on road and rail transport infrastructure networks. As part of the 
project, an operational framework is being developed using an online INFRARISK Decision Support Tool 
(IDST) to advance decision making approaches, leading to better protection of existing transport 
infrastructure. The framework will enable the next generation of European infrastructure managers to 
analyse the risk to critical road and rail infrastructure networks due to extreme natural hazard events. To 
demonstrate the overarching risk assessment methodology developed in the project, the methodology is 
demonstrated for two case studies, which comprise portions of the European TEN-T network; a road 
network in the region of Bologna, Italy and a rail network extending from Rijeka to Zagreb in Croatia. This 
paper provides an overview of the INFRARISK multi-hazard risk assessment methodology and a brief 
introduction to the case studies, as the project is currently ongoing.
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Performance assessment of structures, systems, and components for multi-hazard scenarios has 
received significant attention in recent years. However, the concept of multi-hazard analysis is quite 
broad in nature and the focus of existing literature varies across a wide range of problems. In some 
cases, such studies focus on hazards that either occur simultaneously or are closely correlated with each 
other. For example, seismically induced flooding or seismically induced fires. In other cases, multi-hazard 
studies relate to hazards that are not dependent or correlated but have strong likelihood of occurrence 
at different times during the lifetime of a structure. The current approaches for risk assessment need 
enhancement to account for multi-hazard risks. It must be able to account for uncertainty propagation in 
a systems-level analysis, consider correlation among events or failure modes, and allow integration of 
newly available information from continually evolving simulation models, experimental observations, 
and field measurements. This dissertation presents a detailed study that proposes enhancements by 
incorporating Bayesian networks and Bayesian updating within a performance-based probabilistic 
framework. The performance-based framework allows propagation of risk as well as uncertainties in the 
risk estimates within a systems analysis. Unlike conventional risk assessment techniques such as a fault-
tree analysis, a Bayesian network can account for statistical dependencies and correlations among 
events/hazards. The proposed approach is extended to develop a risk-informed framework for 
quantitative validation and verification of high fidelity system-level simulation tools. Validation of such 
simulations can be quite formidable within the context of a multi-hazard risk assessment in nuclear 
power plants. The efficiency of this approach lies in identification of critical events, components, and 
systems that contribute to the overall risk. Validation of any event or component on the critical path is 
relatively more important in a risk-informed environment. Significance of multi-hazard risk is also 
illustrated for uncorrelated hazards of earthquakes and high winds which may result in competing design 
objectives. It is also illustrated that the number of computationally intensive nonlinear simulations 
needed in performance-based risk assessment for external hazards can be significantly reduced by using 
the power of Bayesian updating in conjunction with the concept of equivalent limit-state.
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Various types of hazards each with the potential to occur multiple times during the long service life of 
bridges may threaten the functionality of transportation systems and significantly impact the society. In 
hazard-prone areas, as the recovery time becomes longer, the likelihood of other hazard events 
occurring before the system is recovered increases. This can result in the accumulation of damage and 
higher vulnerability of the infrastructure. This study presents a multihazard life-cycle cost assessment 
framework to find optimal solutions for retrofit strategies. The possibility of multiple occurrences of 
multiple types of hazard incidents is probabilistically incorporated in the framework. This methodology 
accurately determines the expected life-cycle cost of hazard-induced consequences by comprehensively 
including direct and indirect incurred costs. The presented framework is applied to a realistic multispan 
reinforced concrete bridge in California that is exposed to flood and earthquake hazards. The total life-
cycle cost of several practical retrofit strategies are evaluated and compared for a wide range of bridge 
service lives. A sensitivity analysis is also performed to characterize the impacts of several key variables 
on the expected life-cycle cost of the bridge and the optimal retrofit plans.
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In this paper we summarize a number of risk pathway scenarios that are often claimed in literature as of 
priority for risk analyses in unconventional gas development. The resulting scenarios are structured in 
diagrams representing causal relationships between events. We argue that science is called to fill gaps 
regarding the main processes characterizing the involved events and defining the conditions under which 
their occurrence may be enhanced or inhibited. In this way, these scenarios can be more objectively 
parameterized, making their quantitative assessment a more feasible task and opening the way for the 
formulation of appropriate risk mitigation strategies.
Chulahwat, Akshat; Mahmoud, 
Hussam; 
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multi-hazard design of building systems with 
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Engineering 
Structures 137 268-284 2017 Elsevier
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The possibility of structures experiencing multiple hazards of different types during their service life 
has always been present. However, design of structures has primarily been geared towards addressing 
the most dominant hazard at the location of interest. In recent years, the design philosophy of 
structures has shifted towards a more holistic approach of addressing multiple hazards to ensure 
adequate performance under different loading scenarios. This requires the utilization of new structural 
systems and the development of effective optimization methods that can address multiple hazards. In 
this study, a suspended floor slab-isolated structure is utilized as an optimization test system subjected 
to wind and seismic demands. To perform the optimization a new combinatorial optimization approach 
is proposed, which is a combination of two methods – Nelder-Mead and Coevolutionary Matrix 
Adaptation Evolution Strategy (CMA-ES). The two algorithms are integrated simultaneously to optimize 
three key design variables of the suspended slab system and to obtain a family of optimal solutions that 
can accommodate varying level of participation of each hazard. In doing so, a set of alternatives is 
provided to the designer to accommodate wide variations and combinations in hazards intensities. The 
results of the study highlight the effectiveness of tuning the suspended slab system to meet the wind 
and seismic performance objectives. The system is seen to be more effective in case of taller structures 
than shorter structures. For taller structures, the system can be optimized to improve performance 
under both wind and seismic hazards without significant trade-off on individual hazard performance. 
Furthermore, the system is seen to be more sensitive to wind loading than earthquake loading.
van Westen, Cees J; Greiving, 
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Environmental 
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Tropical cyclones are an example of a multihazard event with impacts that can highly vary depending on 
landfall location, wind speed, storm surge, and inland flooding from precipitation. These storms are 
typically categorized by their wind speed and pressure, while evacuation orders are typically given based 
on storm surge. The general public relies on these single hazard assessment parameters when 
attempting to understand the risk of an oncoming event. However, after the fact, these events are 
ranked by economic damage and death toll. Therefore, it is imperative that when these events are 
communicated to the public, during the forecast period, the multiple hazards are incorporated in terms 
the public can easily associate with, such as economic damage. This article provides an evaluation of the 
potential for real-time use of artificial neural networks, through the utilization of an already developed 
Hurricane Impact Level (HIL) Model, to forecast a range of economic damage from tropical cyclone 
events, during the 2015 and 2016 United States hurricane season. The HIL Model is built prior to the 
start of each season and simulated every 3 h, in conjunction with National Hurricane Center (NHC) issued 
advisories, for oncoming tropical cyclones forecasted to make landfall. Weaker and more common 
tropical cyclones have a less varied forecast and produce more accurate impact level (IL) predictions. 
More complicated and uncertain events, such as 2016 Hurricane Matthew, require the user’s discretion 
in communicating varying landfall locations for a complex track forecast to the model. As NHC forecasts 
change with respect to both track and meteorological hazards affecting land, the estimated IL and the 
HIL model confidence will also change. In other words, if a track shifts to a more vulnerable location, or 
to more locations, or the meteorological hazards increase, the IL will subsequently increase. All tropical 
cyclones from the 2015 and 2016 seasons demonstrate the validity of the HIL Model with a forecast 
confidence of at least 60% for up to 30 h out from an impending landfall.
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Multi-risk assessment involves the inclusion of hazard and risk interactions within the modeling of the 
disaster risk chain. These interactions include more than one disastrous event at the same time, 
cascading events, and how changes in exposure and vulnerability arise over time, including as a result of 
previous events. At a first glance, multi-risk assessment appears to be a better means of approaching 
disaster risk reduction actions. However, it is hindered by a lack of knowledge about the fundamental 
physical processes involved, difficulties in comparing hazards and risks of different types and, especially, 
the topic of this chapter, barriers within risk governance for the successful implementation of necessary 
risk mitigation actions. Such barriers include a lack of standardization in terminology, a deficiency in 
expertise in the range of disciplines that are relevant to multi-risk reduction planning, inadequate 
resources, and biases and barriers in communication between the relevant public and private actors, as 
well as between researchers and policy-makers. This chapter details some of the social, institutional and 
scientific barriers that are associated with the full consideration of multi-risk governance, and provides 
some suggestions as to how these may be overcome.
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International Journal 
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Science 8 3 270-283 2017 Springer
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The details of a multi-hazard and probabilistic risk assessment, developed for urban planning and 
emergency response activities in Manizales, Colombia, are presented in this article. This risk assessment 
effort was developed under the framework of an integral disaster risk management project whose goal 
was to connect risk reduction activities by using open access and state-of-the-art risk models. A 
probabilistic approach was used for the analysis of seismic, landslide, and volcanic hazards to obtain 
stochastic event sets suitable for probabilistic loss estimation and to generate risk results in different 
metrics after aggregating in a rigorous way the losses associated to the different hazards. Detailed and 
high resolution exposure databases were used for the building stock and infrastructure of the city 
together with a set of vulnerability functions for each of the perils considered. The urban and territorial 
ordering plan of the city was updated for socioeconomic development and land use using the hazard and 
risk inputs and determinants, which cover not only the current urban area but also those adjacent areas 
where the expansion of Manizales is expected to occur. The emergency response capabilities of the city 
were improved by taking into account risk scenarios and after updating an automatic and real-time post-
earthquake damage assessment.
Sperotto, Anna; Molina, José-
Luis; Torresan, Silvia; Critto, 
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Reviewing bayesian networks potentials for 
climate change impacts assessment and 
management: A multi-risk perspective
Journal of 
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management 202 320-331 2017 Elsevier
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The evaluation and management of climate change impacts on natural and human systems required the 
adoption of a multi-risk perspective in which the effect of multiple stressors, processes and 
interconnections are simultaneously modelled. Despite Bayesian Networks (BNs) are popular integrated 
modelling tools to deal with uncertain and complex domains, their application in the context of climate 
change still represent a limited explored field. The paper, drawing on the review of existing applications 
in the field of environmental management, discusses the potential and limitation of applying BNs to 
improve current climate change risk assessment procedures. Main potentials include the advantage to 
consider multiple stressors and endpoints in the same framework, their flexibility in dealing and 
communicate with the uncertainty of climate projections and the opportunity to perform scenario 
analysis. Some limitations (i.e. representation of temporal and spatial dynamics, quantitative validation), 
however, should be overcome to boost BNs use in climate change impacts assessment and management.
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The paper presents a methodological framework for multi-hazard fragility analyses for fluvial earthen 
dikes in earthquake and flood prone areas. The methodology and results are an integral part of the multi-
hazard (earthquake-flood) 10 risk study implemented within the framework of the EU FP7 project 
MATRIX (New Multi-Hazard and Multi-Risk Assessment Methods for Europe) for the area around 
Cologne, Germany. The study area covers the Rhine River reach and adjacent floodplains between the 
gauges Andernach and Düsseldorf. Along this domain, the inhabited areas are partly protected by 
earthen embankments (dikes or levees), which may be prone to failure in case of exceptional floods 
and/or earthquakes. The main focus of the study is to consider the damage potential of the dikes within 
the context of the possible interaction between the two hazards. The fragility of the earthen dikes is 
analyzed in terms of liquefaction potential characterized by the factor of safety. Uncertainties in the 
geometrical and geotechnical dike parameters are considered by using a Monte Carlo approach. The 
damage potential of the earthen structures is presented in the form of a fragility surface showing the 
damage probability as a function of both seismic ground shaking and flood water level. The obtained 
results can be used for multi-hazard risk assessment in earthquake and flood prone areas and, in 
particular, are intended for comprehensive risk assessment in the area around the city of Cologne.
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Publishing 
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The United States coastline, where over 50% the population lives, is vulnerable to hurricanes along the 
East and Gulf coasts. However, the question remains as to whether these two areas are equally resilient 
to a landfalling hurricane. In addition, while it is assumed that improvements in building codes, 
infrastructure protections, and changing policy over the past century have been effective in reducing the 
impacts to a community from historically extreme hurricane events, such an assumption is still to be 
validated. Here, a multi-hazard artificial neural network model is used to address these questions. The 
Hurricane Impact Level Model is the first prediction model to utilize machine-learning techniques 
(artificial neural networks) to established complex connections between all meteorological factors (wind, 
pressure, storm surge, and precipitation resulting in inland flooding) of a tropical cyclone and how those 
interact with the location of landfall to produce a certain level of economic damage. This model allows 
for a more all-encompassing assessment of how the impacts of tropical cyclones vary along the coastline. 
The Hurricane Impact Level Model was trained with historical tropical cyclone events from 1998 to 
present day, resulting in established locational associations to modern relevant building codes and 
mitigation practices. Simulating the meteorological factors from historical events allows for a new 
assessment of economic impact changes due to infrastructure improvements and policy adaptations 
over time. In essence, if Hurricane Sandy hit Florida instead of New York, it would have a lower economic 
impact due to lower population density and more stringent building codes, which the artificial neural 
network has associated with the latitudes and longitudes within the state of Florida. If the Galveston 
hurricane were to hit today, the seawall would not succeed in lowering the economic impact to the 
Texas coastline. Over the years, significant effort has been put in to improving the resiliency of the 
United States coastline, mainly in the southern states, but it has not been enough to counteract the 
effects of population growth within coastal counties.
Araya-Muñoz, Dahyann; 
Metzger, Marc J; Stuart, Neil; 
Wilson, A Meriwether W; 
Carvajal, Danilo; 
A spatial fuzzy logic approach to urban multi-
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Science of the Total 
Environment 576 508-519 2017 Elsevier
https://www.sciencedirect.com/science
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Even though most cities are exposed to more than one hazard, local planners and decision-makers still 
have a limited understanding of the exposure and sensitivity to and the spatial distribution of hazards. 
We examine the impact of multiple hazards in the Concepción Metropolitan Area (CMA), Chile. A flexible 
methodology based on spatial fuzzy logic modelling was developed to explore the impact of weather-
related hazards, including coastal flooding, fluvial flooding, water scarcity, heat stress, and wildfire. 32 
indicators were standardised and then aggregated through a stepwise approach into a multi-hazard 
impact index. We find that all the municipalities in the CMA increased their level of impact between 1992 
and 2002, due to a larger increase in the exposure rather than the modest decrease in sensitivity. 
Municipal sensitivity was driven mostly by changes in the population's age structure. Wildfires and water 
scarcity appeared to have the largest impact on all municipalities. Fuzzy modelling offered high flexibility 
in the standardisation and aggregation of indicators with diverse characteristics, while also providing a 
means to explore how the interaction of numerous indicators influenced the index. The resulting maps 
can help identify indicators, components, and hazards or combinations of hazards that most influence 
the impact on municipalities. The results can be used to improve and promote dialogue among policy-
makers and stakeholders regarding prioritisation of resources for urban development in ways that can 
also reduce exposure and sensitivity and lower vulnerability to climate change. The methods presented 
can be adapted to other cities.
Gehl, Pierre; 
Bayesian networks for the multi-risk 
assessment of road infrastructure Doctotal Thesis 2017
UCL (University 
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London) http://discovery.ucl.ac.uk/1546080/
The purpose of this study is to develop a methodological framework for the multi-risk assessment of 
road infrastructure systems. Since the network performance is directly linked to the functional states of 
its physical elements, most efforts are devoted to the derivation of fragility functions for bridges exposed 
to potential earthquake, flood and ground failure events. Thus, a harmonization effort is required in 
order to reconcile fragility models and damage scales from different hazard types. The proposed 
framework starts with the inventory of the various hazard-specific damaging mechanisms or failure 
modes that may affect each bridge component (e.g. piers, deck, bearings). Component fragility curves 
are then derived for each of these component failure modes, while corresponding functional 
consequences are proposed in a component-level damage-functionality matrix, thanks to an expert-
based survey. Functionality-consistent failure modes at the bridge level are then assembled for specific 
configurations of component damage states. Finally, the development of a Bayesian Network approach 
enables the robust and efficient derivation of system fragility functions that (i) directly provide 
probabilities of reaching functionality losses and (ii) account for multiple types of hazard loadings and 
multi-risk interactions. At the network scale, a fully probabilistic approach is adopted in order to 
integrate multi-risk interactions at both hazard and fragility levels. A temporal dimension is integrated to 
account for joint independent hazard events, while the hazard-harmonized fragility models are able to 
capture cascading failures. The quantification of extreme events cannot be achieved by conventional 
sampling methods, and therefore the inference ability of Bayesian Networks is investigated as an 
alternative. Elaborate Bayesian Network formulations based on the identification of link sets are 
benchmarked, thus demonstrating the current computational difficulties to treat large and complex 
systems.
El Khoury Antoun, Jad; 
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In the last few decades, there has been an important increase in building high-rise constructions in many 
cities around the world. Since they offer several benefits in populous areas in terms of space efficiency, 
economy and sustainability, tower buildings attracted practitioners and researchers to understand better 
their exclusive behavior and response to natural hazards (e.g., hurricanes, earthquakes). Because of their 
flexibility and their commonly limited damping, skyscrapers are more susceptible to wind and 
earthquake actions than low- and mid-rise buildings. Moreover, many locations are prone to multiple 
hazards; hence, it is important to understand thoroughly the structural behavior of structures 
undergoing the effect of each hazard separately in order to obtain better designs. In this study, the 
general methodology of performance-based loss assessment is applied to a hypothetical 74-story office 
building located in Miami, FL, and New Madrid, MO. Seismic hazard, wind hazard, and hurricane hazard 
are considered. The expected losses related to the seismic hazard are evaluated following the 
Performance-Based Earthquake Engineering (PBEE) framework proposed by the Pacific Earthquake 
Engineering Research (PEER) center; whereas the Performance-Based Wind Engineering (PBWE) and the 
Performance-Based Hurricane Engineering (PBHE) frameworks are used to calculate the losses 
corresponding to wind- and hurricane-induced actions on the same building. The monetary losses 
considered include those due to damage to structural and non-structural components, as well as those 
due to occupants’ discomfort. The results from the two analyses are compared to each other to form a 
consistent foundation for future investigations of the appropriate mitigation techniques (e.g., using 
dampers) to minimize the total expected losses for the considered building when taking into account 
both hazards. This research is a first step toward a general approach to multi-hazard performance-based 
engineering and uniform risk design for multiple hazards.
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assess the effects of the earthquakes on flood risk to Christchurch. In the course of these investigations it 
has become better understood that floodplain management should be considered in a multi natural 
hazards context. Council have therefore engaged the Jacobs, Beca, University of Canterbury, and HR 
Wallingford project team to investigate the multihazards in eastern areas of Christchurch and develop 
flood management options which also consider other natural hazards in that context (i.e. how other 
hazards contribute to flooding both through temporal and spatial coincidence). The study has three 
stages:  Stage 1 Gap Analysis – assessment of information known, identification of gaps and studies 
required to fill the gaps.  Stage 2 Hazard Studies – a gap filling stage with the studies identified in Stage 
1.  Stage 3 Collating, Optioneering and Reporting – development of options to manage flood risk. This 
present report is to document findings of Stage 1 and recommends the studies that should be completed 
for Stage 2. It has also been important to consider how Stage 3 would be delivered and the gaps are 
prioritised to provide for this. The level of information available and hazards to consider is extensive; 
requiring this report to be made up of five parts each identifying individual gaps. A process of identifying 
information for individual hazards in Christchurch has been undertaken and documented (Part 1) 
followed by assessing the spatial co-location (Part 2) and probabilistic presence of multi hazards using 
available information. Part 3 considers multi hazard presence both as a temporal coincidence (e.g. an 
earthquake and flood occurring at one time) and as a cascade sequence (e.g. earthquake followed by a 
flood at some point in the future). Council have already undertaken a number of options studies for 
managing flood risk and these are documented in Part 4. Finally Part 5 provides the Gap Analysis 
Summary and Recommendations to Council. The key findings of Stage 1 gap analysis are: - The spatial 
analysis showed eastern Christchurch has a large number of hazards present with only 20% of the study 
area not being affected by any of the hazards mapped. Over 20% of the study area is exposed to four or 
more hazards at the frequencies and data available. - The majority of the Residential Red Zone is strongly 
exposed to multiple hazards, with 86% of the area being exposed to 4 or more hazards, and 24% being 
exposed to 6 or more hazards. - A wide number of gaps are present; however, prioritisation needs to 
consider the level of benefit and risks associated with not undertaking the studies. In light of this 10 
studies ranging in scale are recommended to be done for the project team to complete the present 
scope of Stage 3. - Stage 3 will need to consider a number of engineering options to address hazards and 
Kameshwar, Sabarethinam; 
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The performance of coastal infrastructure is threatened by natural hazards such as hurricanes and 
floods. The intensity and frequency of many of these climate related hazards are expected to be 
influenced by climate change, which will add uncertainty to the performance of coastal infrastructure. 
Furthermore, coastal regions are experiencing rapid population growth, which is expected to continue in 
the future as well. Therefore, in view of multiple hazards, uncertainty due to climate change, and 
increasing coastal population, comprehensive performance assessment of regional portfolio of coastal 
infrastructure is essential for managing the existing infrastructure and ensuring adequate performance 
after extreme events such as hurricanes and earthquakes. Therefore, this study focuses on the 
development of a methodology and supporting tools that can be used to facilitate comprehensive multi-
hazard performance assessment of regional portfolios of costal infrastructure.
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This work aims at qualitatively assessing risks resulting from various direct or indirect chains of natural 
and technological hazards for a defined geographical/administrative area - the community of Ciotat. A 
systematic qualitative methodology is proposed based on a cause-effect interaction structure that 
assigns conditions to causes, impacts to effects, protection barriers and types of interactions to a given 
flux between one cause and one effect. Five classes of interactions are used: direct triggers, indirect 
triggers, increases in frequency/probability of occurrence, in intensity and in the vulnerability of the 
exposed elements-at-risk. Various hazards links are conceptualized and represented via a two-
dimensional matrix abbreviated as matrix-of-interactions. It contains every possible interaction, 
therefore chains of multi-hazards are produced that approximate different worst-case scenarios given a 
set of initial causative conditions. A scenario of wildfire and its hazard chain is demonstrated in detail. In 
its qualitative form, this supporting methodology proves useful tool for the decision-making processes of 
multi-hazards risk assessment and management.
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Infrastructure systems, especially in hazard-prone regions, may face multiple occurrences of multiple 
types of hazards during their lifetime. The type and intensity of the hazards and impacts on systems 
can vary from one event to another. An important factor that has yet to be properly addressed in 
natural hazard loss estimation models is the impact of damage induced by various types of prior 
events on the increased vulnerability of systems against various types of potential future hazards. This 
paper presents a new hazard lifecycle cost analysis framework that addresses this gap and accounts for 
effects of incomplete repairs of damage conditions induced by prior natural hazards on the future hazard 
performance of systems. Considering that the space of scenarios for multi-hazard occurrences and the 
impacts over the lifetime of infrastructure systems is significantly large, a recursive algorithm is proposed 
to efficiently determine the lifecycle cost of the system. This framework is applied to a realistic bridge 
exposed to flood and earthquake hazards to determine the optimal retrofit plan that reduces the overall 
lifecycle cost of the bridge. Results show the significance of considering different damage types induced 
by multiple types of hazards and repair time variations for lifecycle cost analysis of infrastructure 
systems.
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Compound extremes correspond to events with multiple concurrent or consecutive drivers (e.g., ocean 
and fluvial flooding, drought, and heat waves) leading to substantial impacts such as infrastructure 
failure. In many risk assessment and design applications, however, multihazard scenarios of extremes 
and compound events are ignored. In this paper, we review the existing multivariate design and hazard 
scenario concepts and introduce a novel copula-based weighted average threshold scenario for an 
expected event with multiple drivers. The model can be used for obtaining multihazard design and risk 
assessment scenarios and their corresponding likelihoods. The proposed model offers uncertainty ranges 
of most likely compound hazards using Bayesian inference. We show that the uncertainty ranges of 
design quantiles might be large and may differ significantly from one copula model to the other. We also 
demonstrate that the choice of marginal and copula functions may profoundly impact the multihazard 
design values. A robust analysis should account for these uncertainties within and between multivariate 
models that translate into multihazard design quantiles. 
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International Journal 
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Tsunami damage on buildings in regions subjected to shaking is commonly modeled disregarding the 
occurrence of a previous earthquake and damages that have already occurred at those buildings. In 
Portugal, there are studies for the regions of Lisboa, Setúbal and Algarve that access damages or 
vulnerability of buildings due to the action of tsunami waves. Even so, they never took into account that, 
if near to the epicenter, usually prior to the tsunami, there was an earthquake shaking capable of 
provoking some level of damages to the building stock in the affected area. In this paper, we propose a 
way of combining earthquake shaking damages with tsunami damages – the aggregated damage. This is 
defined as an additive function. The aggregated damage of a building is the sum of damages caused by 
the earthquake plus those caused by the tsunami. As for earthquake shaking damage assessment, we use 
a home-developed software model based on standard vulnerability indexes conveying fragility curves for 
5 different damage states (DSi), for reinforced concrete and other building typologies (only masonry is 
considered in the present case). The tsunami fragility curves corresponding to similar DSi, were obtained 
from recent published literature where the main variable was the water maximum height reaching each 
building which was estimated using a Geographic Information System (GIS) approach.
Barrantes, Gustavo; Multi-hazard model for developing countries Natural Hazards 92 2
1081-
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Disaster risk assessment related to natural events has generally been carried out separately by specialists 
in each area of earth sciences, which has two negative consequences: Firstly, results of investigations are 
presented in different formats, mainly maps, which differ significantly from each other in aspects such as 
scale, symbols and units; secondly, it is common for an area or territory to contain several hazards that 
can potentially interact with each other, generating cascade effects or synergies. While some authors 
have proposed a multi-hazard analysis framework based on the use of probabilities, the quality and 
quantity of data required for this approach are rarely available in developing countries. Qualitative 
methods, on the other hand, have traditionally been limited to overlapping maps, without considering 
possible spatial interactions. Given the importance of integrated assessment of natural hazards for land 
use planning and risk management, this article proposes a heuristic multi-hazard model appropriate for 
developing countries, based on a standardization of classifications and a spatial interaction matrix 
between hazards. The model can be adjusted to be applied at different scales and in different territories; 
to demonstrate its versatility, it is applied to the municipality of Poás, Costa Rica, a territory with multiple 
natural hazards.
Gehl, Pierre; D’Ayala, Dina; 
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This paper details an integrated method for the multi-hazard risk assessment of road infrastructure 
systems exposed to potential earthquake and flood events. A harmonisation effort is required to 
reconcile bridge fragility models and damage scales from different hazard types: this is achieved by the 
derivation of probabilistic functionality curves, which express the probability of reaching or exceeding a 
loss level given the seismic intensity measure. Such probabilistic tools are essential for the loss 
assessment of infrastructure systems, since they directly provide the functionality losses instead of the 
physical damage states. Multi-hazard interactions at the vulnerability level are ensured by the 
functionality loss curves, which result from the assembly of hazard-specific fragility curves for local 
damage mechanisms. At the hazard level, the potential overlap between earthquake and flood events is 
represented by a time window during which the effects of one hazard type on the infrastructure may still 
be present: the value of this temporal parameter is based on the repair duration estimates provided by 
the functionality loss curves. The proposed framework is implemented through Bayesian Networks, thus 
enabling the propagation of uncertainties and the computation of joint probabilities. The procedure is 
demonstrated on a bridge example and a hypothetical road network.
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Book chapter Chutmina K. & Bosher L.S. Managing disaster risk and resilience in the UK Response vs. Prevention in 
policy and practice. IN: 
Chandler, D. and Coaffee, J. 
(eds.)
267 - 279 2016 Taylor & Francis (Routledge https://dspace10-Sep
Report DfiD Risk Management and Financing. Evidence on Demand, UK DfID 73 2016 Department for Internationa  https://assets 10-Sep Focuses on narrative descriptions (a) that bring together diverse sources of qualitative information to 
inform decision making. Recognises complexity and interactions between hazards, but does not describe 
methods to identify what interactions are relevant.
Guidance note DfID Minimum Standards for Embedding Disaster Resilience in 
DFID Country Offices
DfID 4 2013 Department for Internationa  https://www.g10-Sep Requests multi-hazard risk assessments, but no methods presented (likely focus on assessment of 
multiple single hazards).
Guidance Note DfID Multi-Hazard Disaster Risk Assessment (v2) DfID 6 2012 Department for Internationa  https://assets 10-Sep Endorses development of a risk matrix to compare different hazards. Paper focuses on understanding 
multiple single hazards.
Report Gunawan et al. Natural Hazards Partnership. Hazard Impact Framework: 
First Edition
NHP 109 2017 NHP http://www.n 10-Sep
Report Cabinet Office Keeping the Country Running:
Natural Hazards and
Infrastructure
Cabinet Office 98 2011 Civil Contingencies Secretar   https://assets 15-Sep
Report Cabinet Office The Pitt Review - Learning lessons from the 2007 floods - 
Executive Summary
Cabinet Office 43 2008 Cabinet Office http://webarc 15-Sep Impact report and Future Recommendations following UK flooding in 2007. Minimal overlap with focus 
on approaches to assessing multiple hazards in academic review. Calls on The Environment Agency to 
develop its tools and techniques for predicting and modelling river flooding, taking account of extreme 
and multiple events (including coincidental events) and depths and velocity of water. Suggests running 
different extreme scenarios through the systems, and making sure that the possibility of multiple flood 
events occurring both simultaneously and within different overlapping time periods is taken into 
account. (g and h)
Report Cabinet Office National Risk Register of Civil Emergencies Cabinet Office 71 2017 Cabinet Office https://www.g15-Sep Generally focuses on multiple single hazards, using a matrix to compare the impact/likelihood of these. 
Report Committee on Climate Change. 
Synthesis report: priorities for 
the next five years
UK Climate Change Risk Assessment Committee on Climate Change 86 2017 Committee on Climate Chanhttps://www.t15-Sep Notes that risks arise from risks arise from the exposure of interdependent infrastructure networks to 
multiple,  correlated hazards (e.g. flooding and high winds). Focus on impacts to infrastructure, with call 
for additional action to understand cascading failures. Not sure this report sets out methods for 
understanding multi-hazard and multi-hazard risk.
Report HSE Land use plannign methodology Health and Safety Executive 35 2018 HSE http://www.h  22-Nov Scenario analysis (h); HSE's method also takes into account domino effects and consequential hazards 
(e.g., where a fire may lead to an explosion)
Report Environment Agency Estimating the economic costs of the
2015 to 2016 winter floods
Environment Agency 50 2018 Environment Agency https://assets 25-Oct Groundwater and river 
floods impacts are 
aggregated
Report is focused on impact (economic) of multiple storms and therefore does not overlap with the 
academic review which examined approaches to understand multi-hazards.
Working Paper European Commission Risk Assessment and Mapping Guidelines for Disaster Mana  EC 43 2010 EC 24-Sep Although this paper talks about risk assessment and mapping guidelines, it does not present a standard 
way of developing multi-hazard risk assessments, rather it suggests that both multi-hazard and multi-
vulnerability perspectives are needed. Some narrative is included about what these should entail, but no 
method presented.
Article Espinoza et al. Multi-phase assessment and adaptation of power systems 
resilience to natural hazards
Electric Power Systems 
Research
136 352 - 361 2016 Elsevier https://www.s15-Sep research applied in not by 
industry
Fragility curves are used (h), which provide the failure probabilities of the power system’s components 
as a function of a weather parameter (e.g. wind speed) at any given time. 
Report ONR External Hazards ONR Guide 84 2018 Office for Nuclear Regulatio  www.onr.org
.uk/operatio
nal/tech_asst
_guides/ns-
tast-gd-
013.pdf
19-Oct Nuclear Safety Technical 
Assessment Guide
Tabulates (a) potential secondary/asscoiated hazards with primary hazards. Focus is on methods for 
evaluating single hazards. ONR Annual Report slides show hazard curve (h) for storms.
Report ETI Enabling Resilient UK Energy Infrastructure: Natural Hazard 
Characterisation Technical Volumes
and Case Studies, Volume 12 — Hazard Combinations. 
IMechE, IChemE
Energy Technologies Institut  12 49 2018 ETI http://www.im19-Nov Technical Report prepared 
for ETI by EDF Energy R&D 
UK Centre Limited, the 
Met Office and Mott 
MacDonald Limited
The report draws from the literature a number of methods (e.g. empirically-based, Markov chains, 
statistical (multivariate Bayesian, joint tail models, kernel density) and illustrates the use of copulas (h) 
to assess join probabilties of combined hazards.
Article Bruneau et al. State of the art of multihazard design American Society of Civil Eng143 10 Jan-25 2017 ASCE https://ascelib24-Sep US focused; research 
applied in not by industry
Review paper and therefore touches on a number of methods and relevant approaches. Focus is on 
resilience of engineered structures (e.g., bridges) and design to accommodate threats from multiple 
hazards.
Report EPRI Identification of External Hazards for Analysis in 
Probabilistic Risk Assessment: Update of
Report 1022997
Electric Power Research Institute (EPRI) 142 2015 EPRI https://www.e19-Oct US based corporation This paper points to several guidance documents that note the importance of combined hazard analysis 
but do not give guidance on how to do this. It refers to one paper (SKI 02:27, see below) that does 
include a methodology for identifying and screening combined events, albeit with limitations. The 
chapter focuses on hazard matrices (c), and the use of engineering judgement (h), together with an 
overview of some probabilistic and statistical approaches (i) to assessing correlated, consequential, and 
coincidental hazards. The document makes reference to EDF's methodology, which determines the 
frequency of combined hazards (either dependent or independent), based on their seasonality.
Report Knochenhauer M & Louko P Guidance for External Events Analysis Swedish Nuclear Inspectorate (SKI) SKI Report 82 2003 SKI https://www.s19-Oct Presents a method for identifying combined events, using matrices (c) and engineering judgement (h). 
Report Western European Nuclear Reg  Guidance Document
Issue T: Natural Hazards
WENRA 26 2015 WENRA 19-Oct Guidance for the WENRA 
Safety Reference Levels 
for Natural Hazards 
introduced as lesson 
learned from TEPCO 
Fukushima Dai-Ichi 
accident.
Use of matrix (c) to assess hazard interactions. Closely reflects comments in ASAMPSA reports. Suggests 
probabilistic methods can be used (h) if data is available. Guidance notes rather than detailed 
applications or worked examples.
Report Decker K & Brinkman H List of external hazards to be considered in ASAMPSA_E Project Report 51 2016 ASAMPSA_E http://asamps19-Oct project deliverable Presents a 101 x101 hazard matrix (c), with expert opinion identifying 577 relationships. Considers 
causally connected hazards, and correlated hazards (where hazards are likely to occur at the same time 
due to a shared root cause).
Report Cazzoli et al. Implementing external Events modelling in Level 2 PSA Project Report 2 54 2016 Rapport IRSN-PSN-RES/ SAGhttp://asamps19-Oct project deliverable Discusses development and quantification of event trees (h) although it is not clear if these were actually 
developed.
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 Detailed description of the economic costs 
framework used for case studies  
Each component in Table 2.2 is explained as follows: 
• Fatalities & Casualties – These will contain both financial costs (e.g. lost productivity, healthcare 
costs etc.) and welfare costs (e.g. pain, grief and suffering). Financial costs can be modelled using available 
data on average per-head costs and wage data. Welfare costs can be monetised using a variety of methods 
as described in HMT Green Book , although such estimates can be expensive and difficult to create and are 
often best used from the existing literature.  
• Lost Working Hours – This cost often appears as a productivity cost component of Fatalities & 
Casualties for those killed or injured, but working hours can be lost, too, by healthy people whose working 
life is disrupted by the incident. This is typically estimated using averages wages and ‘on-wage’ costs, such 
as pension and National Insurance contributions, as an estimate of the full economic value of people’s work; 
and multiplied by the total of hours lost. Care should be taken not to double-count with costs estimated 
under Infrastructure or Business Disruption – in incidents that are likely to feature all three cost types, it is 
suggested to try to capture all such impacts within one estimate rather than estimating separate and possibly 
overlapping costs.  
• Social – This can refer to losses of ‘social infrastructure’, such as certain government, charity or 
other services; social impacts, such as a breakdown of law and order; or  Social infrastructure such as 
schools and hospitals are affected by hazard events e.g. closure of schools.  
• Infrastructure – This includes roads, railways, ports, airports, electricity, utilities, communications 
etc. We can estimate the physical damage placed on infrastructure using the cost of additional time to 
repair/replace it; and the lost value of the infrastructure being unusable by measuring and valuing its lost 
‘throughput’ at market prices. However, this does not take into account welfare damages or other financial 
costs as infrastructure often has large positive externalities that may not be captured in these prices. 
• Buildings – Damage and destruction costs can be estimated using insurance costs, estimated repair 
costs or house prices. Care should be taken adjusting insurance costs for underinsurance and factors such 
as tax. We must also consider that house prices will include a valuation of the land the building sits upon, 
which will likely still be present.  
• Other losses – This could include cars, building contents and so on. These may be estimated though 
insurance costs, or they could be estimated using, for example, the observed number of destroyed cars and 
the average prices of a car on the road.  
• Business Disruption (local and regional/national) – This is the effects of businesses being closed 
due to damage or inaccessibility (local); or throughout the rest of the economy if local businesses formed 
part of supply chains. Care should be taken with double-counting with infrastructure costs. Business 
disruption might be included within insurance costs, or it can be estimated using gross value added 
estimates and details of the locations of businesses damaged in the area. Bear in mind that lost business 
activity can be displaced to elsewhere in the economy. 
• Lost Tourism – This could be thought of as within the compass of local business disruption, but is 
much more easily displaced elsewhere as tourists deciding whether or not to visit a, say, flood-hit area can 
very easily just decide to visit somewhere else. 
• Environmental Damage and Decontamination – Multi-hazard events can damage environmental 
resources and amenities; and lead to costs for repair or decontamination.  
• Emergency Response & Evacuation – This is the additional cost incurred to emergency services 
such as the police, fire and rescue and ambulance services; and costs to house people for the long- or short-
term. 
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 Three social-economic case studies 
5.1 THREE CASE STUDIES WHICH PRESENT THE SOCIO-ECONOMIC IMPACTS 
FROM MULTI-HAZARD EVENTS 
5.1.1 Forzieri et al. (2018) Escalating impacts of climate extremes on critical 
infrastructures in Europe 
Forzieri et al. (2018) focuses on the impacts of severe weather arising from climate change across 
Europe to the year 2100. These severe events are ‘multi-hazard’ as they refer to seven climate 
hazards: heat, cold, river and coastal floods, droughts, wildfires, and windstorms, which may occur 
in parallel. They focus on the impact these events have on multiple critical infrastructure that they 
define as “an array of physical assets, functions, and systems that are vital to ensuring the European 
Union’s health, wealth, and security ([including] transport systems, renewable and non-renewable 
energy generation plants, industry, water supply networks, and education and health 
infrastructures).”  
The quantification of impacts derives from a model for multi-hazard risk assessment. Forzier et al. 
(2018) developed an approach employed in Forzieri et al. (2017) to estimate the susceptibility to 
climate hazards of critical infrastructures and monetise the consequent impacts, referred to as 
‘damage estimates’. These are undiscounted over time and expressed in 2010 euros. They should 
be interpreted as structural damage to assets and losses due to production interruption. 
In order to assign economic values to each of the assets and to allow comparability between them, 
Forzieri et al. (2018) allocate a value to each sector (industry, transport, social, energy) that 
expresses the level of vulnerability (very high, high, moderate, low, very low, none) to climate 
hazards based on a survey of experts. Industry and infrastructure are then distributed in space in 
the model and it estimates the intensity of economic value (‘intensity values’) in terms of kilo-
tonnes of oil equivalent (electricity produced), kilo-tonnes of freight transported (good transport), 
annual turnover (industry) and public expenditure (social, e.g. health and education). Only assets 
that had high or very high levels of risk were assumed to contribute to the estimated impacts. 
In order to determine the baseline (that is the cost of environmental damage to Europe if climate 
change were not to intensify in the future), more than 1,100 disaster loss records for climate-related 
hazards that occurred between 1981-2010 were collected from the Emergency Events Database. 
All the data provided was converted into 2010 euros using the Harmonised Index of Consumer 
Prices (HICP). Using this data, Forzieri et al. (2018) were able to model the relationship between 
assets which are exposed to risk and the damage incurred. Once this relationship can be expressed 
as a function, it enables them to translate the intensity value (explained above) of each 
infrastructure at risk, into the corresponding economic damage from the climate event’s reported 
damage expressed in euros. The multi-hazard damage was estimated by summing up single-hazard 
median expected annual damage (EAD) values; in doing so an assumption is made that there is 
complete post-event recovery and independence of hazards (although they can occur at the same 
time). This may mean that the estimates are underestimated for the ‘multi-hazard’ context. This 
could be due to the first hazard causing impact and the proceeding hazards worsening the situation 
and hence not allowing a full recovery of assets as a result the costs are likely to increase. 
The results are presented for the EU, (plus Switzerland, Norway and Iceland) and by sector. Table 
2.5 presents the EAD (baseline – costs that Europe would incur anyway) in column 2, followed by 
the increase in costs that are only as a result of the effects of climate change in each time frame 
(2020s, 2050s and 2080s) up until the end of the century. The table shows all sectors see large 
increases from their EAD to the 2080s.  
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The damage can also be expressed as a proportion of gross fixed capital formation (GFGC), which 
is a measure of the annual investment in fixed assets. As risk rises across Europe the proportion of 
investment value lost to climate events will also rise from 0.12% of GFGC at present to 1.37% by 
the end of the century. The largest proportion being seen in southern European countries where 
risk is set to increase significantly (e.g. Greece – 4.32% and, Croatia – 5.21%). 
 
Table 5-1 Estimated increase in costs due to climate change to 2080s 
Location/Sector EAD (baseline) 2020’S 2050’S 2080’S 
EU+ €3.4 bn €9.3 bn €19.6 bn €37.0 bn 
Energy €0.5 bn €1.8 bn €4.2 bn €8.2 bn 
Transport €0.8 bn * * €11.9bn 
Industry €1.5 bn * * €16.2 bn + 
Social €0.6 bn * * More than double 
*Figures are given in text in Forzieri et al. (2018), but are incomplete for the 2020s and 2050s for some sectors. Full 
data for each decade is given in Figure 2 in Forzieri et al. (2018), but this is difficult to accurately interpret by eye. 
For the energy sector the largest rise in damage costs is borne by energy production (as opposed 
to energy transmission) as a result of its sensitivity to droughts and heat waves. For the transport 
sector, the largest rise will be caused by heat waves (92% of total damage) mainly being driven 
through impacts to roads and railways. For the industry sector, the largest rise in damage will be 
caused by floods and windstorms driven by structural damage to infrastructures, machinery and 
equipment. Finally, for the social sector, damage from flooding and windstorms will rise and 
remain important whereas drought-induced damage may rise considerably. Forzieri et al. (2018) 
illustrate the distribution of hazard impacts over infrastructure types per sector (page 104 in the 
paper). These include: gas pipelines, electricity transport, nuclear power, airports, ports, inland 
waterways, rails, roads, water/waste, chemicals, minerals, health and education. 
The final costs presented in this paper are those of adapting infrastructure to climate change. In 
order to make critical infrastructures resilient up to the end of the century, Forzieri et al. (2018) 
estimate that capital costs may exceed €200 billion and operating and maintenance costs of 
potentially €5.4 billion per year.  
These numbers are only indicative and are subject to numerous uncertainties, as explained by 
Forzieri et al. (2018). Nonetheless, they suggests that adaption can be an effective cost-strategy as 
it is clear that the €200 billion adaption costs over the century would be less than the annual costs 
over the course of the century outlined in Table 5.1 above. Although, the distribution of this cost 
could vary considerably between parts of Europe where risks are highest i.e. southern Europe. 
 
Discussion 
The costs which are included in Forzieri et al. (2018) are shown in Table 5.2 in black; and those 
not included, in grey.  
It is implicit in this method that Lost Working Hours and Business Disruption will be captured 
within the method used for valuing costs to infrastructure, even if these are not made explicit. It is 
implied also that the value of some building will be captured, where those buildings form part of 
the value of the infrastructure or where the costs to industry stem from loss of buildings from 
which to operate, but the method will have missed valuations of residential buildings.  
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Table 5-2 Cost framework for Forzieri et al. (2018) 
Population 
and work 
 Fatalities & 
Casualties Lost Working Hours Social 
Assets 
 
Infrastructure Buildings Other losses 
Economic 
Activity 
 Business 
Disruption (local) 
Business Disruption 
(national/international) Lost Tourism 
Enviro and 
Other 
 Environmental 
Damage 
Environmental 
Decontamination 
Emergency 
Response & 
Evacuation 
 
Social costs are captured within the narrow range of certain social services provided by 
governments, but wider social impacts of climate change are not addressed. It should be 
highlighted that such an omission (indeed, all omitted cost components) are not a failing of the 
method Forzieri et al. (2018) apply, as the paper was not aimed toward developing a fully costed 
model. However, the method of estimating the value of social infrastructure, which is to base it on 
the amount of public expenditure, would almost certainly lead to a large underestimate relative to 
the full economic cost. We would expect government services such as education and healthcare to 
have social and economic benefits that go well beyond their cost of supply and this will be missed 
by the Forzieri et al. (2018) method.  
Impacts of extremes for infrastructure may go beyond damage to physical assets and into wider 
economic, social and environmental impacts. The strength of these impacts will vary based on the 
interdependencies of critical infrastructures in certain economies. Interdependencies of 
infrastructure have not been explicitly modelled in this study due to lack of metrics and models 
that capture these relationships; rather there is an assumption that they are captured in some way 
in the reported damage, being based on actual prior events where interdependencies between 
infrastructure would have been observed. As such, there is a risk that the total cost of climate 
extreme impacts in this study may be under-estimated. 
Estimates are naturally subject to uncertainty due to them being based on simulation data over an 
extremely long time-scale. One thing that Forzieri et al. (2018) do not model is increases of capital 
over time, which would raise costs; and its possible redistribution or increased resilience to climate 
change risks, which would lower costs, over the century. Modelling of capital distribution and 
resilience could only be speculative, but average rates of capital accumulation should be available.  
Estimates are made through modelling future scenarios based on the number of extreme events in 
the past and the location of exposed assets. Therefore, any deviation from the damage which has 
been reported previously will alter the future impacts and thus costs to an unknown degree. Forzieri 
et al. (2018) also highlight that their understanding of long-term climate risks is limited by the lack 
of detailed knowledge of climate impacts due to poor loss data collected in the past.  
The loss data used from the Emergency Events Database (EMDAT) is also subject to uncertainty 
and bias as its content is provided from a wide variety of sources which is collected through 
multiple methods. The varying methods may provide data which is not comparable or robust. 
Forzieri is not clear on how the data is collated in EMDAT or what biases they envisage.  
A final limitation to this paper is that although they look at multiple hazards and multiple types of 
infrastructures they fail to look explicitly at the interdependencies between both; rather they look 
at the summing up of single hazard events, which may occur at the same time across Europe. This 
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is a common finding among the literature reviewed and it seems it is more to do with a lack of 
models which can capture these multi-impacts. 
5.1.2 Environment Agency (EA) (2018) Estimating the economic costs of the 2015-16 winter 
floods  
This report, referred to as EA 2018, looks at the economic costs of the winter floods of 2015 to 
2016 which were a result of multiple storms including: Storms Desmond, Eva and Frank. The EA 
explains their methodology to produce high-level economic estimates of costs which build on three 
earlier reports they produced; EA (2010), EA (2015) and EA (2018).  
EA 2018 tries to value not only the financial cost from damages but also the welfare cost associated 
with impacts to reflect full economic costs. It looks at past storms which are within the definition 
of a ’multi-hazard’ event as storms may include multiple hazards at a given time; wind, floods etc. 
A limitation of EA 2018 is that its primary focus is on the flood damages within these storms rather 
than the totality of the storm, although in EA (2015) they do distinguish between multiple types 
of flooding (fluvial and coastal) and the different impacts they create. In addition, all of the EAs 
reports do not look at one single flood, rather than multiple floods over a period of time, therefore 
the estimated economic costs are those of the accumulated effect. The EA 2018 report derives 
damage estimates from a number of impact categories which are of interest: 
• Residential property damages: physical damage to residential properties and contents  
• Non-residential (including business property damages): physical damage to non-residential 
(including business) properties and contents  
• Temporary accommodation: the costs of temporary accommodation  
• Vehicle damage: physical damage to vehicles  
• Public health: an estimate of additional psychological distress caused to households as a 
result of flooding  
• Emergency services: additional costs (for example, overtime) incurred by the emergency 
services (fire, police and ambulance services)  
• Local authorities: damages to public buildings, public spaces and additional costs faced by 
local authorities such as recovery grants (damages to local roads are considered in the 
transport section)  
• Education: welfare costs of education days lost  
• Transport: costs of repairs and induced losses from disrupted journeys for road and rail  
• Utilities: costs for repairs and induced losses caused by loss and/or interrupted utility 
services for water and electricity  
• Flood risk management infrastructure and service: cost of repairs to flood defence assets 
and additional service costs including staff and contractor overtime and materials  
• Agriculture: damage to agricultural land, including losses of output and additional 
production costs  
• Other including tourism, heritage and wildlife sites: damage to physical assets and, where 
possible to determine, indirect impacts on the wider economy  
The EA 2018 method is to estimate the economic cost of each impact category separately and add 
them together in a cost calculator they developed in 2012 to give total damages. They take care in 
their calculations to reduce the risk of double-counting impacts in different categories which may 
lead to incorrectly over-estimating impacts. For example, in many of the impact categories, capital 
costs are removed as these are thought to be covered by insurance and so included within the 
Association of British Insurers (ABI) business insurance claims. If they were not removed, they 
would be double-counted.  
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Estimates were calculated through a desk-based study using national level data obtained from a 
range of partner organisations6. They estimate both economic costs and financial costs. 
The costs to each of the impact categories are presented in Table 5.3 alongside the economic costs 
from their two previous publication. We have focused our review on the impacts with the largest 
proportion of costs.  
Table 5.3 shows that in 2015/16 the total cost of flooding within the storms that occurred was £1.6 
billon, a similar cost to those seen in the 2013/14 floods. The cost calculator used in EA 2018 
assumes that most impact categories are related to the number of properties damaged by flooding 
e.g. vehicles, public health, emergency services. This may explain the differences in cost from the 
2007 floods to the 2015/16 floods. In 2007 48,000 residential properties and 7,000 business 
properties were affected; whereas over 2015/16 16,000 residential properties and 5,000 business 
properties were affected. It could also be argued that the government response to extreme weather 
events has improved since the 2007 floods leading to a reduction in costs as the 2007 floods led to 
the Pitt review in 2008, which made recommendations for improving flood management. Finally, 
for each EA study different types of flooding occurred, and the 2007 floods included surface water 
flooding. 
It can be seen that businesses incurred the biggest proportion of costs with just over 30% in 
2015/16, an increase from the 2007 floods where they incurred just over 20%.  
EA 2018 suggests it is hard to compare rail damages between different floods and the increase in 
costs for the road transport is largely down to money paid by central Government to Local 
Authorities (LAs) for repairing physical damages to local roads. This figure was not adjusted for 
betterment or VAT, which would have reduced the road transport costs in the 2015/16 floods 
number by approximately half. 
Breaking down the economic costs to the transport sector in 2015/16, £121 million was due to rail 
and £220 million due to roads. A limitation to the transport costs for roads is that although data 
reported by LAs and Department for Communities and Local Government (DCLG) provides 
estimates for physical damages, welfare damages are unknown, and no estimates of disrupted 
journeys were estimated. These ‘welfare’ damages if included could increase costs considerably, 
particularly where roads are closed for several weeks. Welfare damages were however estimated 
in the rail transport sector using data from Network Rail. A further limitation which may be 
present, as mentioned in the paper by Network Rail (2016), is that for this and other impact 
categories, it is not easy to discriminate between wind storm damage and flood damage. This 
limitation should be considered when estimating other multi-hazard event costs. 
The utilities (energy and water) sector is the next category with the largest proportion of damages 
at around 7% of the total costs in 2015/16. The costs include: physical damages to infrastructure, 
additional operational costs and welfare damages to consumers suffering disruption. Although the 
proportion of costs increased slightly from 2013/14 to 2015/16, both are decreases from 2007 
where utility costs contributed just over 10% of total costs. This decrease may be due to the flood 
protection investment programmes implemented by utility companies between 2010 and 2015 
which were reported to cost around £800 million. Data on the effectiveness of these programmes 
is not included in EA 2018 and so it is unclear why costs increased from 2013/14 to 2015/16 when 
they were in place. 
 
 
                                                 
6 Organisations include: Association of British Insurers ABI, Department for Communities and Local Government 
DVLG, Department for Energy and Climate Change DECC (now part of BEIS), Highways England, National Farmers 
Union, Network Rail, Rural Payments Agency, water companies 
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Table 5-3 Comparison of economic costs by flood event by impact category (2015 prices) 
(£million) 
Impact category 2007 (summer 
floods) 
2013 to 2014 (winter 
floods) 
2015 to 2016 (winter 
floods) 
Residential properties  £1,500  £320  £350  
Businesses  £910  £270  £513  
Temporary 
accommodation  
£120  £50  £37  
Vehicles, boats, caravans  £98  £37  £36  
Local authorities 
(excluding roads)  
£170  £57  £73  
Emergency services  £5  £3  £3  
Flood risk management 
infrastructure and service  
£24  £147  £71  
Utilities (energy and 
water)  
£398  £30  £104  
Transport (roads, rail, air, 
ports)  
£310  £295  £341  
Agriculture  £59  £19  £7  
Health  £340  £25  £43  
Education  £14  £2  £4  
Other (wildlife, heritage 
and tourism)  
–  £13  £19  
Totals  £3,900  £1,300  £1,600  
 
Loss of life and health-related quality of life impacts were estimated to be around £43 million from 
the 2015/16 floods. The prevention of fatalities and injuries is an impact considered in a variety of 
UK public policies and there is a common method across Government included in HM Treasury’s 
Green Book, which recommends using a willingness to pay method from the Department for 
Transports (DfT) that estimates the reduction of risk of death in the context of road transport. In 
2014 prices, the estimate is around £1.84 million per fatal casualty. For injuries, EA 2018 use a 
unit value of £72,000 per injury (DEFRA, 2012). It is not clear whether they adjust this value to 
account for severity of injury or illness. A limitation of using these monetary values is that they 
were designed for use in ex-ante policy assessment not ex-post analysis as they are based on the 
willingness to pay to prevent loss of life or loss of quality of life, rather than an assessment of 
actual after-the-fact welfare costs. However, without any better method or data they have been 
used as a next best alternative. EA 2018 identifies that improvements should be made through on-
going research which began in 2007. All of the remaining costs are discussed in the full report.  
 
Discussion  
A strength of this this report, which we can see from Figure 5.4, is that EA 2018 estimates a large 
proportion of the impacts which we would expect to see from a multi-hazard event. This contrasts 
with many academic papers and grey literature which tend to be focused on one or two impact 
categories. The reason why the EA look at so many cost impacts may be because they are a 
government agency who use their evidence to inform policy making. In order to do this, they need 
to understand the total welfare loss to society and how costs are distributed across impact 
categories to understand where they can make the biggest impact.  
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Table 5-4 Cost framework for EA (2018) 
 
The EA may also have better access to data, although the EA 2018 highlights their key limitations 
to be around the availability and quality of data (particularly disaggregated information from the 
insurance industry); and the number and types of assets affected, which could be improved by data 
sharing agreements with key partners. These improvements around data would significantly 
improve confidence in future estimates of flood damages.  
The method in EA 2018 is clear, and they highlight their assumptions and uncertainties under each 
impact category. They also consider the difference between financial and economic costs which 
can often be a weakness of other papers. However, the method used to adjust ‘financial’ costs into 
‘economic’ costs are not infallible and assumptions are made e.g. assuming 50% betterment on 
certain assets where the replacement or repair was of equal quality to a new asset. A further 
assumption made is that grant money is used as a proxy for the economic costs to different 
stakeholders and so is unadjusted. They say that this probably under-estimates total costs as in 
certain cases the amount of grant funding received is capped such that private costs may not be 
covered.  
Finally, it is hard to distinguish the costs of each single storm or flood during 2015/16 as the costs 
are presented over the whole period. This may be due to many factors, such as that residential and 
non-residential properties are unlikely to make an insurance claim after each single storm 
(depending obviously on the severity of that storm). Also, after a single storm, the damage to an 
asset will be ‘carried’ in that asset and will worsen each time another storm occurs. Over a period 
of time, like 2015/16 reported in EA 2018, the multiple storms will have created accumulated 
damage to assets which then require a single claim for replacement or repair in a particular year or 
following a particular storm, which could place the totality of the cost of several years' worth of 
damage in just one time period. This is also true for grant money and funds to LAs as it is unlikely 
that every time a storm hits the government can release funds and more likely that money is granted 
at the end of a period of time when an assessment is made of where funds are required and who 
these are given to. This is true whether the successive events are of single hazard or multi-hazard 
nature. 
5.1.3 Pielke et al (2008) Normalized hurricane damage in United States: 1900-2005  
The final paper, Pielke et al. (2008), looks at the damage incurred from hurricanes. Hurricanes fall 
within definition of ‘multi-hazard’ events as they include multiple hazards within them; high 
winds, heavy rain and flooding etc. Pielke et al. (2008) estimate economic damage costs incurred 
by numerous hurricanes in the United States between 1900-2005 and normalises them to provide 
an estimate of the damage that would arise if they occurred in a contemporary level of population 
and development, for which Pielke et al. (2008) use 2005 as a benchmark. Although this paper is 
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not looking at multi-hazard events in the UK we can hopefully draw out some useful findings from 
their method and estimation of economic costs to such events. 
Pielke et al. (2008) define ‘economic damages’ as the direct losses associated with a hurricane’s 
impact as determined in the weeks (and sometimes months) after the event. Pielke et al. (2008) are 
not explicit as to what ‘direct’ impact categories are included within this cost as damage costs are 
presented as ‘total’ economic losses from each hurricane. However, Pielke et al. (2008) state that 
costs are in part dependent on insured losses which we would expect to include; homes, cars, 
buildings, buildings contents, possibly business earnings and possibly life and health impacts (at 
least to some extent). Impacts which we would expect not to be included in the ‘total’ costs would 
be things which are not insured such as; social impacts, individuals’ lost working hours, 
environmental impacts, emergency response and everything owned by individuals too poor to 
insure their assets or who choose not to do so.  
The loss data applied by Pielke et al. (2008) originates from the ‘Monthly Weather Review’ annual 
hurricane summaries recorded in Landsea (1991) together with loss estimations from the National 
Hurricane Centre (NHC). Piekle et al. (2008) highlight that although they use economic loss 
figures, the estimates presented are in part dependent on insurance figures since about 1987 that 
may have been doubled by the NHC to estimate for uninsured losses, although Pielke et al. (2008) 
were unable to demonstrate whether this had been done consistently. This means there may be a 
lack and accuracy to the results. The EA (2018) suggests a method for adjusting insurance costs 
so that they represent economic costs which may improve the applicability of Pielke et al. (2008) 
estimates, although the long time period of Pielke et al. (2008) analysis and differing legal and tax 
regimes could make this challenging. Pielke et al. (2008) do acknowledge that the relationship 
between economic and insured damages will vary substantially between events due to a number 
of factors such as: extent of flooding, damage to infrastructure and the number of uninsured 
properties but does not explain how they could adjust for these variations or the extent of the 
variability in the results.  
Table 5.5 displays the top 10 of the top 50 hurricanes with the largest normalised economic cost 
having occurred in 2005. Pielke et al. (2008) refer to independent analysis, which has found that 
in some locations losses are in fact doubling every 10 years (ABI, 2005). This is supported by a 
report by Sound (2006) which suggests that this is because of increases in building values, 
increases in infrastructure and changes in their characteristics. 
Table 5-5 Top 10 most damaging storms 2005 (US $billions) 
Hurricane Method 1 normalised cost  Method 2 normalised cost  
Great Miami Hurricane (1926) $157.0  $139.5  
Katrina (2005) $81.0  $81.0 
Galveston (1) (1900) $78.0  $71.9 
Galveston (2) (1915) $61.7 $57.1 
Andrew (1992) $57.7 $54.3 
New England (4) (1938) $39.2 $37.3 
11 (1944) $38.7 $35.6 
Lake Okeechobee (4) (1928) $33.6 $31.8 
Donna (1960) $29.6 $31.9 
Camille (1969) $21.2 $24.0 
 
Pielke et al. (2008) find no trend of increasing normalised damage from hurricanes over the period; 
however, their results illustrate the rising growth in societal vulnerability in the United States to 
multi-hazard events such as hurricanes. This societal vulnerability is only set to increase with 
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increasing populations, personal wealth and greater demand on infrastructures resulting in 
escalating damage from extreme events such as storms placing a severe burden on society.  
Discussion 
Table 5-6 Cost framework for Pielke et al. (2008) (inferred only) 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
This paper demonstrates the value of using large legacy data sets to extrapolate useful information. 
However, due to the age of data, Pielke et al. (2008) made several assumptions where data was 
missing, not collected or not correct in certain years. Pielke et al. (2008) concludes that although 
there are likely to be large uncertainties in loss estimations for individual hurricanes, they find no 
evidence for systematic bias in losses through the dataset.  
Pielke et al. (2008) highlight the practical difficulties in distinguishing between flood damages and 
non-flood damages which is a point also highlighted in the EA (2018) report. This may be a 
common factor when looking at impacts from multiple hazards occurring in unison. Even though 
we might not be able to see the costs of each hazard which affect one another, e.g. high winds and 
flooding, the method for estimation of these hazards as multi-hazards may not differ hugely. To 
estimate costs, we need to understand the unit cost to each impact and be able to multiply to the 
number of assets or people affected. We also need to ensure that costs are being adjusted to 
represent full economic costs rather than solely financial costs. Pielke et al. (2008) approach to 
this (the insured losses x2 method) is an important factor to understand the validity of the approach, 
but is not discussed by Pielke et al. (2008) in any detail. We would need to understand where this 
x2 factor comes from, what it attempts to add onto insured losses (is it just uninsured assets or 
does it include the social welfare of assets) and whether there is any evidence to support the x2 
factor. Otherwise, the cost estimates presented are not robust or complete in their estimation.  
The use of insured losses does also not account for all impacts that we expect from multi-hazard 
events such as hurricanes. You can see from Table 5.6 that the boxes of included impact are 
inferred only based on impacts that we would expect to be insured, but it is hard to know for sure. 
However, Pielke et al. (2008) have made use of the best data available on a semi-consistent basis 
over a century and such shortcomings are unavoidable.  
The normalisation methodologies in Pielke et al. (2008) do not explicitly reflect two important 
factors driving losses: demand surge and loss mitigation. Adjustments for these factors were 
beyond the scope of their paper. Demand surge refers to the increase in costs that can occur after 
large events due to shortages of labour and materials required for reconstruction. Loss mitigation 
refers to practises which can prevent future losses. There is evidence that stronger building codes, 
for example, can significantly reduce losses. However, strong codes in the U.S. have only been 
implemented in recent years and so their effect on overall losses is unlikely to be large in this 
paper. In the future, significant efforts to improve building practices and encourage retrofit of 
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existing structures could see a large impact on reducing damage and such mitigations would need 
to be estimated, as well as they could, if an analysis such as Pielke et al. (2008) were to be 
attempted looking at the next hundred years.  
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 Stakeholder Database 
[See separate file A6_Stakeholder Database.xls]
Name of organisation Name of contact Position in organisation Stakeholder Type Description Identification Participation Contribution Legitimacy Willingness to engage Influence Necessity of Involvement Total Score
Max Score 4 3 3 3 3 16
Stakeholder 1 - Policy / Public body 2 2 3 3 3 13 0.81 1.00 0.57
Stakeholder 2 - Research/Academia 3 3 4 1 2 13 0.81 0.50 0.86
Stakeholder 3 - Practitioner / Eng Consulting 1 2 2 1 1 7 0.44 0.33 0.43
Satellite Space Catapult Elena Lobo Senior Space Innovation Facilitator research private company space technology and applications N 1 2 1 2 2 8 0.50 0.67 0.43 H
UKRI/BGS Anonymous Anonymous research partly publicly-funded company geoscience research and innovation n.a. Y 3 3 2 2 3 13 0.81 0.83 0.86 A
King's College London Bruce Malamud Professor of Natural Hazards research academia public research university name and organisation identified Y 4 3 2 1 2 12 0.75 0.50 1.00 C
University of Portsmouth Anonymous Anonymous research academia natural hazards research university only organisation Y 4 3 3 1 2 13 0.81 0.50 1.00 C
Practical Action Mirianna Budimir Senior DRR Advisor research charity development programme themes on sustainable energy access, 
food and a ri lt re  rban ater and aste  DRR  limate han e  
name and organisation identified Y 3 2 3 2 1 11 0.69 0.50 0.71 D
National Oceanography Centre Mike Clare Researcher research research institution marine science name and organisation identified Y 4 2 3 2 2 13 0.81 0.67 0.86 C
NCAS/DEFRA Anonymous Anonymous research research centre atmospheric  science n.a. Y 3 2 2 2 2 11 0.69 0.67 0.71 D
UKCIP Roger Street research research centre climate change research N 1 3 1 1 2 8 0.50 0.50 0.57 D
CIRIA Anonymous Anonymous research non-for-profit organisation construction industry research n.a. Y 3 1 2 2 2 10 0.63 0.67 0.57 D
Loughborough University Dr Neil Dixon research academia public research university N 1 3 1 1 2 8 0.50 0.50 0.57 D
Leeds University Dr Bill Murphy research academia public research university N 1 3 1 1 2 8 0.50 0.50 0.57 D
LQM Ltd. Prof Paul Nathanial research private company environmental consultancy N 1 1 1 1 1 5 0.31 0.33 0.29 K
Anonymous Anonymous practitioner public body (environment) non-departmental public body for protection and enhancement of 
en ironment in En land
n.a. Y 2 3 2 3 3 13 0.81 1.00 0.71 B
Andy Croxford Deputy Director, Research practitioner public body (environment) non-departme tal public body for protection and enhancement of 
en ironment in En land
N 1 3 1 3 3 11 0.69 1.00 0.57 B
David Hornby (Replacing Karen Alford) Flood Risk Mapping and Data Management Officer practitioner public body (environment) non-departme tal public body for protection and enhancement of 
en ironment in En land
name and organisation identified Y 3 3 2 3 3 14 0.88 1.00 0.86 A
Andy Moores practitioner public body (environment) non-departme tal public body for protection and enhancement of 
en ironment in En land
N 1 3 1 3 3 11 0.69 1.00 0.57 B
Paul Robinson Nuclear Waste Assessor practitioner public body (environment) non-departme tal public body for protection and enhancement of 
en ironment in En land
name and organisation identified Y 4 1 2 3 3 13 0.81 1.00 0.71 B
Charles Pilling Chief Hydrometeorologist practitioner public body (environment) non-departme tal public body for protection and enhancement of 
en ironment in En land
name and organisation identified Y 3 3 2 3 3 14 0.88 1.00 0.86 A
Ian Lisk Head of Environmental Hazards & Partnerships practitioner public body (weather) national weather service name and organisation identified Y 3 3 2 2 3 13 0.81 0.83 0.86 A
Anonymous Anonymous practitioner/research public body (weather) energy and transport - weather, seasonal and climate timescales only organisation Y 3 3 3 2 3 14 0.88 0.83 0.86 A
Prof Brian Golding Fellow in Weather Impacts, co-chair HIWeather practitioner public body (weather) national weather service and WMO N 1 3 1 2 3 10 0.63 0.83 0.57 B
National Trust Virginia Portman General Manager - White Cliffs & Winchelsea practitioner charity conservation organisation N 1 1 1 1 1 5 0.31 0.33 0.29 K
Nick Sartain Professional Head Geotechnics practitioner private company railway infrastructure development N 1 2 1 2 3 9 0.56 0.83 0.43 E
Sarah Trinder Lead Geotechnical Engineer practitioner private company railway infrastructure development N 1 2 1 2 3 9 0.56 0.83 0.43 E
Alison Walker Climate Change Manager practitioner private company railway infrastructure development N 1 2 1 2 3 9 0.56 0.83 0.43 E
Ben Gouldby Chief Technical Director (Flood Risk) practitioner private company research & consultancy civil engineering, environmental hydraulics, 
ater mana ement
N 1 3 1 2 2 9 0.56 0.67 0.57 D
Jonathan Simm Technical Direcor, Flood Management practitioner private company research & consultancy civil engineering, environmental hydraulics, 
ater mana ement
N 1 3 1 2 2 9 0.56 0.67 0.57 D
Anonymous Anonymous practitioner public body (transport) railway infrastructure and asset management n.a. Y 3 2 2 3 3 13 0.81 1.00 0.71 B
Eifion Evans Principal Engineer practitioner public body (transport) railway infrastructure and asset management N 1 2 1 1 3 8 0.50 0.67 0.43 H
Anonymous Anonymous practitioner public body (transport) railway infrastructure and asset management n.a. Y 3 2 2 1 3 11 0.69 0.67 0.71 D
Anonymous Anonymous practitioner public body (transport) railway infrastructure and asset management only organisation Y 3 2 2 1 3 11 0.69 0.67 0.71 D
NHBC John Jones Engineering Manager, NHBC Technical Services practitioner non-profit distributing company house building regulations, insurance ans waranty N 1 1 1 2 1 6 0.38 0.50 0.29 H
Canals & Rivers Trust Siobhan Bulter practitioner non-governmental organisation guardship of British Waterways canals, rivers, reservoirs and docks N 1 2 1 1 1 6 0.38 0.33 0.43 K
Matt Free Director of Geotechnics practitioner engineering consulting engineering, design, planning consulting company N 1 2 1 2 2 8 0.50 0.67 0.43 H
Laurance Donnelly Associate Director Geologist practitioner engineering consulting engineering, design, planning consulting company N 1 2 1 1 1 6 0.38 0.33 0.43 K
Kate Canning Associate & UK-MEA Research Champion practitioner engineering consulting engineering, design, planning consulting company N 1 2 1 1 1 6 0.38 0.33 0.43 K
David Patterson Principal Geotechnical Advisor practitioner public body (transport) highway authority N 1 2 1 3 3 10 0.63 1.00 0.43 E
James Codd practitioner public body (transport) highway authority N 1 2 1 3 3 10 0.63 1.00 0.43 E
Doug Dodds Environmental Resilience Specialist - Natural Hazards practitioner private company electricity and gas utility company name and organisation identified Y 3 2 3 1 3 12 0.75 0.67 0.71 D
David McCollum Team Leader Safety Engineering practitioner private company electricity and gas utility company N 1 2 1 1 3 8 0.50 0.67 0.43 H
Flood Forecasting Centre Graeme Boyce NHP Rep practitioner public body (Met Office & EA) public partnership for 24/7 hydrometeorological service N 1 3 1 2 3 10 0.63 0.83 0.57 B
Rob Cowling EA Rep in FFC practitioner public body (Met Office & EA) public partnership for 24/7 hydrometeorological service N 1 3 1 2 3 10 0.63 0.83 0.57 B
Daniel Lamb EA Rep in FFC practitioner public body (Met Office & EA) public partnership for 24/7 hydrometeorological service N 1 2 1 2 3 9 0.56 0.83 0.43 E
AECOM Patrick Cox Director Major Projects practitioner private company engineering consulting and management company N 1 1 1 1 1 5 0.31 0.33 0.29 K
Jacobs Eng. Group Tom Berry practitioner private company engineering, design, planning consulting company N 1 1 1 1 1 5 0.31 0.33 0.29 K
Transport Scotland Paul Mellon & Graham Edmond practitioner public body (transport) transport agency name and organisation identified Y 3 2 3 1 3 12 0.75 0.67 0.71 D
Scottish Canals Rebecca Fletcher practitioner public body (transport) inland waterways management N 1 2 1 1 2 7 0.44 0.50 0.43 H
Scottish Water Will Carroll Technical Lead (Resilience and Area Strategy) practitioner public body (water & sewerage) public water and sewerage services N 1 2 1 1 1 6 0.38 0.33 0.43 K
Mark Williams practitioner public body (water & sewerage) public water and sewerage services N 1 2 1 1 1 6 0.38 0.33 0.43 K
Miranda Jacques-Turner practitioner public body (water & sewerage) public water and sewerage services N 1 2 1 1 1 6 0.38 0.33 0.43 K
Transport for London Fiona Thomson practitioner public body (transport) transport authority N 1 2 1 2 2 8 0.50 0.67 0.43 H
Independent Consultant John Dora Resilience Specialist in Rail Sector practitioner independent consultant Resilience Specialist in Rail Sector name and organisation identified Y 3 1 2 1 1 8 0.50 0.33 0.57 J
Chris Power practitioner private company engineering consultancy N 1 2 1 2 2 8 0.50 0.67 0.43 H
Paul Maliphant practitioner private company engineering consultancy N 1 2 1 2 1 7 0.44 0.50 0.43 H
Independent Consultant Anonymous Anonymous practitioner independent consultant Consultant DRR specialist anonymous and non-identifiable Y 3 3 3 1 1 11 0.69 0.33 0.86 G
Geotechnics Company Anonymous Anonymous practitioner private company engineering consultancy anonymous and non-identifiable Y 4 2 2 1 1 10 0.63 0.33 0.86 G
Energy Company Anonymous Anonymous practitioner energy energy company anonymous and non-identifiable Y 3 3 3 3 2 14 0.88 0.83 0.86 A
Atkins Anthony Concannon practitioner private company engineering, design, planning consulting company N 1 1 1 1 1 5 0.31 0.33 0.29 K
Stephen Wade Associate Director, Climate & Resilience N 1 2 1 2 2 8 0.50 0.67 0.43 H
Temple Group Mark Skelton Executive Director practitioner private company environmental consultancy N 1 1 1 1 1 5 0.31 0.33 0.29 K
Translink Anthony Stove Engineering Manager practitioner public body (transport) transport infrastructure N 1 2 1 1 1 6 0.38 0.33 0.43 K
George Cobb Low Carbon Team practitioner energy energy company, Scotland N 1 2 1 1 2 7 0.44 0.50 0.43 H
Lucy Byrne Partnership Funding Coordinator practitioner energy energy company, Scotland N 1 2 1 1 2 7 0.44 0.50 0.43 H
London Underground Melina  Kakouratou External Risks Engineer Infrastructure Protection practitioner private company public underground transport company N 1 2 1 2 1 7 0.44 0.50 0.43 H
WSP Paul Munday Principal Consultant practitioner private company engineering, design, planning consulting company N 1 2 1 1 1 6 0.38 0.33 0.43 K
Dr Owen Jackson Assistant Director - International Resilience policy public body government department N 1 3 1 3 3 11 0.69 1.00 0.57 B
Anonymous Anonymous policy public body government department anonymous and non-identifiable; only organisatio Y 2 3 2 3 3 13 0.81 1.00 0.71 B
Ed Foale Assistant Director, Catastrophic Emergency Planning policy public body government department name and organisation identified Y 4 3 2 3 3 15 0.94 1.00 1.00 A
Government Office for Science Arthi Kumar Resilience lead GoScience policy public body government advisory for science policy N 1 2 1 3 3 10 0.63 1.00 0.43 E
UNISDR/PHE Prof Virginia Murray policy UN Office/public body (health) health agency N 1 2 1 3 3 10 0.63 1.00 0.43 E
Historic Environment Scotland Anonymous Anonymous policy public body investigator, carer and promotor of historic environment n.a. Y 3 2 3 1 1 10 0.63 0.33 0.71 J
Scottish Government, Resilience Division Anonymous Anonymous policy public body supporting agency for resilience to emergencies only organisation Y 3 1 2 3 3 12 0.75 1.00 0.57 B
SEPA David Faichney Flood Act Business Change Manager (Evidence and Flooding) - NHP policy public body (environment) environmental protection and regulation name and organisation identified Y 4 3 2 3 2 14 0.88 0.83 1.00 A
Stewart Larter-Whitcher DEFRA NHP rep policy public body (environment, food, rural affairs) environmental protection, food production and standards, 
a ri lt re  fisheries  r ral omm nities) 
N 1 2 1 3 3 10 0.63 1.00 0.43 E
Tim Preece DEFRA NHP rep policy public body (environment, food, rural affairs) environm ntal protection, f od production and standards, 
a ri lt re  fisheries  r ral omm nities) 
N 1 2 1 3 3 10 0.63 1.00 0.43 E
Welsh Government Dr Wyn Price Head of Resilience at the Welsh Government policy government government N 1 2 1 3 3 10 0.63 1.00 0.43 E
Natural Resources Wales Anonymous Anonymous policy public body (environment) management of natural resources n.a. Y 3 2 2 1 2 10 0.63 0.50 0.71 D
Kathryn Brown Head of Adaptation policy public body (climate) governmental advisor on climate change adaptation N 1 3 1 2 3 10 0.63 0.83 0.57 B
Andrew Russell CCC NHP Rep policy public body (climate) governmental advisor on climate change adaptation N 1 3 1 2 3 10 0.63 0.83 0.57 B
Government department for transport Anonymous Anonymous policy government department transport network anonymous and non-identifiable Y 3 2 3 3 1 12 0.75 0.67 0.71 D
Rail Safety & Standards Board John Lane policy non-for-profit organisation railway safety and standards N 1 2 1 2 1 7 0.44 0.50 0.43 H
UKWIR Anonymous Anonymous policy private company research programme for water & sewerage companies n.a. Y 3 1 2 2 2 10 0.63 0.67 0.57 D
Department for Communications, Media & Sport Rob Willis Data Infrastructure Resilience policy government department telecommunications name and organisation identified Y 3 2 2 2 1 10 0.63 0.50 0.71 D
HSE Anonymous Anonymous practitioner non-departmental public body (health & safety) encouragement, regulation and enforcement of workplace health, 
        
only organisation Y 4 3 3 2 3 15 0.94 0.83 1.00 A
PHE Owen Landeg Principal Environmental  Public Health Scientist policy public body (health) government agency N 1 3 1 2 3 10 0.63 0.83 0.57 B
CEH Steven Cole Head of Hydrological Forecasting Group research research institution land and freshwater ecosystems and their interaction with the N 1 3 1 2 3 10 0.63 0.83 0.57 B
Anglian Water Geoff Darch practitioner N 1 2 1 1 1 6 0.38 0.33 0.43 K
Office for Nuclear Regulation Anonymous Anonymous practitioner public body (nuclear) safety regulator for the civil nuclear industry in UK; independent 
           
only organisation Y 4 3 3 2 3 15 0.94 0.83 1.00 A
Yorkshire Water Amanda Crossfield Lead Advisor for Climate Change Adaptation practitioner private company water supply and treatement utility company N 1 2 1 1 1 6 0.38 0.33 0.43 K
Mott MacDonalds
Climate Change Committee
Overall Relevance (for 
this study)
DEFRA
Cabinet Office
SSE
National Grid
Highways England
Arup
Network Rail
HR Wallingford
Expertise Score
Environment Agency
Power Score
Rank (place in 
matrix)
HS2
Met Office 
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 Disciplines which could inform multi-
hazard research and risk assessment 
Natural Hazards Science. This community, focused on understanding Earth and environmental 
dynamics to characterise hazard processes (e.g., earthquakes, landslides, floods, volcanic 
eruptions) includes seismologists, engineering geologists, volcanologists, hydrologists, physical 
geographers and meteorologists. As well as characterising single hazards, a growing community 
of multi-hazard specialists focus on the relationships between multiple natural hazards. 
 
Engineering. This community deal with the design, construction, and maintenance of the built 
environment, and includes many sub-disciplines that inform multi-hazard research and risk 
assessment (e.g., civil, engineering, coastal engineering, geotechnical engineering, transport 
engineering, mechanical and structural engineering). Understanding the impact of natural hazards 
on infrastructure (physical vulnerability) and the measures that are needed to build resilient 
infrastructure requires their engagement. 
 
Social and Economic Sciences. Characterising multi-hazard risk also requires an understanding 
of social vulnerability, and the integration of economic analysis to determine the assets exposed 
to the multi-hazard environment. Helping to provide social/economic evidence to help aid the 
translation into policy 
 
Ecology and Complexity Sciences. Multi-hazard risk involves complex interactions between 
multiple systems, and therefore the experience and insights of ecologists could inform this systems 
thinking. Research centres focused on complex systems exist (e.g., Centre for Complexity Science 
at the University of Warwick, Bristol Centre for Complexity Science) and could be a helpful 
contributing group. 
 
Mathematics and Physics. Quantitatively characterising multi-hazard risk requires the 
application of probabilistic and statistical approaches. Developing these approaches, and 
understanding the uncertainties involved, will likely require those working on probability theory, 
statistics, game theory, and computation.  
 
Computer Science and Modelling. The skills of computer scientists and mathematical modellers 
would allow modelling and simulation to advance multi-hazard analysis and risk assessment. The 
integration of single hazard models or the development of new physical models to characterise 
risk requires this set of skills. 
  
Graphic Design, Communication Studies and the Visual Arts. The communication of 
information regarding multi-hazard risk may be through graphical user interfaces, cartography, or 
the visual arts. Helping decision makers to understand the complexity of multi-hazard 
environments and associated uncertainties is critical to ensuring research has impact. 
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  Relevant Initiatives, Forums, and 
Conferences 
Here we outline some major networks and gatherings where discussion of multi-hazards research, 
and its application to support industry and practice, could be progressed.  
 
Forums, Conferences and Workshops 
 
Natural Hazards Partnership. The UK Natural Hazards Partnership provides authoritative and 
consistent information, research and analysis on natural hazards for the development of more 
effective policies, communications and services for civil contingencies, governments and the 
responder community across the UK. 
 
Integrated Research on Disaster Risk (IRDR). The IRDR initiative is a decade-long research 
programme co-sponsored by the International Science Council (ISC) and the United Nations 
Office for Disaster Risk Reduction (UNISDR). It is a global, multi-disciplinary approach to 
dealing with the challenges brought by disasters, mitigating their impacts, and improving related 
policy-making mechanisms. As a network, it provides an opportunity for scientists from different 
disciplines to interact with each other, and with those coming from policy and practice 
perspectives. 
 
European Geosciences Union (EGU). The EGU Natural Hazards Division brings together 
researchers from geology, hydrology, meteorology, and geography with an interest in natural 
hazards. The annual EGU General Assembly incudes a comprehensive programme of natural 
hazards science, and typically includes sessions linked to multi-hazards research, hazards and 
infrastructure, and the impacts of hazards on society. In 2018, a BGS-coordinated proposal was 
submitted to EGU to create a new multi-hazards sub-division within the EGU Natural Hazards 
division to facilitate greater dialogue on this theme. 
 
American Geophysical Union (AGU). The AGU Natural Hazards Section focuses on geological 
hazards (e.g., droughts, earthquakes, fires, flooding, heat waves, landslides, space weather, storms, 
tsunamis, volcanoes, impact by near-Earth objects). The Section includes those working on 
fundamental research into dynamic Earth and space processes that can generate hazardous 
conditions and applied science and innovation through strategies and designs for hazard mitigation 
and disaster management worldwide. The AGU Fall Meeting gathers approximately 24,000 people 
each year. 
 
INQUIMUS. This workshop series aims to provide knowledge exchange and catalyse dialogue 
on issues generally relating to disaster risk reduction and climate change adaptation. Their focus 
is on ‘integrating quantitative and qualitative assessment methodologies for multi-dimensional 
phenomena’. The 2018 workshop focused on ‘methods and tools to assess multi-hazard risk, 
vulnerability and resilience’. 
 
UK Alliance for Disaster Research. This forum brings together the UK's diverse disaster research 
community to facilitate collaboration and partnership, and to support representation of the research 
community at government level in the UK, and, where appropriate, help with the implementation 
of the Sendai Framework for Disaster Risk Reduction. They host an annual conference, with the 
2018 theme being ‘complex hazards, complex vulnerabilities’ aiming to bring together those 
working on disasters from the perspectives of the arts, social sciences, engineering, and physical 
sciences, as well as practitioners, academics and policy makers.  
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Multi-hazard Approaches to Civil Infrastructure Engineering. This 2016 book, published by 
Springer, is dedicated to the emerging critical issue of mitigating multi-hazards, from the 
perspective of the civil engineering community. While multiple volumes address single hazards, 
this collection relates to overall safety, sustainability and resilience of the built environment when 
subject to multiple hazards and different types of hazard relationships. While not a formal network, 
this volume gives a rapid overview of the key initiatives in the civil engineering community, and 
research groups working in this field. 
 
Further Publications are noted in the references and Appendix 3. 
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  Transcripts 
[See separate file A11_Transcripts.xls] 
  
Stakeholder Identification Q3: What methodologies, approaches and procedures (including R&D) do you use in your organisation to understand the processes underlying multi-hazard events, their impacts, and to assess the risks?
Q6: To what degree are the existing methodologies and approaches 
accessible, applicable and useful?
Q8: What (if anything) hinders you from 
undertaking robust multi-hazard risk 
assessment within your sector?
Q9: What (if anything) enables you to 
develop robust multi-hazard risk 
assessment within your sector?
AOC
Primary Secondary Notes Research Practice Notes (methodology, procedures, approaches) Evidence/best practice Advantage Pitfalls Notes Yes No Knowledge Skills Knowledge Skills
UKRI/BGS identification info 
not provided
Landslides triggered by precipitation, 
earthquakes or volcanic unrest
Groundwater flooding triggered  by intense precipitation; 
surface flooding, triggered by landslide blockages
Geomagnetically induced currents 
triggered by magnetic (solar) storms
5 5 YES - empirical observations (natural domains and experiemntal degimes) of processes and their impacts; techniques include field 
observations, RS, surface/subsurface monitoring (geophysical, geotechnical, geo-chemical methodologies); analysis of past events using 
historical events or events occurred over geological timescale; modelling of future hazardous events based on observational patterns and 
historical analysis of events; probabilistic assessments used to develop risk scenarios (with partners from other disciplines)
MH processes are of increasing importance as demonstrated by 
recent events (cascading events leading to Fukushima disaster, 
Bangkok floods); across all there are many problems with 
measuring impact and economic costs; increasing interest in the 
impact of multi-hazards across sectors (e.g., impact of natural 
hazards on the economy, human, animal or plant health, food 
security, political instability);
no universal recognised methods exist; 
considerable research is required to develop 
good-practice and standardised 
methodologies
The value of multi-hazard risk assessments to inform 
improved decision-making is well recognised, even 
though they may be very narrow in the range of 
possibilities they can realistically asses. Several 
Catastrophe Modelling companies undertake risk 
assessment - on the basis of multi-hazard analysis – 
and specialist advice centres (such as the Cambridge 
Judge Business School) provide scenarios for planning 
purposes.
Limitations posed by computational capacity. It is highly challenging to realistically 
model one linear set of cascading events that may be triggered by the intersection 
of two nonlinear processes. Modelling all outcomes arising from these is even 
more difficult. Once multiple events, and all of their possible outcomes, are 
considered, computational resource is quickly overtaken by the range of 
possibilities. This is a fundamental problem when focusing on natural hazards 
alone. Challenges are exponentially greater when other, commonly technological, 
hazards are also considered, let alone when issues of vulnerability and exposure 
are also captured and entertained in wider risk assessment.
The science of multi-hazard assessment is very immature. 
Although we (globally) have a reasonably good picture of 
the range of scenarios that may be possible, the science, 
and quantitative techniques to characterise these is 
commonly poorly understood. This is well illustrated in 
landslide science, where understanding, let alone 
forecasting, of triggering thresholds is highly challenging, 
particularly when analysing landslide hazards beyond the 
site scale.
The degree to which existing methodologies and approaches are accessible applicable and 
useful is generally very low. To a large degree this is because the different process 
models, and risks associated with them, are often very different in architecture, 
uncertainty analysis and approach. Issues of interoperability are highly problematic in 
multi-hazard assessment and modelling. Some organisations, such as the global 
Earthquake Model (GEM), have sought to standardise methodologies with partner 
organisations that focus on non-earthquake hazards - such as the Global Volcano Model 
(GVM), the Global Tsunami Model (GTM) and the global flood partnership (GFP). Such 
convergence is useful, and should be encouraged. Even though the direction of travel and, 
to a lesser extent, the rate of progress, of development of multi-hazard risk assessment is 
starting to look promising, the barriers to access (through data and model availability, 
training and wider capacity issues) are likely to prevail for the foreseeable future. Many 
risk models currently have significantly limited capability and applicability.
BGS frequently monitors and assesses multi-hazard scenarios which, if not the norm, 
are very common. 
Modelling of these, for the reasons given above, remains challenging, 
particularly when trying to probabilistically assess associated risks. 
 The challenges are amplified when attempting to 
undertake robust multi-hazard risk assessment, 
because of uncertainties in quantifying vulnerability, 
fragility, and exposure.
BGS almost always works with partners that have 
greater expertise and experience in assessing 
these factors when working on risk assessment. 
Nevertheless, BGS also recognises the value of its 
science in quantifying these factors, and so 
commonly works with partners to improve them 
(for instance in the METEOR project).
The primary gaps in multi-hazard 
knowledge relates to our poor 
understanding of critical processes (and 
associated uncertainties), as well as the 
physical, chemical and biological regimes 
within which they occur. The incomplete 
mapping and measurement of impact 
prevents rigorous evaluation of their real 
costs.
Beyond understanding multi-hazard events, the very poor state of 
knowledge about exposure, vulnerability and fragility of people, societies 
and their assets (including infrastructure) significantly hampers multi-hazard 
risk assessment.
Government 
department for 
transport
anonymous and 
non-identifiable
Scenarios involving hazards which could trigger 
power loss on a local or national level
Storm surge on the east coast – this would involve both 
storm and flooding, but we treat it as a single risk.
There are other multi-hazards (cold 
weather to thaw flooding, pandemic, 
storms and power loss, space weather 
and comms/power loss) which we are 
aware of and do consider, but not 
formally. We haven’t formally assessed 
each hazard to understand if it could 
form part of a multi-hazard although it 
is understood that it could have 
different outcomes.
1 – No 
knowledge or 
very minimal 
knowledge of 
that used in 
research from 
resilience 
conferences.
2 – Some 
knowledge of that 
used in practice, 
but no clear 
understanding of 
best practice for 
multi hazard 
assessment.
NO - We have a very well developed single-hazard risk assessment method, however no specific supporting approaches are used for multi-
hazard. We do have most of our risks assessed by multiple groups representing different sectors, which can have the effect of shedding light on 
scenarios that hadn’t been envisaged previously by single groups. We also have regular discussions with experts in the fields of specific hazards 
which can shed light on multi hazard possibilities.
Impacts for different individual hazards are well quantified, but 
no formal  multi-hazard impacts are known on a systematic level
Best practice for this is not known. It is 
considered that the economic costs could be 
quantified if the attempt were made.
However [our current approach] does allow for some 
historic evidence to be used, defensible response 
plans, and a minimal resource effort on developing 
plans for every combinations of situation
The approach  currently used is based on experience and past issues. This past 
example based approach has clear disadvantage of not having much foresight of the 
risks which could arise as multi-hazards and having the potential of being without a 
suitable plan
We do make some hypothetical multi-hazard 
considerations but they are not well evidenced
Existing methodologies that are used in research that we are aware of (from conferences 
etc) are not accessible. Academics researching risk assessment methodologies, when the 
question is asked, tend not to be focused on finding ways to apply their research to real 
situations outside of maybe the one they were funded for. However, we do have limited 
contact with this branch of academia.
We don’t formally address multi-hazards as an issue. The approach taken 
where they are taken in to account is based on experience and past issues 
where we may have seen multi-hazard issues in either the UK or 
internationally. An example of this would be power loss issues from space 
weather seen in Sweden and Canada. It is considered as an influencing factor 
when assessing likelihood.
Key issue is that the National Risk Assessment and 
cross government approach to risk does not cover 
multi-hazard. There are also issues around resource 
to approach the issue, and knowledge gaps.
We do have long and reasonably well 
documented experience of previous issues, and 
an experienced set of staff and stakeholders.
An un-coordinated approach to resilience 
science which has previously been an issue 
for the organisation has left us with large 
knowledge gaps in the understanding of 
multi-hazard events. The overall cross 
government approach leaves individual 
branches of government lacking in 
knowledge.
Outside of the multi-hazard risks that are known, access to the relevant 
understanding of what is a reasonably likely multi-hazard risk and best 
practice in assessing combinations of hazards. It would be reasonable to 
assume that we could successfully assess the impact if we were able to focus 
our efforts on multi-hazard risks. Another key gap is that our risk assessment 
method is scenario based rather than consequence based which leaves us 
with an incomplete picture of consequences across all scenarios.  A 
consequence based approach would allow us to better understand the depth 
of some risks and the multi-hazard implications.
Energy company anonymous and 
non-identifiable
All types of these multi-hazards (and scenarios 
mentioned above) have the potential to impact 
the safety of infrastructure. At a practical level, 
often an important aspect concerns whether 
operatives can get out after the first hazard to 
make repairs before another hazard occurs; in 
this situation the time aspect is very important.
2 4 There have already been a selection of projects in the nuclear energy sector which have summarised 
industry guidance and academic literature (e.g. ASAMPSA-E, NARSIS, MATRIX). However, I think that the 
knowledge of practice is a little stronger than of the academic sphere
YES - We use statistical techniques to estimate the joint probability of multi-hazards. This includes copulas and multivariate extreme value 
statistical distributions. Some other groups are also using specific numerical models (e.g. hydrodynamic models such as TELEMAC and 
TOMOWAC) to run simulations which try and capture multi-hazards; this is usually done for coastal flooding hazards such as combinations of 
waves, storm surge, tide, wind etc. Most of our R&D work is undertaken to estimate safety levels as required by our regulator but there is also 
internal work understanding possible hazard cascades and ensuring safety during these events.  
For the nuclear industry, multi-hazards can cause damage to 
infrastructure but also threaten the safety of operatives working 
on-site. The Fukushima event in 2011 has been used as a case 
study in the past and some attempts have been made to quantify 
the economic costs. 
However, generally I am not aware of 
specific studies that have attempted to 
quantify the costs of multi-hazard events in 
comparison to single hazard events.  
Given the appropriate data, different methods can 
provide an estimate of the joint probability of many 
hazards occurring.
 However, there are currently some key issues that need to be dealt with when 
using these methods: (i) There are a lot of different methods which can provide 
very different answers. Some type of guidance would be very useful. (ii) Many 
current examples are bivariate and it is not clear how easily some of the methods 
would scale to multi-hazard scenarios. (iii) Spatial/temporal context of multi-
hazard events – how long apart or far away do hazards need to occur for them to not 
cause an increased impact. This is likely to differ if considering infrastructure at a 
single site or the whole energy network. (iv) • What exactly is the metric we’re 
interested in – most statistical methods are good if we want a joint probability of 
two (or more) variables being extreme at a specific time but is this the most useful 
question?
Current methods can definitely be used and do provide us with useful risk estimates. 
However, I think improvements could be made and some guidance could be provided. 
We are asked to take multi-hazards into account. In many situations this takes the form 
of assessing combinations of hazards (usually pairs of hazards). This usually takes the 
form of a screening process to see which combinations can be left out of an analysis and 
then an assessment of the remaining combinations. There is gradually a move towards 
looking at scenarios instead (e.g. extra-tropical cyclone, convective storm, anti-cyclonic 
summer weather pattern), but I think this is very much in its infancy within the sector.
Data availability can sometimes be a problem. The 
fact that we have to look at very extreme levels (e.g. 
10,000-year return level) can make it difficult to get a 
robust answer. There is also sometimes a lack of 
clarity from the regulator on which particular multi-
hazard scenarios should be investigated further 
which can make it difficult to develop an industry-
wide position. 
There is a definitive push for us to undertake 
more research on multi-hazards and an interest in 
pushing the science forwards in this area. There 
are a lot of different projects in this area which 
provides a lot of information and can help us to 
try and build a robust consensus. However, this 
can also be a problem as there are a lot of 
competing methods that could be used.
Some general guidance on what multi-
hazard scenarios could affect the UK would 
be useful. This could be a synthesis of the 
available information from academic and 
industrial sources. Currently, a lot of the 
work on multi-hazards in the nuclear 
industry is qualitative (saying whether 
hazards can occur together) and I think 
there is a need to produce a synthesis of 
different methodologies that can be used 
to quantitative answers. It would also be 
interesting to have more information on 
how quantitative results should be 
transferred to impact assessment.
The regulatory framework is currently not well set up for the assessment of 
multi-hazards. Hazard assessment is often very focused on single hazard with 
strong guidance on what is expected on this topic (e.g. protection up to and 
beyond the 10,000-year return level), with less guidance on what is expected 
for multi-hazards.
Environment 
Agency (Charles 
Pilling)
name and 
organisation 
identified
Various flood sources e.g. river and coastal 
coinciding
4 4 NO - Risk = P% x V x E Various & numerous primary, secondary & tertiary impacts from 
heavy rain & flooding. 
Yes, Met Office HPC Business Case Review by 
London School of Economics, FFC BC, Day 
Curve, EFAS/GLOFAS (EU/Global Flood 
Awareness System)
Various approaches and case studies available eg 
World Bank, good NMHSs & NWP data to drive models 
in near real time 
Scaling, insufficient knowledge of systems & science & physical / socio-economic 
data ability to work with low likelihood events/probabilities
Useful at large scale and theoretical level, much more to be done, proven & demonstrated 
in near real time
Yes, partnership working Time/People resource and competing priorities mean 
progress isn’t as rapid as it could be
More detailed data & knowledge Gaps between practitioners and scientists; 
Better& more impact assessment studies, 
socioeconomic data; Saleability and 
connectedness of multi-hazard events; Non-
stationary / Climate change assessments 
Communication and translation of 
science
Dependencies between hazards, full multi-hazard end to end modelling 
system, density of monitoring and observational data + answers to Q10; 
Detailed Non-stationary / Climate change assessments
Environment 
Agency (David 
Hornby)
name and 
organisation 
identified
Weather events leading to flood. Fluvial flood 
event, combined with coastal/fluvial/surface 
water and any combination of them. 
2 4 YES - We have a research science team who undertake projects to assess these sorts of issues. We also work with academia and framework 
partners to undertake specific pieces of work. 
Risk to life and day-to-day working of society and business. 
Economic impacts. Quantified - Yes for some combination of 
hazards (e.g. river and sea only)
Yes we can share certain aspects of the work. 
The work is our National Flood Risk 
Assessment which looks to quantify the 
economic impact from river and sea flooding 
and also the number of properties affected. 
Current methodologies give a good assessment of 
modelling flood risk, using 2d computational flood 
modelling software such as TuFLOW and Flood 
Modeller Pro. These are tried and tested deterministic 
approaches with robust methods. Emerging is the use 
of probabilistic modelling to better understand flood 
risk. We use this in our National Flood Risk 
Assessment. It starts to introduce an appreciation for 
the uncertainties associated with the data and model 
and tries to express in results. 
Availability of good quality data, both in terms of completeness and also whether it 
can be trusted. Computing power is another. Models are getting bigger and more 
complex and taking longer to run. 
Existing methodologies are accessible, our National Flood Risk Assessment is leading 
science in how it is able to measure defence performance in a probabilistic framework. 
Yes, we model certain multi hazards together, such as coastal and fluvial (joint 
probability) flooding. We also combine the outputs of all flood sources (river, coastal, 
surface water) together into a single risk map that we publish as Open Data on 
Data.Gov.
Access to good quality data. Computing power. n.a. More research on joint probability events 
and associated uncertainty. Effective 
communication of uncertainty to 
customers.
Ability to be agile and 
move with technology, 
skills, and knowledge 
as and when it 
becomes available and 
credible. 
Environment 
Agency
identification info 
not provided
We warn of and respond to floods on the coast 
and in main rivers; Probably the main multi-
hazard issue for us is floods in different places at 
the same time. We’ve done some work on the 
likelihood of this, but that was mainly to make 
sure people realise that it’s not nearly as remote 
as they think. There’s also an issue with floods in 
different places in close succession. One of the 
problems here is whether we’ve already 
deployed assets (e.g. demountable flood 
defences) but also the issue of having people 
who are available to respond. 
We have a less specific responsibility in droughts, where 
many of the responses belong to water companies. 
We respond to environmental incidents 
– mainly pollution, though droughts 
also cause or increase the likelihood of 
some environmental incidents like fish 
mortality
n.a. n.a. How much do we know about the likelihoods of multiple events? Not that much, but I think that’s 
because our approach is to have plans and people in place to deal with major, widespread incidents 
however they’re caused. This automatically gives us the capacity to deal with multi-hazards without 
having to understand all the possible combinations. This is the same approach used in much emergency 
planning and, I understand, this is the CCS approach in the NRA. Rather than think about and try to define 
all the possible hazards, they think about some representative combinations that should provide an 
envelope round all the range of things that may happen. In that sense, I think this is state of the art, 
though there’s a useful social science literature that criticises the development of contingency plans 
precisely because they let people avoid understanding probabilities and consequences explicitly, and 
may let them ignore the events that will actually cause problems. 
n.a. n.a. n.a. n.a. n.a. Does this ever go wrong? Yes, of course. We tend to 
assume that major events will die down, giving us time to 
recover (mainly in the sense of letting staff go back to their 
normal roles or just take some time to rest). Prolonged 
events – like the long winter of floods – place increasing 
pressure on people. I don’t know whether knowing the 
likelihood of this would change our approach, though. We 
have a fixed level of staff and a high proportion with some 
sort of incident role (mine is providing scientific advice, 
ultimately to SAGE).  The main problem, I think, is probably 
around incidents where the same few people hold all the 
skills and knowledge and are being pulled in many 
different directions. While scientifically I’d like to 
understand the probabilities and consequences, I’m not 
sure this would actually make much difference to our 
planning or response. 
n.a. n.a. n.a. Our response to multihazards is probably mainly 
constrained by resources, and that I’m not sure that a 
better understanding of the risk of low probability, 
high consequence events would help much, because 
we’ll remain constrained by the number of people 
we have. 
n.a. n.a. n.a. n.a. n.a.
Environment 
Agency (Paul 
Robinson)
name and 
organisation 
identified
The most appropriate multiple hazards of 
relevance would be scenarios where hazards 
interact to increase the magnitude of a single 
hazard. For example for a surface repository 
located on the coast, we would expect 
assessment of the impacts of storms events, 
flooding and tidal surges.
With specific reference to the 
assessment of environmental safety for 
the disposal of radioactive waste in 
surface and geological repositories we 
would undertake the assessment of 
multiple hazards on a site specific basis, 
such assessments would be an 
exception to the main hazard 
mechanism such human intrusion and 
long term site evolution. 
2 - some 
knowledge of 
the multi hazard 
assessment
4 - very good 
knowledge of risk 
assessment 
methodologies
Within the nuclear regulation function of the Environment Agency NO - As a regulator, we would assess the methodologies, approaches and procedures used by the permit holder or applicant to undertake multi 
hazard assessment, as such we are not prescriptive of the approach used and do not undertake any assessment ourselves. Our guidance expects 
the risk assessment to be proportionate to the nature and hazard associated with the waste.
The assessment of climate change hazards is not currently well 
developed. It is reasonable to assume that many of the predicted 
climate change impacts could be multi hazard in nature.
n.a. No real opinion No real opinion No real opinion not applicable not applicable not applicable not applicable As stated above, improvements in the 
assessment of multi hazards associated 
with climate change would be of greatest 
use.
No opinion Hazards associated with the surface disposal of radioactive wastes 
are relatively low,  are regulatory focus is on the long term 
behaviour and safety of the waste, short term hazards being 
assessed by the Office of Nuclear Regulation. As stated, the nature 
and extent of multi hazard assessment is site specific in nature. The 
importance of multi hazard scenarios will therefore be dependent 
on the site location and context. For example, there are disposal 
sites located adjacent to operational military airfields and we have 
required assessment of aircraft impact. It should also be noted that 
the nature of radioactive waste means that the consequences of 
hazard realisation tends to be slow and cumulative rather than 
quick.
Historic 
Environment 
Scotland
identification info 
not provided
Combinations of different flooding sources 
(pluvial, fluvial, groundwater), rainfall plus 
wind/storm events (WDR), coastal flooding plus 
ground instability, etc 
2 2 NO - We have undertaken assessment for single hazards, but have no methodology for quantifying multi-hazard events. Potentially very high and increasing; no quantification of costs, 
though some work could be done using know levels of poor 
housing condition/maintenance requirements combined with 
known failures of buildings (in terms of building collapse and 
masonry falls)
n.a.  Not enough experience (but would like to know!) We don’t do it, so perhaps they are not so accessible! No, not in a systematic quantified way. We need some expertise/collaboration We would have some in-house capacity to 
facilitate (though see answer to 8), plus we have 
an increasing mandate to understand risk and 
develop methodologies for our sector (traditional 
buildings/historic environment in Scotland)
There is some data available, though 
probably not all; but the main barrier is 
methodology and expertise.
There is some data available, though probably not all; but the main barrier is 
methodology and expertise.
Happy to discuss further –and keen to do some work in this area to 
build on our existing risk assessment work which looks at a series of 
hazards individually.
HSE only organisation All of the above [triggering, amplification effect 
and compound MH scenarios]
4 to 5 4 to 5 HSE’s focus is on man-made hazards rather than natural hazards, although natural influences are 
considered when developing failure frequencies.
YES - For major hazard sites, HSE’s general approach to risk assessment incorporates the following steps: 
a) Hazard Identification; 
b) Failure Frequencies; 
c) Consequence Modelling; 
d) Risk Calculation. 
Multi-hazards occur throughout the process.
Risk Assessment of major hazard sites focusses on danger to life 
only. When events occur, they are usually treated as major 
incidents, and assessed via a formal HSE investigation, the results 
of which are published
Examples include Buncefield 
(http://www.hse.gov.uk/comah/buncefield/
response.htm) and Flixborough 
(http://www.hse.gov.uk/comah/sragtech/ca
seflixboroug74.htm), which are both 
examples of the domino effect where initial 
hazards have led to further hazards. Work 
has also been undertaken by HSE to assess 
the potential impacts of accidents occurring 
at major hazard sites 
(http://www.hse.gov.uk/research/rrhtm/rr1
055.htm).
The processes are complex – this makes it difficult to 
quantify failure rates, and understand the uncertainty. 
When combining assessments of different hazards (that may coincide) the 
approach taken tends to be pragmatic and cautious (but not so cautious as to be 
restrictive).
The methodologies used are usually published. Individual site assessments are not in the 
public domain.
Yes. But as mentioned in question 5, it’s complex. The hazards (for COMAH) that HSE are 
interested in fall into three groups: thermal, overpressure and toxic. For modelling 
purposes, the first two are assessed from a hazard perspective (by calculating thermal 
dose and pressure (bar) respectively), while toxic (describing the release of a toxic 
substance into the atmosphere) takes into account different release scenarios and is 
assessed based on risk. The levels of hazard and risk calculated are used to define 
geographical zones that delineate HSE’s dangerous dose 
(http://www.hse.gov.uk/chemicals/haztox.htm). There are three zones – inner, middle, 
outer – which are used for land use planning purposes.
For sites that hold multiple substances, or store substances in different locations 
around a site, there is a need to construct combined zones on a site-by-site basis. 
Where the assessment is based on hazards only (e.g. multiple tanks holding the same 
substance, or sites with thermal and overpressure hazards), the zones are combined 
using a worst-case approach. This means that triggering, amplification, and 
compounding of hazards is not explicitly calculated. Where the assessment is based on 
risk (i.e. the likelihood of receiving a dangerous dose), the risk is combined by summing 
the likelihoods of the multiple hazards.
For sites that combine toxic (risk) and thermal/pressure (hazard), the assessment 
combines the zones.
Access to science is good, but the evidence to support 
and develop the science is often lacking. HSE are 
recognised globally as one of the leading 
organisations in major hazard site assessment
HSE’s role as regulator for major hazard sites 
means that there is a duty to support that 
regulation with quality science. As a consequence 
HSE have spent a lot of time and resource 
developing capabilities in hazard site risk 
assessment.
For HSE, a lack of events and associated 
evidence can be a barrier. This includes 
recordings of previous events, which are 
thankfully few.
As for Q10 – more evidence would help to develop the science for multi-
hazard risk assessment.
Independent 
consultant
anonymous and 
non-identifiable
Hazard A and B 3 3 YES - As a consultant I tend to use the “host organisation” processes and procedures. I also use DFiD`s
Multi Hazard Disaster Ras and https://drmkc.jrc.ec.europa.eu/
n.a. Only aware of the HSE “Cost Benefit tables” Not aware of any significant issues Very accessible, but need to vary use depending in the client. Yes, for clients that I work for as most understand a embrace the approach. Lack of understanding by some clients – but a 
minority.
Client specified deliverables. Clear understanding of “The occurrence of 
hazard A can change the likelihood and/or 
magnitude of hazard B in the future 
(amplification effect)”
Generally, lack of sector specific experts working as a team.
Independent 
consultant (John 
Dora)
name and 
organisation 
identified
Difficult to say – not really recognised 
the issues
2 1 NO - Only recognised where prompted Believe the 2013/2014 winter was a good example of e.g. wind 
then rainfall. 2007 summer floods – warm then very wet? Not 
really attached to multi-hazard causes, more related to flooding
Dr. John Hillier Loughborough Uni and 
Insurance industry studies e.g. 
https://dspace.lboro.ac.uk/dspace-
jspui/bitstream/2134/19098/3/hillier.pdf and 
Natural Catastrophe Risk Management and 
Modelling: A Practitioner's Guide by Kirsten 
Mitchell-Wallace, Matthew Jones, John 
Hillier, Matthew Foote
n.a. n.a. n.a. No – the rail industry has not sufficient capacity to undertake such research Insufficient capacity to undertake MH research A will to expand knowledge but only if funded 
from external sources
This topic is not well appreciated by those 
in the rail industry – one or two do 
understand the concept and are supportive 
of researching this
This topic is not well appreciated by those in the rail industry – one or two do 
understand the concept and are supportive of researching this; also there are 
no tools readily available to help.
I have responded to these questions as if I were a rail practitioner – 
it’s some six years since I was full time employed in the rail 
industry and part time since. However I believe (from recent work 
with Dr. Hillier) that my views are representative of the rail 
industry. 
Kings College 
London (Bruce 
Malamud)
name and 
organisation 
identified
All three examples [triggering, amplification 
effect and compound MH scenarios]
I don’t really have a ‘sector’ but rather 
am an academic who has knowledge of 
multi-hazard scenarios across a broad 
range of scenarios. Therefore, I have a 
good knowledge of case studies and in 
many cases theoretical treatment of all 
three examples given in the definition. 
4 not applicable  I do not really have a ‘sector’ so cannot answer that question, however in terms of practice, we have a 
joint PhD student between EDF and KCL where we have done a systematic review of many quantitative 
methods currently being used in the grey- and peer-review literature to examine multi-hazard 
interrelationships
YES - From point of view of an academic reviewing the literature, there are many methodologies currently in use to understand the the 
processes, including (i) gathering of case studies related to the three parts of definition given on p. 1 of this document from social media 
reports, grey-literature and peer-review literature (i.e., to understand what has previously occurred), (ii) comparing case (local) studies with 
global assessments of potential hazard interactions, (iii) use of instrumental records to better understand the magnitude of hazard 
interrelationships, (iv) laboratory studies to assess the potential existence and magnitude of hazard interrelationships, (v)  many quantitative 
approaches that we have broadly categorized (but not yet published) including  (a) stochastic approaches (e.g., copulas, joint tail models), (b) 
empirical (e.g., regression, rank correlation), (c) mechanistic (e.g., climate models, hydrological models).
Again, as an academic, I don’t have a ‘sector’. So this one is 
difficult for me to answer in terms of economic costs, although I 
have been collecting a number of case studies.
• There are some specific hazard interrelationship 
approaches (e.g., rainfall thresholds for landslides, 
earthquakes triggering landslides, landslides triggering 
floods) where the literature is becoming more mature 
and organized with methods (often empirical based, 
rarely mechanistic) becoming more widely used and 
certain types of standards of going beyond the case 
studies.
• From a social sciences perspective, there is becoming 
in the Global North much more awareness that such 
interrelationships between hazards exist, and 
attempts to at least discuss these. This is not as 
evident in the Global South (as they are often focussed 
on the single natural hazard, when they can compared 
to the many other hazards that they face such as food 
security, illness, and political conflict) although there 
are notable examples where (natural) hazard 
interrelationships are certainly being considered in 
the Global South.
• Many current approaches that say they are multi-hazard are focussed on all single 
hazards in a multi-layered context, in other words that do not consider holistically 
the interrelationships between different hazards (e.g., triggering, 
amplification/deamplification, coincidence). 
• Many current approaches to interrelationships are case study specific and rarely 
are they applicable to other regions or other cases.
• Many current approaches fail to take into account the growth (or more 
importantly the decrease, where possible) of uncertainty as a (triggering) cascade, 
or amplification cascade of hazard progresses in time.
• Many current quantitative approaches are very mathematical, locked in the 
statistics literature, or difficult to access for users.
• Many current approaches, both qualitative and quantitative, fail (particularly in 
the Global South) to take into account the every-day natural hazards (e.g., heat 
increases) which people might consider as a part of their local life, and also fail to 
take into account the low probability high magnitude events (e.g., large 
earthquakes in Kenya).
• Many current approaches fail to take into account dynamic vulnerability.
• An example of a full approach multi-hazard assessment is given below (Gill and 
Malamud, 2014), and each of the parts can fail to be taken into account.
• Current methodologies such as gathering case studies are very accessible, but difficult to 
apply due to human power and lack of data. 
• Methodologies that are more quantitative often require specialized training in the 
mathematics.
My organization is a university. In terms of the academic literature, yes, there is 
certainly an increasing understanding and literature on multi-hazards. Within research 
grant calls within the UK and Europe, there is a frequent call for ‘multi-hazard’ studies, 
but often without understanding what is meant by multi-hazards, or any gathering of 
multi-hazard knowledge across research grant. There is a lot out there locked in the 
academic literature, but only several attempts to pull it together, and once it is pulled 
together in systematic reviews, it often becomes so high level as not to be useable by 
practitioners.
Speaking more broadly for how I perceive multi-
hazards being applied in half a dozen organizations 
(industry) that I have come in context with I would 
say those items that hinder are the following:
* Lack of understanding which single hazards might 
impact a given region and time period, due to hazard 
experts often being siloed within organizations, i.e., 
they are experts in just ‘one’ hazard, and do not think 
across multiple hazards.
* Growth of uncertainty in hazard cascades.
* Not enough systematic reviews of current 
methodologies being used to understand multi-
hazards.
* Lack of data for case studies, instrumental records, 
changing vulnerability.
* A misunderstanding of the idea of dynamic 
vulnerability where the social vulnerability and 
physical vulnerability (exposure) change from pre-
disaster, post-disaster 1, and then post-disaster event 
2. See below from Gill and Malamud (2016).
Currently, I believe it is the systematic reviews of 
what others are doing and access to data.
See previous sections. See previous sections. In the above I have not discussed anthropogenic hazards, which are 
also an integral part in amplifying or deamplifying the impacts of 
natural hazards in triggering relationships.
There are three papers published with Joel Gill (BGS) as lead author 
on different aspects of multi-hazards and two more we are working 
on, these go more in-depth into many of the issues raised in this 
questionnaire.
1. Gill JC & Malamud BD (2017) Anthropogenic processes, natural 
hazards, and interactions in a multi-hazard framework. Earth-
Science Reviews 166: 246−269.
2. Gill JC & Malamud BD (2016) Hazard interactions and interaction 
networks (cascades) within multi-hazard methodologies. Earth 
System Dynamics. 7: 659−679.
3. Gill JC & Malamud BD (2014) Reviewing and visualizing the 
interactions of natural hazards, Reviews of Geophysics 52(4): 
680–722.
In addition, I have a PhD student working on multi-hazard cascades 
related to floods in Nairobi, a colleague working with me on multi-
hazard interactions of hazards in Kenya (Nairobi) and Malawi 
(Karonga), a PhD student (mentioned above, funded by EDF) 
working with me on quantification relationship between hazards, a 
past visiting student working with me on the impact of hazard 
interactions on infrastructure.
Met Office only organisation All three types above are relevant for our work – 
our customers are starting to become more 
interested in understanding multiple hazards. 
I’m not sure I can yet narrow it down to 
combinations of specific hazards, but our work is 
mostly on the hydrometeorological hazards side, 
plus space weather (given our operational 
responsibilities in both these areas and our 
responsibilities w.r.t. providing climate change 
information).
4 (processes), 2 
(Risk 
Assessment 
methodologies)
3 (processes), 2 
(Risk Assessment 
methodologies)
I think we have good understanding of the underlying processes, though quantifying multi-hazards is 
challenging. I am also talking mostly about hydrometeorological hazards here, though our work does 
intersect with other physical hazards (e.g. landslides).
YES - Generally, we use weather and/or climate models, along with observation data, and customer-provided data; coupled with statistical 
techniques such as extreme value analysis. Also some use of event-set type approaches. UKCP09 allowed the calculation of joint probabilities 
for a small subset of hazards (I believe something similar will be available from UKCP18). 
I’m also not aware of anything looking at any more than two concurrent hazards (so this is “multi” in the loosest sense!).
I expect there are other methods which are more qualitative in nature but it seems like the people who are asking us about multi-hazards are 
also those who are most interested in quantifying things rather than being satisfied with a qualitative approach.
[Here, “my sector” is the customers I work with rather than my 
organisation itself.] Not aware of anything specific in terms of 
costs I’m afraid. Again, this can be a struggle for single hazards let 
alone multi-hazards. I can’t really answer this easily because 
there are different effects in different sectors.
Most meteorological hazard assessments of which I am aware 
have concentrated on single hazards. We have conducted 
relatively little work, to date, looking at joint hazards, but I 
expect this to become more common with time. Customers’ 
appreciation/understanding of multi-hazards generally lags 
behind their appreciation/understanding of single hazards. Some 
sectors are becoming more aware of multi-hazard effects but I 
think this is a relatively untapped area. Not aware of anything 
specific in terms of costs I’m afraid. Again, this can be a struggle 
for single hazards let alone multi-hazards.
We have recently been involved in a project 
producing guidance on hazard 
characterisation for energy infrastructure; 
one of these guidance documents is about 
hazard combinations (again of only two 
hazards). The guidance will be available for 
download from mid-Nov (project launch 
event in London on 12th Nov: see 
https://twitter.com/IMechEevents/status/10
49226644047593472). 
One challenge is defining the problem in the first place (as the UNISDR definition 
shows!). The definition sensibly stays in the world of qualitative rather than 
quantitative, and indeed it is probably problem-specific (e.g. evaluation of energy 
assets at a site vs evaluation of the whole UK electricity transmission grid – your 
definition of what constituted a combination of hazards would need to account for 
the different spatial scales).
The biggest issue I see is separating out combined hazards from combined impacts. 
Often it is not so much the hazards occurring in combination (however we choose 
to define “combination”) that is an issue for a stakeholder – rather, the combined 
impacts. However this is a really complex area with many factors. For example, 
which is worse for a stakeholder: one really huge windstorm, or a sequence of 
several moderate windstorms? We can look at the frequency of either of these 
cases, hazard-wise (including projections into the future) – but understanding how 
the impacts relate back to that is key. This brings in a lot of resilience-related 
concepts (e.g. how quick is the recovery after an event – is it complete before the 
next event comes along? If not, the impact of the second event could be 
worsened...etc). So stakeholder input is important.
I think this is a really interesting area and there could be a 
lot of value in drilling down into the stakeholder impacts of 
particular weather events, how they respond to events, 
etc. A further key thing is that many multi-hazard events 
don’t just affect one sector, and when impacts happen 
concurrently across sectors, problems can be further 
exacerbated (e.g. a widespread wind+rain event could 
flood roads and bring down rail power lines, so transport 
resilience is depleted because both road and rail are 
affected). 
I suppose the initial screening process is relatively simple (i.e. which combinations do I 
definitely need to worry about; which might be worth considering; and which can I ignore 
from the outset?), though it depends on the level of stakeholder knowledge.
The statistical approaches for quantifying joint hazards are rather technical and not very 
user-friendly! 
Again replying with customers in mind: I think only very few customers have 
this on their radar currently, but interest is increasing.
For some hazards we don’t know enough about the 
single hazards let alone combining them with others.
Even if we can “do” hazards, often stakeholders’ 
information about their vulnerability/exposure is 
commercially-sensitive or otherwise confidential, so 
it can be difficult to combine those with hazard 
information to assess risk.
Alternatively the vulnerability/exposure may not 
even be known – also not good for assessing risk!
I don’t personally feel like we’re at “robust” yet – 
more dipping a tentative toe into the water.
See previous answers See previous answers
Met Office (Ian 
Lisk)
name and 
organisation 
identified
Strong winds, wind, rain, river-/coastal-/surface 
water-/groundwater- flooding and landslides; 
Thunderstorms, strong gusty winds, lightning, 
large hail, surface water- flooding and landslides; 
Strong winds, snow, ice and extreme cold; 
Heatwave, poor air quality, high pollen count;  
Heatwave, wildfires and poor air quality; Space 
weather impacts on power grid during period of 
extreme cold.  Volcanic ash and poor air quality.
5 5 Significant R&D programme to maintain a world leading global atmospheric modelling capability in support of downstream multi-hazard 
application and services, including, in partnership with science organisations and other operational agencies, development of pre-operational 
hazard impact models for high winds and surface water flooding and; climate change risk assessments for the rest of this century
Met Office is in the business of providing 
science and data in support of third party risk 
assessments of hazard impacts.  The Met 
Office High Performance Computer (HPC) 
business case includes an assessment of the 
economic benefits of the HPC weather and 
climate forecast outputs.  A copy of these 
assessments may be available on request
Better informed, fully integrated risk assessments for 
decision makers
Expensive and difficult to do and dependant on fully open and interoperable data 
and policies.  Requires multi-agency shared vision, commitment and funding or a 
centrally funded consortium approach
NHP Hazard Impact Modelling work is arguably amongst the most advanced in UK but has 
realised only limited progress after 7-years of effort due to cons raised in 5 above.
YES - Met Office produces subjective assessments of multi-hazard impacts based on 
world leading science and modelling data and information.
Shared commitment, staff resourcing and funding 
from/for partner agencies to support development 
and pull through into information services of multi-
hazard impact assessments.
Discretionary but inevitably limited in-kind 
support of partners through the NHP.
Lack of interoperability of hazard models 
and data.  Lack of access to vulnerability and 
receptor data. 
Lack of interoperability of hazard models and data.  Lack of access to 
vulnerability and receptor data. 
National Grid 
(Doug Dodds)
name and 
organisation 
identified
a. Weather hazards both direct and secondary 
impacts – Storms (wind), snow, ice, flooding 
(inland and coastal), extreme temperatures, 
drought, wildfires – weather (water) driven 
geohazards and erosion
b. Space weather impacts leading to widespread 
electricity failure
c. Effusive volcanic eruptions – pollutants 
particularly those where the particles are highly 
charged
d. Other geohazards both natural and man-made 
earthquake, fracking
e. Cyber-attacks, terrorist attacks
f. Pandemics both human and animal 
3 2 Individually we know a fair mount on some hazards but only some on how these individual risks trigger 
further hazards either at the same time or overtime and are potentially amplified
a. Targeted research 
b. Risks managed through internal risk management and sector resilience plans
c. Design standards
d. Using existing data identify potential connections
a. It’s very much a case of because ‘what we don’t know’ or ‘we 
think it’s ok but cannot prove it’ it’s therefore a risk.
b. While we can say that we may understand most hazards 
individually we do not understand how they influence, trigger 
and amplify each other.
c. We do not understand potential future tipping points where 
relatively minor risks may trigger major issues. Essentially we 
need to understand and plan for tipping points - where we 
should have invested or changed our design standards in 
anticipation of projected changes.
d. As a regulated industry, we must justify why and when we 
invest in resilience the current data and lack of firm evidence 
makes providing firm ‘a needs case’ for investing difficult.
e. If we better understand the individual hazards and how they 
may interact we can better formulate proportional targeted 
investment to archive resilience incremental resilience
f. We are identifying and experiencing more geohazards 
associated with climatic changes to the rainfall/water cycle 
through hidden and visible flooding damage
The energy sector approach to flood 
resilience ETR132 which sets out a target 
resilience level of 1:1000 for substations 
which supply over 10,000 customer points.
 a. Typically, currently and traditionally risks are looked at 
individually there is very little expert and central guidance 
on what should be investigated
b. Flooding grabs the headlines as it is visible on the 
surface but little thought is given to the secondary long 
term issues 
Much of the data already exists however there is a lack of information on how individual 
hazards may interact.
Somewhat - National Grid has taken existing geohazard data and flooding data and 
compared this to our assets to give a first pass assessment of multi-hazards
a. A lack of understanding and guidance on which 
multi-hazards or which combination of hazards 
should be investigated
b. As a regulated industry, we must justify why and 
when we invest in resilience the current data and lack 
of firm evidence makes providing firm ‘a needs case’ 
for investing challenging.  High impact very low 
likelihoods ‘what ifs’ tend not to grab the attention or 
a viewed as accepted levels of risk. 
A ‘toolbox’ of approaches for none academics to 
take forward detailing known data sources and a 
hazard relationship map possibly showing the 
current position and any associated research
Clear relationships between hazards and a 
demonstrable increasing risk profile
The responses I have given are my own and may not be those of 
National Grid
National 
Oceanography 
Centre (Mike 
Clare)
name and 
organisation 
identified
Multi-hazard scenarios most typically include 
triggering (e.g. submarine landslide triggers 
tsunami; tropical cyclone triggers turbidity 
current; earthquake (or compound small 
magnitude processes) triggers landslide etc) and 
amplification (e.g. particularly on volcanic islands 
where increased ash fall, or in fjord delta 
settings where increased meltwater related river 
run-off/flooding, provide enhanced sediment to 
offshore that does not directly trigger, but make 
turbidity current activity more likely)
I predominantly work offshore with 
offshore renewables, oil and gas, and 
telecommunications industries, hence 
processes that affect seafloor 
infrastructure are most relevant. 
3 to 4 3 to 4 Primarily observational – using direct monitoring and repeat sensing, backed up by statistical and hindcast analysis. Multi-hazard processes have been underestimated by offshore 
industries – particularly for triggering of hazardous events. I am 
working with offshore cable companies to understand the 
economic costs but do not have numbers available at this time. 
Work is ongoing. 
Process interactions are poorly understood/constrained in many models. 
Assumptions need to be tested by field observations/direct measurements. 
Many current approaches are “MULTIPLE HAZARDS AT A POINT” and not “Multi-
hazards” according to the definition above. Visualisation of multi-hazards scenarios 
is challenging and often not attempted. 
Statistical approaches are often inaccessible for those from an observational background 
and there is not an obvious tie between statistical multihazards assessment and those that 
attempt to understand/quantify the physical processes interactions 
We are starting to incorporate multi-hazards into our risk assessments for Small Island 
Developing States. A recent case is work funded by the Commonwealth Office for 
offshore hazard assessment in Vanuatu, South Pacific. 
General frameworks exist, but calibration of process-
interactions is sparse. How to define 
confidence/uncertainity using statistical models? 
Funds for large scale research projects that tackle 
applied challenges. Multi-hazard assessment 
requires multiple disciplines/sectors and 
conventional Innovation-type research funding is 
not sufficient to support these sorts of activities. 
See the NERC summary report that was 
prepared prior to the call for this project. 
See the NERC summary report that was prepared prior to the call for this 
project. 
Natural 
Resources 
Wales 
(identification 
info not 
provided)
Hazards that lead to inundation e.g. coastal, 
fluvial, surface water flooding, reservoir failure, 
landslide, impact on utilities, pollution
1 3 NO - Risk assessment as part of our incident work as well as work with Local Resilience Fora as a Cat 1 organisation As well as looking at the initial mitigation of the hazard which 
may cascade, we look at consequence management which looks 
at the host of impact caused by a particular hazard
Lack of specialist skills and knowledge I do not know In our risk assessment we look at consequence management.  Using the 
national risk register we have compiled all the hazards which lead to 
pollution of air, land, and water and have collated these together and our 
controls look at pollution prevention as well as response and recovery to 
these types of events.  
Lack of specialist skills and knowledge within the 
team that undertakes the assessment, as we are 
generalist emergency planners.
Effective collaboration, coordination, and 
information sharing
Guidance on how to carry this out, I am not 
aware of what is available and stick with the 
guidance provided for multi-agency risk 
assessment within Local Resilience Fora as 
guidance.
Lack of knowledge and understanding of the process.  If I understood this 
better I could engage with the busy technical specialists in a way which uses 
their limited time efficiently and sparingly.
NCAS identification info 
not provided
Most relevant would be those associated with 
interaction between air quality and 
meteorology, often under conditions where 
dispersion is limited. Examples include:
a) Air quality and heat wave – conditions driving 
the heat wave also cause the air pollution event, 
the high temperatures also lead to higher ozone 
for the same meteorological conditions due to 
lower ozone stomatal uptake to vegetation when 
plants are under heat stress.
May also then be linked with 
Drought – would bring increased dust component 
to particulate matter.
Wildfire – emissions to air (presumably wildfire 
risk also linked to drought).
b) Air quality and cold weather
c) Volcanic eruption (effusive or explosive) – 
emissions to air.
3 2 In looking at air pollution events meteorology is a crucial part of any analysis. Studies of air pollution rarely occur without consideration of 
meteorological variables, as they are such an important part of the atmospheric system that we use to explore air pollution observations, 
modelling and impacts. Inherently the atmospheric modelling used to look at air pollution events includes meteorological processes and in 
order to understand the representativity of air pollution measurements and to interpret variations observed, consideration of meteorological 
variables are key.  When assessing the impacts of air pollution events the medical community are also required to account for the cofounder 
that is high temperatures (when events occur during heat waves). Both air pollution modelling and measurement data are used to investigate 
the processes underlying observed air pollution episodes, including meteorological drivers.
n.a. n.a. n.a. n.a. n.a. n.a. Links between those involved in the fundamental 
science and those concerned with assessing impacts 
on health, and the environment, particularly the less 
easily measured such as loss of productivity or 
psychological impact.
The focus on long term health impacts of air 
pollution. The relative importance of peak values 
versus prolonged exposure is an area that has been 
identified as a research need for assessing, and 
minimising)  impacts of air pollution. 
Both of these apply for air pollution as a single hazard 
as well as multi-hazard. Attribution of impacts and 
analysis of additional impacts is more challenging if 
the single hazard impacts are not well enough 
characterised.
Close links with the meteorological community. Studies of multi-hazards such as wildfire 
have not been carried out in the UK and so 
assessment of the impact on air pollution 
and therefore human health and the 
environment have not been assessed. 
Inclusion of the impacts of wildfire on air 
pollution in an assessment of multi hazards 
does not (to my knowledge) occur. Work 
has been done on wildfires abroad where 
they predictably occur every year and 
application of findings from these studies 
could help to move forward how we 
consider this hazard in UK scenarios, 
particularly perhaps for forecasting and 
messaging during events.
n.a.
Network Rail only organisation Extended periods of dry and hot weather. 
‘extreme’ Dry weather leads to desiccation of 
earthworks and increased wildfire risk. Hot 
weather exacerbates this. Hot weather can lead 
to track deformation and desiccation exacerbates 
this.
Storms can result in flooding, lightning strike, 
wind damage, coastal erosion and power loss. 
These may be in one location or geographically 
spread, but linked.
Cold weather and rain/moisture can lead to icing.
1 1 I have no personal experience of using such tools and my awareness of them is low – 1
I am not aware of Network Rail using such tools, however I am not familiar with all aspects of Network 
Rail – 1.
I am unaware of the actual level of knowledge in the sector as a whole, but my assumption is that it is low 
– 1
Our risk assessment processes take a single event/hazard approach.
NO (see Q2) Single hazards (e.g. single weather events) can severely impact 
our asset and service performance leading to increased safety 
risks, increased maintenance and repair costs, increased delays 
and compensation costs and decreased reputation. The costs of 
delays and the increased safety risks are tracked and can be 
quantified, but the maintenance and repair costs are only 
partially tracked and cannot therefore be fully quantified.
The effects of multi-hazards are not monitored and cannot 
therefore be quantified. However it is expected that the same 
types of impacts will be suffered, but at an increased severity.
The advantage is that this [single hazards approaches] 
keeps them simpler and less resource intensive to use.
The pitfall of the current assessment methodologies that we use is that it assesses 
single hazards, and in many cases, single events. 
I do not know. No they generally assess single hazards, and in many cases, single events. It is a catch 22 situation. The lack of subject 
awareness, data and information means there is no 
understanding of the existence/extent of the risks 
and the perceived lack of risk therefore means that 
there is no push/appetite for investing in 
understanding the issue.
not applicable For our sector it is a) a lack of understanding 
of the need for assessment b) the lack of 
simple and/or national guidance on an 
approach/need and the lack of compelling 
data to overcome the lack of understanding
I do not know Our understanding of single weather hazards is mature, as is our 
business continuity risk assessment for single risks to workforce 
and office/building functions. Our business continuity risk 
assessment is being developed for our assets. Neither risk 
assessment considers multi-hazards.
Network Rail identification info 
not provided
Amplification and compound hazards. 
Amplification hazards are in particular evident 
from natural slope failures where periods of 
increased activity can develop following an 
initial hazard. Operationally the railway can 
suffer from compound hazards during prolonged 
periods of wet weather where multiple routes 
may suffer restrictions / closures that reduce the 
capability of the network.  
3 3 NO - Enterprise risk management; qualitative risk assessments using a common corporate risk matrix to assess safety, performance, reputation 
and value against corporate appetite.
Financial impacts through delays. Economic costs are more 
difficult to quantify. 
Lack of common currency in terms of consequence, hazard (likelihood) and 
ultimately risk. This creates uncertainty when comparing different components of 
infrastructure. Multi-hazard assessments are challenging. Individual assessments at 
portfolio level of individual infrastructure components are somewhat more 
straightforward. 
Limited No, not in the way that I am interpreting a multi-hazard assessment. Consistent currency and definition of risk. Complexity 
of modelling from development, through to 
implementation and upkeep. 
n.a. Appreciation of infrastructure capability 
and the complex dynamics that enable a 
system to perform or fail. 
n.a.
Q11: In your experience, what are the current gaps in knowledge or skills for 
undertaking multi-hazard risk assessment within your sector?Q1: Given the multi-hazard definition stated earlier, what multi-hazard scenarios are most relevant to your sector?
Q2: On a scale of 1 to 5 (1 – no knowledge, 2 – some knowledge, 3 – fair knowledge, 4 – good knowledge, 5 – very good 
knowledge) what is the level of knowledge you have about multi-hazard processes and risk assessment methodologies used 
in (a) research, and (b) practice (industry and policy) within your sector?
Q4: What impact(s) do you believe multi-hazard processes have on your sector? Has this (or can 
this) been quantified in terms of economic costs? Are you aware of any evidence or best-practice 
guidance (e.g. reports) that support such an analysis?
Q5: In your experience, what are the advantages and pitfalls of current methodologies and approaches used to undertake multi-hazard risk assessments? Q7: Do existing risk assessments in your organisation take into account multi-hazards? If so, how? Q10: What are, in your experience, the current gaps in knowledge or skills for better understanding multi-hazard events and their impact?
Network Rail identification info 
not provided
We deal with a number of weather events 
triggering geological events; specifically, 
extreme rainfall triggering flood events or 
ground movement, landslides
Very occasionally deal with earthquake events; whereas 
the flooding and landslide events occur 20 – 30 every year, 
earthquake (EQ) events, probably 1 in every 10 years.
Because we are transportation 
infrastructure owner, terrorism events 
are quite infrequent; we had the 
London Bridge event which was quite 
close by to one of our assets, but it 
wasn’t directly involved in that event; 
although, there were some impacts on 
people using trains and using 
vulnerable stations as shelter; it had an 
emotional effect on people but no one 
was injured but members of staff were 
involved in that event.
We don’t deal with anything like 
pandemic, unless our staff is affected 
by it; we will just be taking guidance 
from the government.
The data security, yes we are affected 
by that; we have a number of firewalls 
to prevent that happening, how to keep 
the data safe by using passwords, etc. 
but I don’t think that’s above any other 
government based organisation.
Because we are transportation 
infrastructure owner, terrorism events 
are quite infrequent; we had the 
London Bridge event which was quite 
close by to one of our assets, but it 
’  di l  i l d i  h   
3 4 Research (3) – there are a number of academic institutions we partner with to access that research; we 
also have quite a good liaison with partners like CIRIA, a lot of the universities; for practice, industry and 
policy good knowledge (4).
For industry and policy we are a part of the Geotechnical Asset Owners Forum; we do spread good 
practice across the industry and learn from other industries; we’ve got  no policies that applies to 
geotechnical and environmental hazards.
We have a team at the Melton Keynes office that look into those things with other railway infrastructure 
owners around the world to make sure we are leading the way with some of the approaches and 
methodologies and spreading good practice.
About 6 years ago, we were not as efficient as other railway operators around the world; a number of 
people went to other countries to test that and spoke to people from SNCF and the Railways in Canada, 
Australia, New Zeeland, Italy, Scandinavia, Ireland. We actually tested that and we felt we came out very 
well compared to other railway operators; so I think we’ve got a good knowledge of what happens 
outside of our country.
The reason why there’s been a gap of 5 years between that benchmarking exercise and now, is that we 
were some years ahead of a number of those countries so we decided to rein in on that benchmarking; 
we were a leading railway operator of the world.
NO - One recent example: the Global Stability Assessment – for looking at the combinations of slope angle and geology type on slope stability 
and there are a series of easy to use charts that help us to do that; those were derived by consultants (Engineering Analysis) by superimposing 
our failure information; onto that we were able to see that things like vegetation have quite a lot of effect on stability of slopes; so that’s quite 
an easy to use one.
We’ve also done some analysis on impacts of outside party slopes; so these are slopes outside of Network  Rail boundaries with BGS; this 
analysis gives us the number of locations that are at risk from outside party events based on slope angle, geology, etc. and we will need to look 
out into those in a bit more detail; we are in a very early stage at looking how to do that; there are hundreds of thousands of locations that have 
been ID now, but it’s a good start.
We had a company called JBA, they’ve done a slope risk analysis of impacts on the railway and we were able use that to identify locations that 
we need to visit more regularly; also, when we have a flood, a severe flood warning we were able to send response teams out to those 
particular locations to assess if there is any damage to our infrastructure.
A live tool that we can use – the alert coming from the EA, that’s a good example.
No – not aware of such studies existing at Network Rail; we can 
assess the damage cost for infrastructure and the likely cost of 
infrastructure; we can assess the likely delay to our customers; 
what we cannot do is understand consequential costs (e.g. delays 
on a train by 2h, how much does that cost UKPRC in terms of lost 
revenue to the company); there are other economic costs 
associated with the delay in a particular location; in the worst 
case scenario, you can see that if we are particularly unreliable, 
we could affect particular town or cities; I don’t think there’s 
anything in the company that can assess that economic cost.
There are some things we have done to try and put together 
business cases for things like line speed improvement; for some 
locations we have carried out engineering work to speed up 
trains, so a train will get from A to B perhaps a few minutes 
quicker;  that can be turned into a business case to pursue if 
that’s worth doing; that sort of CBA (cost-benefit analysis) does 
exist, but we generally do that for reopening lines, speeding up 
lines, etc.; I think that’s quite  common practice now also in the 
environmental industry.
No best-practice guidance found in other 
companies or in other countries; we had 
problems in the company even with 
determining ourselves what impact would 
for instance a line closure or speed 
restriction would have on a particular line; 
we can assess how much the cost to repair 
things is, how much it costs to delay trains; 
but for example, if I put a speed restriction 
at 40 miles on a particular track and I say to 
myself, how much would have cost us more 
if we had a 20 miles speed restriction? - It is 
quite difficult to determine those exact 
numbers because it depends on a huge 
number of factors (e.g., the number of trains 
travelling, the speed that they’re going, 
wheatear there are stations on either side of 
that particular location, etc.).
We have quite good processes of risk assessment for single 
and multi-hazards; we need to protect not only our trains 
but also our staff in those particular situations; one that we 
have just started to look at is dynamic risk assessment e.g., 
we’ve got company risk assessment for going out and 
examining rock slopes; we will tell people what they need 
in order to walk safely on track, not walking on hazardous 
areas, have the correct PPE, etc., so it’s planned activity; if a 
boulder rolls from a rock face and derails a train and the 
train is turned over, there are a number of injuries, police 
and fire brigade come, etc., I need to send someone at that 
particular location, a potentially hazardous situation, 
completely unplanned and new; so these types of 
situations for which we have no experience for or may 
never had planned – dynamic risk.
We started having some training with Mountain Rescue 
Centre from Abbeymoore, Scotland on how to assess the 
risk when these situations occur, not how to save people.
We will re-evaluate the risk levels as new information 
comes in; we will take a more planned risk assessment and 
see if it has changed as a result of that particular incident.
It might be that the assets have become potentially unsafe 
and cannot access it without temporarily making it safe; 
this approach is not common, there is a lot of work to be 
done on this;
If you look at the Fire Service of the Ambulance, they will 
be trained on how to carry out the dynamic RA but we’re 
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99% of the time they are appropriate and useful; 1% of the time (when there is the highest 
consequence, high risk) not so much; we are still asked to go out and deal with this to 
make sure our staff is correctly trained on such situations. In terms of vulnerability of 
assets and the risk pose to them – people’s safety is a priority, and the assets last
See Q6 See Q6 Time and experience; we concentrate on the 99% 
rather than the 1%, when we have to do the dynamic 
risk assessment on MH.
Also, the competence of people; there are very few 
people who have been trained on MH; the new staff 
members have not been exposed to those extreme 
events so I would say that effective training is really 
key; we’ve only just started setting up courses to give 
those individuals some experience on what has 
happened in the last 20, 30, 50 years.
It’s difficult to explain the impact of those events on 
new starters that haven’t been exposed to them (e.g. 
multi-fatality train accidents haven’t happened in the 
last 20 yrs).
We can learn from other countries; I was talking 
that we are one of the best in the world and we 
still have the opportunity to learn from the best 
and the worst as well, given also the 
environmental changes; one example, the 
Christchurch EQ in New Zeeland – rockfall damage 
on rail assets, EQ damage on railway; good source 
of knowledge is the lessons learned in the 
aftermath and the changes in procedures, 
standards, equipment, as a result of that event. - 
Some of these multi-hazards drive significant 
innovation quite quickly, such as the Fukushima 
incident; they came up with some robotic 
equipment remotely controlled in areas where 
they couldn’t access the nuclear chamber safely; 
that sort of innovative equipment can be used in 
some of our inaccessible areas e.g., tunnels, 
shafts, etc. We have started to liaise with some of 
the companies or universities in Japan for such a 
piece of equipment; in the same line drones, scan 
can be used for rapid MH events response; so such 
innovative techniques could be helpful as well.
In UK we don’t have many hazards such as 
EQ, tidal waves, nuclear hazards, so learning 
from others countries who face these types 
of hazards is a way to fill the gap (e.g. 
Fukushima reactor explosion); so, sharing 
experiences and examples of MH events 
around the world would be helpful.
The same as above, learning how RA have changed as a result of different 
MH events; if BGS can do something about capturing some of these issues 
and sharing them across different sector.
ONR only organisation • One or more hazards that affect the plant and 
occur as the result of a separate event that also 
affects the plant. For example, an earthquake 
that causes a tsunami.
• One or more hazards that affect the plant in the 
same time-frame due to persistence or similar 
causal factors. For example, meteorological 
conditions such as storms intrinsically involve 
the combination of several phenomena such as 
rainfall, wind, and storm surge.
• One or more hazards may exacerbate other 
hazards. For example freezing conditions, 
drought or persistent rain can affect drainage 
conditions during subsequent rainfall.
• One or more sequential hazards that affect the 
plant.  For example if a wind hazard causes 
damage to building cladding, then any rainfall 
occurring during the period before the cladding 
is repaired will gain entry to the building.
• Realistic combinations of randomly occurring 
independent events affecting the plant 
simultaneously. 
Nuclear licensees need to take into 
account all combinations of external 
hazards that could reasonably be 
expected to occur at a given site.  
Categories of external hazards include 
seismic, geological, flooding and 
hydrological, meteorological, 
biological, man-made, fire, and other 
hazards including solar activity. More 
information is available in ONR’s 
guidance, in particular Technical 
Assessment Guide TAG 13
4 4 We use the methodologies, approaches and procedures set out in TAG 13. We also take account of national and international research and 
guidance – some examples are listed below: 
A matrix approach is often used to list and identify hazard combinations. A helpful cross-correlation matrix has been included in a recent report 
by a European Union funded project called ASAMPSA_E., see:   Decker, K. and Brinkman, H., “List of external hazards to be considered in 
ASAMPSA_E, EURATOM 7th Framework Prog. ASAPSA_E, Tech. Rpt.ASAPSA_E/WP21/D21.2/2017-41,” February 2017, 
http://asampsa.eu/wpcontent/uploads/2014/10/ASAMPSA_E-D21.2_External_Hazard_List.pdf.
Combinations of hazards is an area of current research. One example of a research project that is on-going is being conducted by Lancaster 
University to create “storm hazard curves.” See Case Study 2 in: http://www.onr.org.uk/documents/2018/onr-regulatory-research-annual-
report-201718.pdf
Section 7 of this document provides a review of practices used by a number of international  bodies to consider combinations of hazards: EPRI 
(Electric Power Research Institute), “Identification of External Hazards for Analysis in Probabilistic Risk Assessment: Update of Report 1022997,” 
29 October 2015, www.epri.com/#/pages/product/3002005287/
This document discusses combinations of weather hazards and lists of examples along with their possible effects: WENRA RHWG, “Guidance 
Document Issue T: Natural Hazards Head Document - Guidance for the WENRA Safety Reference Levels for Natural Hazards Introduced as 
Lessons Learned from TEPCO Fukushima Dai-ichi Accident,” 21 April 2015, 
www.wenra.org/media/filer_public/2015/04/23/wenrarhwg_t1_guidance_on_issue_t_head_document_2015-04-21.pdf.
Another example of methodologies is provided in section 4 of: Knochenhauer, M. and Louko, P., “Guidance for External Events Analysis, SKI 
Report 02,” 27 February 2003.
The impact of multi-hazard processes on the nuclear sector 
(including the economic impact) is hard to quantify.
I am not aware of any evidence or guidance 
that supports this type of analysis.
Current methodologies tend to be good at identifying 
and screening possible combinations of hazards
They are less useful as a way of analysing these combinations statistically to derive 
combined hazard curves (frequency vs severity) or of systematically identifying 
possible effects on nuclear plant.
See Q5 We do not perform risk assessments ourselves but expect licensees to 
demonstrate that they have adequately considered combinations of hazards.  
We are non-prescriptive in terms of methodologies that they should use to 
do this.
See Q5 See Q5 See Q5 See Q5 Multi-discipline working would be required in order to address the 
gaps in current methodologies.  For example the derivation of a 
combined storm hazard curve would require a team that included 
experts in statistics, in meteorology, and in nuclear safety.  In my 
experience it is very difficult for these teams to form due to “silo 
working” in each discipline.
Practical Action 
(Mirianna 
Budimir)
name and 
organisation 
identified
All [triggering, amplification effect, compund 
hazards scenarios]
5 4 NO - None/very little – there is limited awareness within the organisation as a whole of the implications of multi-hazards. There are some 
projects I am involved in that specifically are looking at cascading events (rainfall induced landslides/mudslides/huaycos). These are the only 
ones that actively examine multi-hazards. The most focused on multi-hazards is the LANDSLIP project – taking a multi-hazard approach to 
landslide early warning system at district level in India.
But in practice, the organisation as a whole do not consider hazards outside of our sphere of focus. If a particularly big event (e.g. earthquake) 
occurs in a country we work in and have strong DRR team located, then the organisation will provide advice/support in response/development 
initiatives directed at the event (e.g. rebuilding after an earthquake) – but this is more multiple hazard than multi-hazard.
Smaller events (especially rainfall triggered landslides) are a 
regular occurrence, causing outburst floods, or increasing the 
river bed level and therefore increasing subsequent flood levels.
Bigger, less frequent events do impact the general NGO sector – 
increasing the severity of events and complicating response 
mechanisms (e.g. greater resources needed in response, location 
of safe/refuge places that are not affected by 
subsequent/coincident hazards etc). Not quantified in terms of 
economic costs
Not for my sector Greater understanding of interactions between 
hazards could potentially lead to safer/better 
response/preparedness/mitigation that incorporates 
all hazards affecting a community/location. Can reduce 
unknowns and ‘swiss cheese’ effect of cascading 
disasters, reducing the bigger losses from multi-hazard 
events.
Often termed ‘multi-hazard’ when it is in fact multiple/more than one hazard. 
Difficulty to implement in practice. Lack of data in the real world to implement 
(especially in developing countries). Difficulties of working across physical science 
disciplines (let alone human science, practitioners, government division of 
responsibilities etc). Lack of resources to guide approach at practitioner/non-
technical level and lack of resources (and evidence) to convince/persuade policy 
makers and high level decision makers that it is worth doing. Uncertainty in single 
hazard risk assessments are multiplied (and possibly unquantified) for multi-hazard 
risk assessments.
From my background, there are interesting scientific publications (with associated barriers 
in access/use/understandability). But lacking in practical guidance for methodologies and 
approaches for non-technical (e.g. NGO, responders, government). If they exist, I am not 
really aware of them or the issues of accessibility etc.
No Evidence on the need.
Guidance on how to do in practice in developing 
countries.
not applicable Lack of data disaggregated by hazard.
Lack of cross-hazard research disciplines in 
research institutions (this is changing).
There are lots of case studies of big events, 
but less evidence collected for high 
frequency events.
Tendency to be single-hazard focus (this is changing a little in some places).
Lack of evidence on the need and guidance of how to do so in practice.
Scottish 
Government
only organisation All natural hazard or non-malicious risk multi-
hazards would be of relevance to our work.
2 2 We have some knowledge of multi-hazard processes through involvement in the UK NSRA. NO - We do not undertake multi-hazard risk assessments I suspect multi-hazards would have a significant impact on 
available resources to deal with emergencies and would impact 
our ability to deliver government services. 
I have no access to support this thinking. We do not currently have a methodology for undertaking 
multi-hazard assessments.
We would be able to access the system that is currently used by UK Cabinet Office. No We have not scoped this work out so cannot say what 
the barriers might be.
This is not something we currently undertake. There are large gaps in our knowledge on 
how to assess multi-hazard risks.
I have limited experience of this.  Work on natural hazard risk assessment by the Scottish 
Government is fairly new. Over the last two years we have been 
establishing our methodology and introducing this work to policy 
areas across the Scottish public sector. We are interested in 
developing our work to include multi-hazards – following the 
Cabinet Office approach to include linked and compound risks as 
part of the UK risk assessment. We would therefore be interested 
in methodologies and research into a multi-hazard approach.
Transport 
Scotland (Paul 
Mellon & 
Graham 
Edmond)
name and 
organisation 
identified
Multiple failures of Transport Network that could 
be triggered by a single failure, such as landslide, 
flood or major incident.  This could be due to the 
diversion of the traffic to another unsuitable 
road or increase the stress of another mode –e.g. 
train to road or vice versa – alternative roads may 
be the responsibility of another roads (local) 
authority on which he have limited control or 
minimal information.  There may also be 
cascading failures on utility supply to electrical 
railways for example.
3 3 Knowledge of likely capacity or restrictions on diversion routes are built up from close working relationships with local authorities and other 
relevant organisations including emergency planning partnerships.  This also includes the providers of transport services e.g. ferry companies, 
train companies and the freight sector.  We have commissioned research from bodies such as TRL, for example to analyse quantitative risks and 
economic impacts of disruption events.  Transport Scotland have been active partners in international research such as the Impressions Project 
on High Level Climate Change and the NERC ERIIP on interdependencies between the transport network and utility providers.  We are also 
partners in Climate Ready Clyde which is an initiative to create a shared vision, strategy and action plan for an adapting Glasgow City Region.  
This includes the health services which  are a major user of the transport network.
The impacts include economic, level of service and reduction in 
public perception/confidence.  Some research has been 
undertaken on for example the economic impacts of the closure 
of the A83 trunk road due to landslides and the associated QRA 
(Quantitative Risk Assessment).  The next iteration of the 
Scottish Climate Change Adaptation Programme (SCCAP2) will 
suggest a cross sectoral outcome answer to climate change.
This provides a much better understanding of the 
interdependencies between providers and more rapid 
holistic response.  Such an approach needs strong co-
operation between agencies including private sector 
companies.   
The latter have been reluctant to share potentially commercially confidential 
information.  
See Q5 Partially – included in asset management systems and resilience strategies and plans. See Q5 See Q5 The proper interdependencies between the 
agencies are not fully understood nor are 
unknown or very low probability risks or 
hazards.
The consequent response will require a joined up collaborative approach 
that may require regulation and or government intervention.  Solutions need 
to be practical and affordable.
University of 
Portsmouth
only organisation All [triggering, amplification effect, compund 
hazards scenarios]
As an academic, I am interested in the 
processes and theory of multi-hazards, 
so all scenarios are relevant to me (and 
must be considered for a thorough 
multi-hazard risk assessment, even if 
only to be excluded from further 
analysis.)
3 to 4 For practice (I work 
with a range of 
stakeholders in 
urban Africa), I 
think there is good 
knowledge (4) of 
some specific multi 
hazard processes 
(e.g., storm > 
flooding) and very 
little knowledge (2) 
of others, 
particularly at a 
broader spatial 
scale
In terms of risk assessment methodologies for both research and practice, I think there are still gaps in 
our knowledge, so maybe a 3. 
YES - Literature reviews (both published and grey literature), spatial analysis (e.g., overlays), process diagrams, matrices (for both hazards and 
impacts), archive searches (e.g., newspapers), database construction
Speaking not from the academic sector but from analysis of urban 
Africa, it is very difficult to find case studies of multi-hazard 
impacts to quantify the economic impacts. Due to the high levels 
of informality in terms of housing and livelihoods, I do not 
believe an economic quantification would really reveal the 
impacts of multi-hazards in Urban Africa (although would be a 
good motivator for planning and preparedness!). 
I find modelling the spatial interactions of hazards quite challenging – i.e., if two 
hazard maps overlay, this is not the full footprint of the interaction – one hazard 
occurring at quite a distance could trigger/increase the probability of another. I find 
the databases I use (e.g., DesInventar) are not particularly good at recording the 
links between events to rapidly pull out case studies of multi-hazards. 
I find the matrices (e.g., Gill and Malamud) very useful for identifying potential cascades 
for a specific location. I do not feel there is a robust spatial methodology available at 
present. 
Speaking from experience of working with local governments in Africa, I do 
not feel that multi-hazards are strongly taken into account, as our 
understanding of some of the single hazards is still evolving, and capacity can 
be an issue. 
Access to data. Communicating uncertainties to 
stakeholders (speaking from an academic perspective 
now). 
n.a. Better databases of multi-hazard events 
and their impacts. Better understanding of 
the spatio-temporal dynamics of cascades. 
Sometimes large silos of knowledge and lack of cross-sectoral working (in 
Urban Africa, but perhaps also more generally)
UKWIR identification info 
not provided
When you think about leakage for example, two 
of the environmental factors that influence 
leakage (freeze and thaw), cold weather isn’t 
good and also drought as the soil around the 
pipes will shrink and move
Difficult to define MH; - the industry 
will plan for large climatic issue such as 
flooding, drought, deluge but in terms 
of MH, I was thinking more along the 
lines of things that are affected by; so if 
the weather affects power supplies or 
the roads network then, that can have 
an effect on the industry assets. I know 
the work the industry does on those 
single hazards, and they’ll do a 
significant amount of contingency 
planning, but I was struggling with MH 
scenarios and I don’t know for what 
specific things they might have planned 
for [cascading hazards vs cascading 
impacts]
2 4 to 5 Research: some knowledge (2); if it’s nationally recognized research, e.g. climate change scenarios, then 
the industry will be aware and use those; if it hasn’t had that profile, they might not be aware (e.g. locally 
developed, university research)
Practice: most companies will have developed their own tools to do that; contingency and hazard 
planning is very advanced and very tailored too; that should be 4 or 5
Policy: it it’s important because it will affect the service the water industry provides, it will be written 
into legislation that they need to plan for certain scenarios (e.g. Water resource Management Plan). If it’s 
very important, the regulators will make sure the companies are taking that into account and the 
companies will take those very serious anyway (4 or 5)
They probably all have their own well developed approaches and procedures; the data that they use (national datasets) is a common dread, but 
might have developed their own way of assessing a likelihood or outcome and build all that into their contingency and business planning
But if you would ask them what criteria, what is the main principle behind it, you will find a commonality there in terms of what datasets are 
they using, what kind of events do they plan for, even if they have a tool that ranks things differently
If you have a look at the Ofwat’s [the water service regulation 
authority – responsible for economic regulation of the privatised 
water and sewerage industry in England and Wales] website and 
access their business plan for 2015 – 2020, in some of the business 
plans have done quite some work on resilience (and it was 
specifically asked for last time), and there will be costings 
associated with that. Because they are all in competition, 
economic costs are something that we don’t share a lot not even 
in the research arena
We do climate change planning with them, 
so they will look at climate change scenarios, 
taking the latest data from the government 
(UKCP18), so they have plans to do 
collaborative projects to see what that 
means for the models they us. You probably 
need to ask them, I struggle to answer that 
myself. In the past we have worked with the 
industry and the regulators to run projects to 
review and improve the water resource 
management planning as well, looking at 
what extra data is available, what lessons 
have they learned from previous rounds of 
undertaking that planning, but they’ll 
probably work with localized scenarios; e.g., 
they’ll work with the police and EA, local 
government to maybe plan for something 
like coastal inundation on the East coast. For 
national scale scenarios we will help them 
with anything they jointly use, but for any 
local scenarios (e.g. storm hitting regionally 
and affecting 1 -2 companies), they’ll work 
locally with all proper planners and 
emergency services to sort out what needs 
to happened there, including lessons 
learned
As ever, you have to make a lot of assumptions about the data (accuracy, missing) 
and the capability of the model; usually, there’s a lack of good datasets going back 
long enough historically and at the granular detail required; e.g., in a recent project 
we knew the Met Office was able to provide rainfall data at a finer granular detail 
than before and the industry used that data to improve their response to storm and 
rainfall; so, getting enough historic data and at a right level is a struggle. What we 
also find is that the climatic patterns have changed so much, that there are so many 
short sharp downpours as opposed to a nice smooth profile, how do you plan to 
those now? And they are certainly more seasonally prevalent recently, so you have 
to make a lot of assumption when you get to the frequency of those events. Sharing 
data, having nationally important datasets available, the way to understand them, 
having the right connection points weather that is a group point to understand it 
(do you need an advanced degree to be able to use it?)
What we found, and probably the reason why we are struggling to do much research in 
this area, is that it’s more useful at the local level; the best, most accurate methodologies, 
data, etc., it’s been very comprehensive at area or local level; when you try to do it 
nationally, the spatial data is not always as good. What we also found, with academia, you 
might do a very good project with them, produce a model but then the project stops, and 
if the industry things that model is not going to be kept up-to-date, if someone doesn’t 
own it/help with training users, etc., it won’t be used which is a shame; so the model 
hasn’t been supported beyond the life of the project. If the industry comes together and if 
we work with academia, UKWIR will take that model on, on behalf of the industry and we 
will keep it up-to-date with the help of the developers and  we will license that model 
toward the water companies so that they can keep using it rather than buying licenses 
individually, trying to get data; and if they get better data, they can add it in the model, 
but someone needs to host whatever it is that’s been developed and make sure it will be 
continually developed and updated
The water companies take into account cascading scenarios; if it’s a scenario that will 
affect power supply or security of service or supplied, then the industry have done the 
risk assessments and investments to make the services more secure where they can 
and contingency planning where they can’t
The lack of data at the detail level required; given the 
localized character of MH, having the data at this level 
is a challenge. Understanding the frequency of MH; 
it’s very hard to predict hazard patterns and impact 
areas to try and do some mitigation for those 
exposed assets; it’s getting better but trying to do it 
more locally reliable is the key
Data sharing; better data at national scale; 
probably some help looking at the criteria that are 
already included in the models that the industry 
has; some expert judgment on how to improve 
the models, datasets used, methodologies
Half the battle is probably knowing who are 
those recognized as experts in the country; 
if you ask the industry who are they going 
to contact first to talk about MH, they might 
go to the regulators to see what they are 
doing, some might be aware of different 
organisations and groups; so, knowing who 
to go to, where to get help from, training, 
etc.
One of the big things that helps is having the type to review things after they 
happened, and look at why the model predicted in a certain way: was it the 
lack of data, was it change; a lot of times we try to predict it, but we also 
should spend more time on learning lessons after the events, trying to 
pinpoint which particular aspect would have helped in that scenario. How 
fresh the knowledge and update of knowledge of the industry is I don’t 
know, and is someone would have said to me “ we need to train people on 
this”, I probably wouldn’t know where to send them
Huge caveat to take into account: this is a perspective from a high 
level, to fill out the gaps, speak to one of the companies. Insurance 
companies use lots of data and assessments at the more accurate 
data is available the more they use this for insurance policies and 
insurance premiums. Water industry publishes business plans and 
water resources management plans. These are on the internet 
pages of the companies.
Cabinet Office 
(EF)
name and 
organisation 
identified
A severe storm which happens at the same time 
as flooding; that can have multiple impacts over 
infrastructure with  cascading effects towards 
multiple services and infrastructure; if there is a 
power outage on a regional or national basis 
then that can have cascading effects over a 
whole range of services; that can last several 
days, at which point there are huge amount of 
dependencies on that electricity supply
We look at endemic influenza, which has a huge amount of 
“slow-burn risk” i.e. it is spread over several months/years; 
the range of consequences that would have would result in 
a range of a whole set of other risks, in a similar way of 
power outage (e.g., impact on every day services); that 
would be difficult to predict
Another obvious example in terms of 
cumulative effect over time is climate 
change (CC); we don’ really define CC 
as a risk in itself; it’s more as a thematic 
trend; if you would do a long term 
trend analysis, you would be able to 
pinpoint the real life manifestation of 
various risk related to CC as a driver 
over time. On top of that, another 
example is cyber – although cyber in 
itself is not really a risk – but makes a 
whole area of risks more likely (e.g., 
fraud)
3 3 Not aware of any standard models from academia; we had to work quite hard, because what we found is 
that there isn’t a “one-size-fits all” approach; a good example is the storm leading into power outage: if 
you assume there’s no electricity at all, you realize how many dependencies there are upon that power; if 
there’s a short time power outage, those dependencies are not quite so prevalent; it’s only when it is 
sustained over a longer period that you realize how many dependencies there are.
We had to do quite a lot of work to unravel how that scenario could look like and how expensive those 
impacts would be; the scenario changes quite a lot as when you look at those dependencies and 
cascading effects; but that’s quite different to other scenarios when, e.g., pandemic influenza because 
dependencies are less clear but we can identify them more easily as they manifest over a longer period 
of time.
In each of these areas we have worked with industry and other subject matter experts and we’ve looked 
at UNISDR but if there are any standardized models that would ease our work – we would be very interest 
to know about that; so, I’d say, on balance, maybe a (3)
YES - in essence we’re trying to unravel the complexities in all instances (complex system back-analysis); we have a tailored approach towards 
each of those plausible cascading or concurrent scenarios and we try to make sure we are unravelling all that.
We try to ensure there’s a common driver (e.g., severe storm) and that everything is plausible in that way because otherwise you end up having 
a long and extensive RA, putting a huge amount of analysis in it, when  actually what you really need in terms of the overarching NRA 
framework is having the capabilities adaptable to what is actually happening.
What we frequently find is that scenarios rarely manifest in the same way as we have listed in the RA, so we try to look at what is plausible and 
the common driver rather than pinpointing random risks where there might not be a common cause.
We work on what we call “the reasonable worst case scenario” (RWCS), which is somewhere in the middle between the most plausible and 
most impactful; something which is proportional to use for planning purposes.
We work hard on the economic analysis of specific scenarios 
within the NRA; that includes the costs which may be summed, 
costs which are more difficult to quantify (e.g., impact on the 
tourism industry).
However, it’s hard to know how rigorous those assessments are 
and if there is more research which can better inform the way we 
do those assessments, we are very open to that.
If we’re using something like the RWCS, then you’re 
obviously planning all your resources upon that and 
there is a risk that a scenario will present itself which 
will overwhelm the resources available; the most 
likely thing that will overwhelm a single scenario is the 
cascading risk when there is that common driver; the 
advantage is that trying to work which scenario is most 
likely to occur simultaneously or near-, it better 
informs the resources that would be required to 
respond and make sure we’re planning proportionally
Obviously, all that is very complex; the real risk is that it’s very easy to have an 
endless RA, imagining all sorts of MH scenarios which are very unlikely to happen 
and actually an extension of that is, is relatively easy to work out the probability of 
RWCS, but trying to work out the likelihood of concurrent or MH scenarios is more 
difficult to establish. It’s important to figure out, what the scope of the initial MH is 
and how you’re going to limit yourself to do possibly an endless RA
It would be really useful for a MH RA, is if we prevent these 
MH events; e.g., if we knew a severe storm was coming into 
UK, if we can manage the expectations of the crisis 
managers and decision makers, that it’s likely to have the 
cascading effects and working out what steps we can take 
to reduce the impact and affect a greater response.
They are useful – if you know the scope and limit yourself to a reasonable MH scenario; if 
there’s a methodology that can help refine that from the start and then works out how to 
simply these complex systems and dependencies; we are not aware of an existent 
framework which does that particularly well.
Due to the complexities of each risk, the methodologies need to be tailored to each 
specific scenario (flexible approach); and we haven’t found an approach that does all that
This is something we are currently working on a new version of the NRA now; we used 
the RWCS methodology and at the complexities and patterns of cascading risks and how 
that might impact a whole range of sectors; now the team is trying to do is to look at 
how different RWCS can happen simultaneously and establish a methodology to work 
out what  is proportionate to use in that instance in order to drive that planning and 
make sure we are ready for something that is not far lower in likelihood like a single 
RWCS can potentially be
Resources and the fact that, with a few exceptions, 
MH events are still less likely to happen than single 
hazard events.
So it’s a case of the resourcing; making sure we’re 
going to have something that is going to inform our 
RA more meaningfully than we currently have and 
we’ll have a better outcome because of that; so, 
that’s the most important: time and knowing what 
would come out of it.
Another barrier: knowing it will achieve the expected 
outcome
Resources It’s how we incorporate any methodology 
(e.g., engineering) which could use to learn; 
it’s not transferred to policy –making at the 
moment; if we can point to those examples 
from the industry and demonstrate where it 
worked or had positive outcomes, that 
should be used and it’s currently a gap in 
knowledge
What goes along is the skills; how 
to conduct those MH RA; if there is 
any existing technology or 
software than can aid with that
See Q10 In terms of the evidence base and governance, we have a good 
structure and links with the academia; we work closely with the 
cabinet office for science which ensures that the best evidence and 
knowledge of chief scientific advisors is available; In terms of the 
understanding of the MH events, we are actually quite in a good 
place for that; it is the methodology to conduct that MH RA in a 
meaningful way that is really missing
Cabinet Office only organisation At the moment, we don’t specifically 
talk about MH, we just link to each 
weather/natural hazard scenarios that 
we’ve got and we’ll also try to mention 
within the risk, another risk that isn’t in 
the national risk assessment (NRA) that 
might be caused by it.
Landslide is a good example but we are 
interested in any of them; but we’re 
particularly interested in those that will 
tip one hazard into another one  that 
isn’t on the NRA at the moment.
3 4 Very good knowledge (5) of RA methodologies but probably less (4) so about MH processes; in research 
(3) lower than practice (4); 3 – 4 multi-hazard knowledge
NO - Main approach: to talk with people that perform the methodologies rather than doing any development ourselves; so we rely on people 
from the NHP departments to understand it, in order for us to input it into our RA.
When it comes to methodologies, any knowledge I might have as an individual as well as taking with experts in the field rather than sitting 
down and reading documents; we rely much on workshops to try to understand those processes; we make a list of any risk we think are linked 
or compound and those will be sent to a group such as NHP to sense-check before we included in the NRA.
Massive impact because if two things happened at once then you 
will be stretching your capabilities but also make the emergency 
response both locally and nationally.
Economic costs – no, difficult to do; although you probably know 
of SWIMS (Weather Impact Model Systems) which they use down 
in Kent to work out how much each event costs 
[https://www.kent.gov.uk/__data/assets/pdf_file/0008/83915/M
onitoring-the-impacts-of-severe-weather-2016-2017.pdf].
They tried to do a CBA (cost-benefit analysis around the NRA) in 
the Cabinet Office, I’m not aware of anything that’s been written 
up publicly
Not heard of anything multi-hazards 
specifically
That also means that is quick and easy to see but it is 
very rudimentary at the moment
The pitfall in the methodology of the NRA currently: it is very, very basic and it 
relies on the person who is writing the summary
What we do on the NRA is very basic, we do plan to work 
with some experts in the communication of risk to help us 
display or understand how risks might interlink; we are 
looking at that in the future
I don’t know; at the moment there isn’t much in terms of methodologies; it is currently 
growing; it is not just MH it is across the whole RA world that things are not happening in 
isolation; how we display and communicate that is difficult but needed work
Yes, they try to link each risk with each risk, but only in a narrative form at the moment It’s really difficult – where do you start, where do you 
finish when it comes to MH; I think the hindrance is 
knowing what to put in there
Having links into groups such as NHP (multi-
organisational); so many of the risk assessments 
that we do, we’ll be just working with multi-
partners and relying on them to do the interaction 
with other departments; having access to groups 
that have that multi-sectorial view will enable us 
to do the MH RA
We can only use historical evidence for the 
impact of MH, so it’s always difficult to 
imagine others; so I guess there’s a gap in 
knowledge to understand things that 
haven’t already happened (there’s a 
tendency to think that Armageddon will 
happen if two things happened at once, but 
probably isn’t)
We probably have the knowledge but not the skills for understanding how 
we can display it for people (communication skills).
Knowing at what point to stop – where do you stop in scenario that is 
plausible (cold – snow – flu – social care provider failure - …) and how to deal 
with those MH
CIRIA identification info 
not provided
Each sector is different and how they identify 
hazards in that sector is different as well.
In construction there is the social (e.g., buildings) 
and the linear infrastructure (e.g., energy, 
water); a variety of MH scenarios are relevant to 
those sector; e.g. flooding and secondary effects 
such as settlement with buildings, groundwater 
issues, landslide risks; landslides are certainly an 
issue for Network Rail, Highways England, 
Transport Scotland,  etc. because they don’t have 
control over these hazards.
Some hazards they may have with their own 
assets, they can plan for those and manage the 
associated risks, whereas the other ones are 
beyond the boundary of their infrastructure; it 
depends on how they define the hazard and how 
they manage it – how far do you go?
The hazard is the unknown; wind is one other 
hazard for the bridges and energy infrastructure 
(e.g. National Grid).
The most “talked about hazards” lean 
on the resilience aspect in the context 
of climate change
2 to 3 2 to 3 CIRIA coordinates a lot of the work stream for NERC within ERIIP; so a lot of MH methodologies are within 
this framework; CIRIA has information (as opposed to knowledge) about existent MH methodologies; 
they are not experts but they can get that information and know who to speak to; 
In terms of research and practice, more so for practice, they can get that information; with research it is a 
bit of a “murky” world for CIRIA
NO - The research CIRIA has underway at the moment is focused on how one assesses natural slope risk and hazards from a practical point of 
view (geologist, engineering geologist, geotechnical engineer, geomorphologist, etc.); CIRIA brings together the information from these 
different areas as opposed to producing their own
CIRIA does not do any studies on economic costs of MH. Lee took 
part in the Infrastructure Operators Adaptation Forum on 3 
October, which is within the Department of Transport, and 
involves all UK and Ireland infrastructure owners and operators 
but also the Committee on Climate Change, various research 
establishments in that space or around CC adaptation [can 
provide that information; forward some links].
The National Infrastructure Commission is very interested in that 
as well; they haven’t produced any of their own work.
In terms of scenarios, hazards and associated economic impacts,  
there is some internal work at the EA at the minute with regards 
to floods, coastal erosion and risk not only for properties but also 
infrastructure; national scale; the ultimate aim could be to use 
that information to engage with the infrastructure community on 
economic impacts but also for allocating funding schemes; the 
metrics that would be used in assessing the suitability of those 
schemes need to be revised to include infrastructure as opposed 
to what it is now, property level protection.
- It is difficult to put that cost information together because a lot 
of these reports are conducted in a silo manner i.e., they don’t 
often involve infrastructure owners, operators, etc.; to get to the 
true value of the impact it is difficult.
Cannot answer this question [outside of remit] Because CIRIA doesn’t actually use the MH methodologies (people with whom they 
engage with are probably using it), cannot answer this question. To inform any 
methodology or approach they take a lot of information is out there but spattered; it is a 
big challenge for the industry over the whole knowledge transfer/management area to 
utilize the existent information; it takes time, patience, which a lot of organisations do not 
have the luxury of doing that;
More could be done on making things accessible and digestible; there a lot of work within 
any of the RCs, for instance, which people don’t use because they don’t have the time to 
look into it and how it could be used; the research and roads institution could have a lot of 
useful methodologies; 
There is a lot of information out there, perhaps not used in the right way; so there is a 
need to address the educational side, on how to use these methodologies and 
approaches, how do you classify hazards and risk; to get to multi-hazards, one needs a 
clear understanding of single hazards; this is what CIRIA is taking on the as a project: how 
to assess natural slope hazard and risk, because depending on who you are, the 
classifications of hazard and risk can be subjective;
To improve current approaches we will need to be able to generate data in different ways, 
use available technologies to develop semi-quantitative approaches of risk assessment.
No risk assessment approaches undertaken at CIRIA; CIRIA is doing brokerage 
and knowledge transfer between academia and industry partners; they 
provide guidance on how one can do risk assessment (e.g., the natural slope 
hazard and risk assessment project; info available on the website; project 
building on the rock slope netting guide and as part of the scoping research 
activity on engineering natural slopes) but does not develop/undertake MH 
risk assessment
not applicable not applicable The may well be gaps in knowledge but 
people don’t necessarily have a good 
understanding of the current knowledge 
base and the opportunity to learn from the 
research underway. We can only 
understand the current gaps in knowledge 
if we have access to existent knowledge. To 
continuously try to go through a cycle of 
having to find what are the current gaps 
without having site of what is already 
available it will not be efficient. In his 
experience, what we need to do is connect 
people with the research and information 
published and presented in an 
understandable way (not too scientific), 
easy to understand. We need to raise 
awareness to the MH (both environmental 
and man-made e.g., digital infrastructure). 
Capacity-wise it is more of an issue – not 
enough work force in the industry to 
understand MH events and their impacts; 
that’s where research comes into role to 
produce the risk assessments.
First thing needed is to present the knowledge and then go through a 
scoping process to find out what the gaps are.
Needs coming from the end-user side (industry): in light of the 
meeting on 3rd October, where UKCP18 data is to be released at the 
end of 2018, there are various insights from the industry (e.g., what 
products can be developed from that); some approaches will be 
more easy to do than others (e.g., temporal aspect, wind hazard, 
etc.); there is a lot of development needed e.g., how to use the 
data available to them in a right way, how to model the data.
CIRIA is a member of the Transport Adaptation Group within 
Transport for London, a London focused group, trying to develop a 
research programme in collaboration with other owners/operators; 
CIRIA may reach funding from various areas where industry 
stakeholders cannot.
Infrastructure Operators Adaptation Forum – there’s a lot of 
information to use from there. CIRIA is limited in what can truly 
represent as an industry view
Geotechnics 
company
anonymous and 
non-identifiable
Rainfall events, landslides, and the interaction 
between them (rainfall triggers or increases the 
probability of a landslide). One of the big things 
is rainfall and actually surface water flow; we 
tend to think at landslides in relation with 
groundwater, but actually, our experience 
particularly in the last 10 yrs, is an increasing 
number of surface water flooding events that 
leads to wash-out type landslides or erosion of 
the toe of the slope that then causes a more 
“traditional” landslide
Warm winds causing snow packs to melt (Scotland) and 
potentially triggering landslides; people tend to think that 
rainfall melts the snow quickly, but actually warm wind 
even more, as it has a larger source of thermal energy for 
snow pack melting. - In terms of wind, probably the one 
that they come across most often is the effect on trees, and 
that has numerous knock-on effect; one of them is the 
movement of large trees which causes the roots to move 
and subsequent levering of blocks on rock faces (“root 
jacking”); the sail effect on the trees; we seem to be 
getting stronger winds during the parts of the year when 
the trees are in leaf - as an anecdotal; when the wind blows 
trees over you quite often get the release of soil or rock 
debris from the root ball; so, wind would definitely be a 
trigger lots of those things.
On a soil type landslides you could have root induced 
loading of the slope – wouldn’t say I can think of an 
example where this was the trigger or the cause but I can 
foresee that in some cases.
In terms of dissolution, I think the management of surface 
water drainage with these high intensity rain cells that we 
have now is quite an issue; so there is probably more 
chance of existing drainage systems being topped and then 
water getting into the ground [currently working on a legal 
case where that kind of thing happened].
Where you’ve got sinkholes forming, I would’ve thought 
extreme dry and then extreme wet weather could lead to 
ll  f il l  [ h i k ll  ll]  i i   
No scenario of the type: wildfire – 
intense rainfall – landslides was 
experienced by the UK operations; this 
is more relevant for Canada, Portugal, 
Australia; however, after the recent 
fires over the moorlands this summer 
in the Pennines, there might be a larger 
propensity for wash-out type of failures
3 to 4 4 to 5 Most things on that front are done As a bespoke to a particular project (e.g., internal analysis, etc.) and that is something we have improved 
actually just to make things more comparable between different situations
MH processes are probably the biggest causes of loss or loss of 
function in infrastructure in our area; any one thing on its own 
you can cope with but when you have 2 – 3 things affecting 
infrastructure at once we do tend to struggle.
Unfortunately , other than large scale studies, I think most of the 
individual problems are dealt with on a problem-by-problem 
basis; as in when they occur, so a lot of things are still quite 
reactionary and the emphasis is on solving the problem at the 
time; and so there is probably not much done on the 
quantification of the losses as individual events or if it is done 
within organisations like Network Rail or Highways England is 
done at much higher strategic level; the strategic side of it is 
divorced from a lot of the practical and get-the-infrastructure-
open side and a lot of the latter is divorced from the former.
I don’t think there’s enough putting together of those teams (like 
in a Venn diagram) to overlap; so the people who are doing the 
strategic stuff at high-level are doing that remotely and the 
people who get on with managing the day-to-day are doing that 
remotely.
A really good example is the work done with BGS on the Network 
Rail Outside Parties, but obviously we are very much at the call 
phase (we get called out at failures) and then we put in place 
solutions and mitigation measures to prevent them happening 
again; we also do some research on some of the topics; obviously 
BGS has a large database of information and do a lot of research 
on the topic; that’s all very well but then it kind of disappears 
into the Network Rail Centre, where a different team of people 
d  ll h  i  l i  f  h  k d h  f  
Often people try to treat the symptoms of a hazard rather than actually getting at 
the bottom of the real hazard; a good example would be an earthwork that is 
susceptible to erosion and wash-out type of failure, people concentrate on the 
slope and try to reinforce that, whereas the simple way is to try to prevent the 
water getting at it; so those kind of things where you treat a part of it, but you 
might not actually treat the cause or the trigger; it’s the thing that is susceptible to 
another hazard. An example of that is, if you’ve got a slope where you need to 
bring about a geotechnical expert but actually the solution might be to deal with 
the surface water problem; and it’s people who can see those and identity the 
contributions of various elements to it
Cannot comment to much on standardized methods; one thing that has been highlighted 
at recent meetings is people’s understanding of hazard, risk, consequences (and this is 
quite worrying); it’s probably not as good as we’d hoped; it should be relatively simple 
and very obvious, but the more you speak to people the more you realize people don’t 
actually understand the difference between a consequence, a likelihood ,etc. And there 
are multiple definitions out there but there are some fundamental things that people just 
don’t get.
We tend to run project risk registers that will bring in other types of hazards; 
e.g., we might be looking at the environmental hazards and impact whilst 
we’re looking at the developments of a mine;  things like reputation; we’ve 
looked at the consequences of cliff falls in a seaside town and the 
consequences of not only loss of life and damage but also loss of reputation; 
so, that’s more on the consequence side than on the hazard side, although 
you could say one of the hazards of those cliffs is that someone gets injured 
and you lose tourism as a result of that; it is a hazard to the local authorities 
or to the community.
Time – as a hazard; if infrastructure is closed for a period, what are the 
consequences of that, what backup solutions are available; this is almost like 
a robustness assessment on a very wide sense;  and even financial costs even 
for designers if we do something wrong and have to revisit it but can’t get 
more budget for it. So we have project risk and hazard management that 
takes into account all sort of things.
The risk assessment procedures that we undertake 
are reasonably robust, fairly simple, so definitely on 
the qualitative or semi-quantitative side but I think 
they are reasonably robust from that point of view
See Q8 One of the big ones, especially from an 
infrastructure owner/manager point of 
view, is comparing risk assessments (RA) 
from different areas, e.g. flood RA with 
landslide RA, with say, vehicle safety if 
you’re running a road. How would you 
equate those in terms of cost-benefit 
analysis, for example? I can see that being 
quite a challenge for infrastructure owners 
that they struggle with;
I’ve seen some good examples of that on 
some new Network Rail projects where we 
had workshops on the project risk; and 
everyone from each different sector sat 
around and we’ve gone through it all 
together; this way, you stand more of a 
chance than when it’s done in isolation; it’s 
very difficult for the decision maker to 
compare apples with bananas, etc. So I 
think probably some work on that would be 
of value; So, we need to have more 
standard approaches of RA for each 
individual area, but also a way to bring 
them together
In terms of skills, one  that is 
missing is the people’s lack of 
understanding of individual terms 
and terminology; if you’re not 
speaking the same language it can 
be very difficult to work together; 
we were at a recent meeting with 
Highways England on geotechnical 
resilience and it was interesting to 
how different the views were on 
different topics; so it needed 
explained to people who you’d 
thought they already know 
(technical people);
The biggest one is how to compare the sources of different hazard an risk in 
terms of, if it is for example pavement or road safety, bridge vs an 
earthwork, earthwork vs drainage, etc. Where do they balance off next to 
each other? There’s a very big spectrum of people’s knowledge and 
approaches and probably people tend to be fixated with a particular problem 
they’re working on, without thinking of the wider issues; we had a recent 
case where, for a mining job, people total focused on rockfall and landslides; 
when I joined the project, I realized the biggest issue was avalanches; so an 
outside pee-reviewer could give you that fresh perspective which the 
people involved miss because they’re too focused on the scope.
Network Rail’s guidance on designing drainage (1/25 – 1/50 yr 
storm), they do ask you to consider (a bit vague) a ½-- or 1/500 yrs 
storm and the likely effect; but what we tend to do with that is to 
look at what areas would that flood and the adjacent slopes; 
actually that pushes toward the multi-hazard but it’s not quite 
specific, some people wouldn’t see it as that.
My view is, if we’ve got a slope we know has a poor factor of safety 
(FS) and it’s going to be in an area that it’s going to be flooded by a 
1/200 yr event, we ought to look into the stability of that slope into 
more detail or flagging it as a “project risk”.
So, it is quite a good think they [Network Rail] said to consider 
those implications but it is a bit unclear: what does that mean? 
What are the consequences of flooding that area or what other 
hazards that then trigger?
In my experience, people will say: yes, we’ve considered extreme 
events (1/200 – 1/500yrs) but will not get to the next step i.e. is 
there something critical in that area?
Department for 
Communication, 
Media & Sport 
(Rob Willis)
name and 
organisation 
identified
Heatwave causes wildfires which can have 
implications for radio communications; severe 
winter weather (ice, snow) impacting overhead 
power lines, resulting in loss of power (another 
hazard); starting with a natural hazards but 
resulting in an anthropogenic hazard; [loss of 
power is considered a hazard in its own right]. 
The most frequent scenario would be the impact 
of weather-related hazards: ice and snow 
affecting the power lines resulting in another 
hazard which is loss of power; flooding (surface 
of fluvial) as a result of extreme rainfall; severe 
weather is the main issue (rain or snow and ice-
related; winds affect the power as well but 
sometimes by themselves they can cause issue 
to the network)
Space weather – really big storms like solar storms (e.g., 
1859 Carrington Event); they think this might happen at 
some stage and we don’t know what the impact might be; 
likely, power gain (examples in Canada, US); TCs satellite 
might also be impacted by solar storm and this can cause 
terrestrial problems;
In TCs, it’s more about the 
consequences; you can have a range of 
hazards that can have a knock-on effect 
that might have a multi-hazard effect 
but in the end it is the same sort of 
consequence i.e. the total network will 
get a loss of power. If there are MH 
happening it makes it more difficult for 
engineers to get out and about and to 
fix and repair things; e.g., if you got a 
storm, that might blow mobile phone 
down or cause wires to get loose; with 
severe weather and flooding it makes 
harder for people to reach those 
problematic areas [direct and indirect 
losses, in terms of intervention and 
mitigation]
2 to 3 2 to 3 TCs providers have a good understanding of hazards and how they might impact on the network; but in 
terms of multi-hazards, we make assumptions (like in the heatwave – wildfire example) there can be 
other interactions we are not aware of.
[Emma Bee has spoken to some of the stakeholders in the TCs industry group about potential interactions 
between groundwater flooding and sinkholes]
They are well versed in terms of severe weather, they know what the National Risk Assessment is, and 
they are aware of all the historical examples; but in area where research is still ongoing (e.g., sinkholes 
and their impact on underground cabling, infrastructure, which might be vulnerable, etc.), the industry is 
not that well sighted and it would be useful to know more about this.
In terms of risk assessment methodologies: there has been some development on the impact of flooding 
on the network and certainly there is something called the National Flood Resilience Review – a review 
done after the storm Desmond in 2016 causing serious flooding in N England; there is a lot of government 
prospective work on that and the minister picking out the infrastructure that was impacted and what 
steps could be taken within the industry sectors to make sure they are better protected against flooding; 
the DTMS lead on that for the TC sector; the main providers looked at the flood vulnerability in the critical 
sites and set up a program of putting temporary flood defences.
In terms of other risks that has really been done because they haven’t had any central direction of doing 
it; there are expenses associated with those sort of measures.
Internally, wildfires; a moorland fire event this summer in Winter Hill, Lancashire (June-July) following 
heatwave; the wildfire created problems for one of the huge radio-transmitter in the line of fires; if that 
would’ve been damaged in would have taken out   TV, radio for the whole NW region; the fire & rescue 
service were able to put in measures such as digging trenches and dousing the ground to divert the fire 
from the transmitter; this is an example where the industry is not fully aware of the risk involved with 
wildfires.
NO - We don’t use them specifically; we are very much in the mind-set of single hazards; we have a NRR and base our assumptions on that; 
there is a good risk awareness across the industry (also with hazard managers, forecasting services available, etc. and we make full use of those)
Not aware of studies/analyses of multi-hazards economic costs; 
will follow up with colleagues as he just joined DTMS in March 
2018; maybe this has been done previously – particularly in terms 
of flooding; doesn’t think that something has been done in terms 
of economic impact for TCs; there are economic implications in 
terms of loss of revenue for companies, due to for example loss 
of internet (for just a few minutes).
Some work has been done for things like flue epidemics and the 
potential impact on the industry; DTMS is part of a wider group 
set up by the Cabinet Office (Pan flu Board?); within this context, 
they were asked to look at the potential impact of panful 
epidemic (recorded also in the NRR); some planning work has 
been done around that particularly in the business continuity 
context; they asked TC providers to look at their plans and inform 
how will they be able to cope with e.g., more than 30% of their 
engineers unavailable; they think they’ve got sufficient 
continuity arrangements to enable them to do the essential 
work; the non-essential stuff will not be satisfied (all within the 
business continuity view rather than direct economic losses).
In terms of the MH process, not fully aware of how we  are 
doing things different than for the single hazards; it is an 
area that could be useful, but at this stage we don’t know 
enough to say that MH risk assessment will be useful or 
more useful than single hazard approaches.
It would be useful to know how that risk assessment process might work as well as the 
benefits and differences with regards to single hazard approaches; this will be up to you 
[research] to show that; we need more science and research support for that; as part of 
the NHP this that was quoted as an area of work (e.g., heatwaves – mooreland fires risk); it 
would be interested to know a bit more about MH risk assessments
See Q3 Probably because our understanding of what MH are 
and what methodologies to use to plan against them, 
our knowledge needs to be enhanced a bit rather 
than having to looking at hazards and risks in isolatio. 
E.g., the science is still developing in areas such as 
groundwater related hazards, we will need more 
information to understand how to plan against them
See Q8 Sometimes this all comes down to what 
would you say rather than the science and 
knowledge; how you will use the basic 
common sense in terms of looking at 
economic impacts, looking at risk from that 
point of view in terms of business 
continuity; so basically looking at the 
practicalities rather than the science 
because it’s great to plan for risks but how 
will that pay off in terms of investment 
(e.g., investing in better defences for 
infrastructure, with climate change in mind, 
how might investing in better flood 
defences return on investment? Initially it 
might cost £millions; but if those defences 
are not in place, that might cost more than 
that in terms of disruption and redoing the 
defences. It is that mind-set of thinking in 
terms of resilience by design.
Strategies must be based on robust 
scientific and historical evidence; 
understanding that at some point a MH 
event might happen e.g, a flood or a space 
weather event; there is a need for putting 
things in perspective, and persuading 
people to plan these things but also from a 
hard-cost measure which the industry must 
t i  l
At the moment there is quite a good understanding of what the risks are, but 
is the combination of risks (MH approach) that we don’t know much about 
(personally either); I’ve touched on a few scenarios, but I’m sure there are 
more examples. The gaps is in understanding about the multi-hazard 
approach and what that is and how to do it and how that pitches against how 
we do things at the moment, which is very much looking at hazards and risk 
with no interaction.
It would be useful to know what MH are in the context of UK, how 
the use of that methodology would benefit in the long term (e.g., 
thinking out or the box on how we do risk assessments, is there a 
better way of doing is, how we can work across silos and across 
risks, etc.); with practical example as well (what are the MH, when 
can they actually happen, etc.).
We’ve touched upon the economic impact of multi-hazards and 
risk, I think that’s not something that has been done to any real 
extent; so if this study acts as a catalyst for then that is something 
to tap into.
SEPA (David 
Faichney)
name and 
organisation 
identified
Anything that has to do with floods: rainfall, 
surface and river flooding together, coastal 
flooding and fluvial flooding in lower reaches of 
rivers; when a prevailing flood warning comes, 
we endeavour to take the join probability of two 
processes happening together and see what the 
impact of the join probability of these two 
hazard happening together will be multi-variate 
models)
Snowmelt is an important component of MH; snow where 
interested in terms of maybe not road closure, etc. but 
accumulation of snow that can feed into the flood effect 
quickly.
We are interested in snow in relation to wind in particular; 
where interested in storms (low pressure cells causing 
storm surge) which can lead to estuarine floods, and also 
wind associated with high sea level and wave action. 
Examples of multihazards along the coast: nuclear power 
plants that have no cooling water and get close to a 
criticality event. Another multi-hazard problem is in 
Scotland where there are 12 reservoirs that are cascades 
(chains of reservoirs)
SEPA is a regulator authority for 
reservoir safety; we’re interested in 
when reservoirs maybe subjected to 
activity from the slopes – landslip 
action causing overtopping failure. 
There’s definitely a gap in 
understanding how weather events can 
contribute to reservoir failure and 
that’s a big deal.
When we do our assessments for flood 
risk management purposes (every six 
years strategies), we can set up the 
impact of flooding on a number of 
things, and one of them is 
environmental impact (e.g. flood 
happening near a refinery which results 
in an environmental incident; other 
major incident induced by human 
factors as well); examples along the 
coast with very localized impacts 
(contamination with oil, asbestos, etc.).
We have a responsibility as a CAT1 
responder under the Civil Contingency 
Act, so we have to make our info and 
knowledge available to those who are 
acting under that. Over 600 m reservoirs 
(e.g. four reservoirs) – quite a few in 
Scotland
2 3 to 4 policy (4) YES - We do consider impact in the flood risk management planning (e.g., source – pathway – receptor approaches using scores, etc.) in terms of 
human health, environment, economy and cultural heritage (as requested by the Flood Risk Management ACT and the EC Flood Directive); 
some of these have sub-categories under them e.g, number of properties, average annual damages for human health, for cultural heritage we 
look at heritage safety, etc. (based on scoring); economy has airports, roads, rail links, infrastructure, detour at RABT, etc.
We have quite detailed approaches for flood risk management planning well developed in terms of flood forecasting and warning but not so 
well in terms of understanding the impact; we did a pilot case study for the Commonwealth Scheme in Glasgow: we ran an impact based flood 
forecasting warning pilot study for pluvial events; we must understand what is the impact in real time situations, whereas long term planning 
will contribute to the analysis; we do consider MH (coastal – pluvial – fluvial) using joint probabilities for MH RA.
In terms of where we need to be with that process, it works; it help us prioritize resources; it terms of warning, there’s a lot of improvement to 
be done there in terms of understanding how to prioritize flood warning based on impact; in particular, what events progress, what is the 
sequence of impact.
Flood Hazard Research Centre – multicolour 
manual [https://www.routledge.com/Flood-
and-Coastal-Erosion-Risk-Management-A-
Manual-for-Economic-Appraisal/Penning-
Rowsell-Priest-Parker-Morris-Tunstall-
Viavattene-Chatterton-
Owen/p/book/9780415815154] and the 
categories and processes in there to help 
place values on particular assets; we realized 
that things such as design standards of 
buildings are different in Scotland  cost pe r 
msq differs, impact is different from one 
country to another.
You can understand multi-variate problems at play; 
e.g., good river flood data with 60 years flood records 
with only 10 years of coastal data records; data quality 
issues; You can put together different skillsets; we’ve 
got good coastal modellers but not so good skills in 
multi-variate modelling, people that understand the 
big picture (multi-criteria analysis, what balance of 
actions is the best, multiple sets of uncertainty); able 
to use or develop algorithms that are robust (not 
subjective).
We need to know what we need to get to help 
decision-making; it also needs to be good enough in 
terms on knowledge.
.The advantage of it is that theoretically everything is 
covered in terms of complexity or process interaction
The way organisations are set up in terms of roles and responsibilities (silo 
approach); how groups come together to solve MH, how to make them agree where 
to spend their money, look out for synergies. Scotland faces a clear MH EQ event 
(tsunami, flood) on the East coast; we need a coordinated response from various 
organisations; 
Scottish Gov is pretty good; we have the Scottish Gov 
Resilience Division (SGRDS), they have a clear role is this; 
we have the local and regional resilience partnerships; 
Scottish Gov Resilience (SGOR) overarching things – 
equivalent of COBRA; SGOR meetings are coordinated multi
agency meetings under the responsibility of the deputy 
first head minister and the Resilience Division of Scottish 
Gov; it is thought that a national scale intervention or 
mutual aid intervention are required; very well structured 
events.
SEPA contributes to weather related meetings.
The governance of that is very good; in Scotland, you are 
never really far from the government.
They are accessible; they are useful; but are they good enough? We can always develop 
our methodologies and pick things from whatever is out there, but as in the example of 
the Coloured Manual: they might not be good enough/applicable for Scotland (e.g., non-
residential properties, etc.).
We are rating methodologies so we’re picking the best it’s out there; they could be better 
but we don’t know if they can result in a better outcome for us (better decision-making, 
etc.); certainly are big gaps to be filled like the links between drivers behind reservoir 
failures; high likelihood of fatalities for reservoir failures; 
Most of fatalities during floods in Scotland in the last 20 years have been of people being 
of the move (driving over bridges, through high water, etc.).
Yes, in terms of flood risk management planning (strategic work). We do that using 
multi-variate analysis  and joint probability analysis.
.I think the strategic work is multi-variate analysis whereas the other one is joint 
probability; probability (chance for strategic, and joint probability (frequency) for 
forecasting). The probability is also used in land-use planning.
We don’t do enough to understand costs; we ask operators to consider this; critical 
national infrastructure; all telecommunication companies have a program of upgrading 
to the flood risk management plan (e.g. remove installations from flood 
plains/anticipated levels of floods).
No, in terms of real time or near-real time forecasting and warning. The first questions is: do we need them? Then, do we 
have the right resources, often the right data? There 
is a knowledge gap (do we know as much about both 
hazards?), e.g., tsunamis on the E coast (lack of 
knowledge); but the main barrier: lack of resources.
The legislative requirement to act; we have to 
look at all hazards, we have to develop models for 
different types of flooding; I think we should look 
more on how flooding can impact other type of 
problems (landslides, environmental, etc.).
A lot of information missing on impact; 
regardless of the hazards, the availability of 
good quality of receptor information is not 
there; is getting better, but not there; so its 
impact.
In terms of the hazards, there are other 
than the natural ones; so there’s some 
scoping in understanding where are the 
MH, what MH combinations are possible 
other than weather/flood related and what 
is their impact on different sectors.
The receptor information (EaR) is very 
important; it will help us understand 
consequences more regardless of MH 
scenario.
I don’t know if there’s a mechanisms, legislative framework that encourages 
us to do it; often the money follows the legislative requirement.
Maybe there’s not a need for that in Scotland; we work on known hazards 
but what do we do with unknown hazards.
The analysis of where the MH events will have a significant impact (!); where 
do MH matter?
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